The bill
Restoring Integrity and Efficiency to Inspector General Oversight Act of 2026
HR. 9725, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3]
ID: H001077
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9725, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 198-200 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 23 - 20.
July 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 9725: Restoring Integrity and Efficiency to Inspector General Oversight Act of 2026** *Or: How to Fire the Watchdogs While Pretending to Strengthen Them*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated goal of HR 9725 is to “restore integrity and efficiency” by abolishing the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)—a nonpartisan body that coordinates oversight across federal agencies. In reality, this bill is less about reform and more about eliminating a centralized mechanism that makes it harder for political appointees to ignore, bury, or retaliate against inspector general (IG) findings. The sponsors claim CIGIE is redundant or bureaucratic, but its actual function is to ensure IGs can act independently and collectively when agencies resist accountability. Abolishing it under the guise of “efficiency” is like firing the hospital’s infection control committee because “nurses already wash their hands”—and then wondering why MRSA outbreaks spike.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill abolishes CIGIE effective one year after enactment and transfers its functions to various executive branch officials: - The **Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)** gains authority to develop IG standards, coordinate governmentwide fraud/waste/abuse initiatives, mediate inter-jurisdictional IG disputes, and oversee whistleblower protection best practices. - The **Comptroller General (GAO)** gets inspection standards development. - The **Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)** assumes control of the CIGIE revolving fund and professional training academies for IG personnel. - IGs retain limited coordination duties (e.g., identifying vulnerabilities, whistleblower facilitation) but lose institutional support. Crucially, the bill severs the IGs’ collective autonomy by placing oversight functions directly under OMB—a politically appointed office within the White House—thereby subordinating independent watchdogs to executive branch control. Personnel tied to CIGIE are terminated unless reassigned, effectively dismantling the council’s infrastructure.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Inspectors General**: Lose a critical forum for coordination, training, and inter-agency leverage. Their ability to tackle cross-cutting fraud (e.g., pandemic relief fraud, defense contracting abuse) is weakened. - **OMB & White House**: Gain direct influence over IG operations, creating a clear conflict of interest—especially when investigating administrations or politically connected contractors. - **Whistleblowers**: Lose a protected, coordinated channel for reporting reprisals; now dependent on OMB-mediated processes that may prioritize loyalty over accountability. - **Taxpayers & Public Interest Groups**: Face reduced transparency and weaker oversight as IGs operate in greater isolation, making collusion or suppression of findings more feasible. - **Congress**: Loses a reliable, bipartisan source of coordinated oversight data, increasing reliance on partisan investigations.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill doesn’t “restore integrity”—it undermines it. By replacing a collegial, independent council with OMB-led oversight, it exposes IGs to political pressure, particularly during administrations under investigation. The fragmentation of IG functions invites siloed efforts, duplication, and gaps in coverage—especially for complex, cross-agency fraud. Whistleblower protections become more vulnerable to delay or neglect without CIGIE’s neutral coordination. The real motive? To make it easier for the executive branch to ignore or suppress inconvenient audits without facing unified resistance from the IG community. In short: this isn’t oversight reform. It’s a coup against the watchdogs—dressed up in a suit labeled “efficiency.” And like most such coups, it’ll end not with better governance, but with more fraud, waste, and abuse—just harder to prove.
Rep. Higgins, Clay [R-LA-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001302
Top Contributors
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(h)(1) amends the Inspector General of the Library of Congress Act, removing references to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, potentially reducing oversight of law enforcement surveillance technologies.
Section 2(g)(6) amends administrative procedure and judicial review requirements, potentially affecting labor unions' ability to negotiate and enforce contracts related to government agencies and contractors.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's proposal to abolish CIGIE and redistribute its oversight functions aligns with Project 2025's broader goal of reducing bureaucratic duplication and increasing centralized control over oversight mechanisms, particularly by placing IG functions under politically influenced entities like OMB. Both emphasize streamlining oversight and eliminating redundant oversight bodies, though the bill does not specifically target DHS or immigration-related functions as Project 2025 does."
