Emerging Innovative Border Technologies Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/993

Last Updated: July 29, 2026

Emerging Innovative Border Technologies Act

HR. 993, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Correa, J. Luis [D-CA-46]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$90,300 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 171-173 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

March 10, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Analysis of HR 993: Emerging Innovative Border Technologies Act**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect this bill through the lens of innovation, efficiency, and, most importantly, its potential to augment my wealth and influence.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of HR 993 is to enhance border security operations by leveraging emerging technologies such as AI, machine learning, and advanced sensors. The bill aims to identify, integrate, and deploy innovative solutions to address capability gaps in border security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **CBP Innovation Team Authority**: Establishes a framework for the Commissioner of CBP to research and adapt commercial technologies to enhance border security operations. 2. **Plan Development**: Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a plan to identify, integrate, and deploy emerging technologies within 180 days of enactment. 3. **Assessment and Evaluation**: Mandates regular assessments of the effectiveness of these efforts and the impact on privacy and security in border communities.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Private Sector**: Companies specializing in emerging technologies will benefit from increased opportunities for collaboration and procurement with CBP. 2. **CBP and DHS**: The bill aims to enhance their capabilities, but also introduces new bureaucratic hurdles and reporting requirements. 3. **Border Communities**: May experience improved security, but also potential privacy concerns and disruptions due to the deployment of advanced surveillance technologies.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Increased Efficiency**: Leveraging emerging technologies can streamline border security operations, reducing costs and improving effectiveness. 2. **New Business Opportunities**: The bill creates a framework for private sector companies to develop and deploy innovative solutions, potentially generating billions in revenue. 3. **Consolidation of Power**: By centralizing authority within CBP, the bill may lead to increased bureaucratic control, which could stifle innovation and limit competition.

In conclusion, HR 993 presents a unique opportunity for my business interests to capitalize on emerging technologies and expand our influence in the border security sector. While there are potential risks and challenges associated with this legislation, I believe that its benefits far outweigh its drawbacks. As a visionary entrepreneur, I will continue to monitor and shape this bill's development to ensure it aligns with my strategic objectives.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Correa, J. Luis [D-CA-46]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$90,300

24 donors

PACs

Organizations