— 165 — Department of Homeland Security and staff. Although the CRCL Officer and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Officer/Privacy Officer are statutory, their offices are not mandatory. CRCL and PRIV Officers and employees should report to a Deputy General Counsel, who would be a political appointee. The CRCL Officer should focus on equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance and the civil liberties function and investigate matters only within Headquarters or support components. Operational components’ civil liberties offi- cers should investigate incidents regarding their own agencies. The CRCL Officer should ensure that all civil liberties or civil rights complaints are sent to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for review. If the OIG chooses not to investigate, the CRCL Officer should only provide supportive information on possible courses of action for complainants. The PRIV Officer and FOIA Officer should focus on FOIA, Privacy Compliance Policy, and Privacy Incident Response. The Deputy General Counsel should provide guidance to DHS leadership regarding Privacy Compliance and Privacy Incident Response. To ensure that only U.S. persons and Lawful Permanent Residents are provided protections as required by the Privacy Act, all DHS issuances should be updated to reflect that DHS protects the privacy of individuals as required by the Privacy Act (U.S. persons and lawful permanent residents);16 the Judicial Redress Act of 2015;17 and any U.S.–European Union Data Protection and Privacy Agreement. Because of the lack of public trust in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, CRCL and PRIV staff should no longer review intelligence products or provide guidance on any intelligence products or reports. A consistent, clear, and singular message is necessary for DHS’s mission. Therefore, all communications and/or meetings with any federal, state, local, or nongovernment groups should be limited to the Deputy General Counsel. In addi- tion, given the narrower scope of work, OGC should disband the outside advisory boards and the more than 50 working groups in which CRCL and PRIV currently participate. Finally, CRCL and PRIV should no longer issue bulletins or periodicals. OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION OMBUDSMAN (OIDO) AND OFFICE OF THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN (CISOMB) OIDO. The Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman should be eliminated. This requires a statutory change in Section 106 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020.18 OIDO was designed to create another impediment to detention through an additional layer of so-called oversight. Several agencies already perform detention oversight. ICE conducts internal audits of facilities and investigates complaints against ICE agents through the Office of Professional Responsibility. Similarly, CBP accepts individual complaints regarding facilities through the Joint Intake Center — 166 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and manages complaints against agents through the OPR. In addition, CRCL, OIG, GAO, and Congress all perform detention oversight. These multiple bodies place unmanageable and unreasonable burdens on ICE to manage several sometimes inconsistent audits/inspections at the same time. If OIDO remains a DHS component, the Secretary should immediately issue a direc- tive stripping CRCL of its immigration portfolio. OIDO is in a better position with dedicated resources and immigration experts to perform this function than CRCL is. Allowing both offices to conduct detention oversight is duplicative and wasteful. The Secretary should conduct a thorough review of the effectiveness of Direc- tive 0810.1,19 which is widely interpreted as requiring a wholesale referral of cases to OIG. In reality, OIG investigates only a small fraction of them and often sits on cases for longer than the five-day window specified in the directive. Meanwhile, the other agencies wait in limbo to execute their duties. CISOMB. The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman should be eliminated. The DHS bureaucracy is too large, and the Secretary has too many direct reports. CISOMB’s policy functions can be performed (and sometimes already are) by OIG and GAO. The specialized case work can be moved into USCIS as a special unit, much like the IRS Taxpayer Advocate. This would require a stat- utory change to Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.20 If CISOMB continues as a DHS component, a policy should be issued that prohibits CISOMB from assisting illegal aliens to obtain benefits. Currently, approximately 15 percent–20 percent of CISOMB’s workload consists of helping DACA applicants obtain and renew benefits, including work authorization. This is not the role of an ombudsman. In addition, the government should be a neutral adjudicator, not an advocate for illegal aliens. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS It is critical to the achievement of the President’s policy objectives that all agen- cies and departments touching immigration policy work in sync with one another. While there are numerous areas in which such cooperation is critical, immigration has proven to be the most difficult. Accordingly, several objectives will be necessary for each of the following departments. l Department of Health and Human Services: Agree to move the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to DHS or, alternatively, implement an aggressive and regular effort by the Secretary of HHS to ensure that ORR is fully pursuing presidential objectives in support of DHS. l Department of Defense: Assist in aggressively building the border wall system on America’s southern border. Additionally, explicitly acknowledge and adjust personnel and priorities to participate actively in the defense
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on restructuring inspector general oversight across federal agencies, while the Project 2025 excerpt addresses immigration enforcement, detention oversight, and interagency coordination within DHS and other departments. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not specifically target immigration policy or DHS components like CRCL, OIDO, or CISOMB."
— 166 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and manages complaints against agents through the OPR. In addition, CRCL, OIG, GAO, and Congress all perform detention oversight. These multiple bodies place unmanageable and unreasonable burdens on ICE to manage several sometimes inconsistent audits/inspections at the same time. If OIDO remains a DHS component, the Secretary should immediately issue a direc- tive stripping CRCL of its immigration portfolio. OIDO is in a better position with dedicated resources and immigration experts to perform this function than CRCL is. Allowing both offices to conduct detention oversight is duplicative and wasteful. The Secretary should conduct a thorough review of the effectiveness of Direc- tive 0810.1,19 which is widely interpreted as requiring a wholesale referral of cases to OIG. In reality, OIG investigates only a small fraction of them and often sits on cases for longer than the five-day window specified in the directive. Meanwhile, the other agencies wait in limbo to execute their duties. CISOMB. The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman should be eliminated. The DHS bureaucracy is too large, and the Secretary has too many direct reports. CISOMB’s policy functions can be performed (and sometimes already are) by OIG and GAO. The specialized case work can be moved into USCIS as a special unit, much like the IRS Taxpayer Advocate. This would require a stat- utory change to Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.20 If CISOMB continues as a DHS component, a policy should be issued that prohibits CISOMB from assisting illegal aliens to obtain benefits. Currently, approximately 15 percent–20 percent of CISOMB’s workload consists of helping DACA applicants obtain and renew benefits, including work authorization. This is not the role of an ombudsman. In addition, the government should be a neutral adjudicator, not an advocate for illegal aliens. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS It is critical to the achievement of the President’s policy objectives that all agen- cies and departments touching immigration policy work in sync with one another. While there are numerous areas in which such cooperation is critical, immigration has proven to be the most difficult. Accordingly, several objectives will be necessary for each of the following departments. l Department of Health and Human Services: Agree to move the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to DHS or, alternatively, implement an aggressive and regular effort by the Secretary of HHS to ensure that ORR is fully pursuing presidential objectives in support of DHS. l Department of Defense: Assist in aggressively building the border wall system on America’s southern border. Additionally, explicitly acknowledge and adjust personnel and priorities to participate actively in the defense — 167 — Department of Homeland Security of America’s borders, including using military personnel and hardware to prevent illegal crossings between ports of entry and channel all cross-border traffic to legal ports of entry. l Department of Justice: Agree to move the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the Office of Immigration Litigation to DHS and/or, alternatively, to treat the administrative law judges (immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals) as national security personnel, decertify their union, and move to increase hiring significantly to enable the processing of more immigration cases. l Department of State: Allow DHS to lead international engagement in the Western Hemisphere on issues of security and migration. Additionally, quickly and aggressively address recalcitrant countries’ failure to accept deportees by imposing stiff sanctions until deportees are in fact accepted for return (not just promised to be taken). l Department of Housing and Urban Development: Ensure that only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents utilize or occupy federally subsidized housing. l Department of Education: Deny loan access to those who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and deny loan access to students at schools that provide in-state tuition to illegal aliens. l Department of Labor: Eliminate the two (of four) lowest wage levels for foreign workers. l Department of the Treasury: Implement all necessary regulations both to equalize taxes between American citizens and working visa holders and to provide DHS with all tax information of illegal aliens as expeditiously as possible. l Intelligence Community: Cooperate in the shrinking or elimination of the I&A role in the IC while replacing it with CBP and HSI representation to the IC. AUTHOR’S NOTE: I had the honor of coordinating the efforts of the experts listed as contributors to this book, nearly all of whom have spent more time inside or interacting with the Department of Homeland Security than myself. I wrote only a small portion of the chapter and relied on the contributors’ experience and expertise to give the chapter both its depth and policy impact. No views expressed herein should be attributed to any single contributor.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on abolishing CIGIE and redistributing inspector general oversight functions, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses DHS intelligence restructuring, legal counsel reform, and congressional affairs—there is no direct thematic overlap between the two."
— 162 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments. The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coor- dination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) Needed Reforms OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations, policies, and programs. Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters Gen- eral Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equiv- alent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head. The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS. OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making. OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressio- nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses. — 163 — Department of Homeland Security The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the department that can pull responsive communications quickly. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT (OPE) DHS’s external communications function should be consolidated and reformed so that the President’s agenda can be implemented more effectively. The Office of Partnership and Engagement should be merged into the Office of Public Affairs. In many Cabinet agencies, outreach to companies and partner organizations is similarly performed by the Office of Public Affairs. This would also accomplish a needed DHS organizational and management reform to decrease the number of direct reports to the Secretary. Both public and legislative affairs staff in the components should report directly to their respective headquarters equivalent. This would help to avoid a failure by the department to speak with one voice. It would also allow the component staff to perform more efficiently, overseen by expert managers in their trade. This would also allow DHS to respond to crises effectively by shifting staff as needed to the most pressing issues and better use underutilized staff at less active components. Only political appointees in OLA should interact directly with congressional staff on all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To prevent congres- sional staff from answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components, DHS legislative affairs appropriations staff should be moved from MGMT OCFO into OLA. Regarding components, budget/appropriations staff should move from component budget offices into component legislative affairs offices. Because dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or claim to have jurisdiction over some DHS function, DHS staff from the Secretary on down spend so much time responding to congressional hearing and briefing requests, letters, and questions for the record that they are left with little time to do their assigned job of protecting the homeland. The next President should reach an agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee jurisdiction to one authorizing committee and one appropriations committee in each cham- ber. If congressional leadership will not limit their committees’ jurisdiction over DHS, DHS should identify one authorizing and appropriations committee in each chamber and answer only to it. To focus more precisely on the DHS mission, OLA staff should also identify outdated and needless congressional reporting requirements and notify Congress
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.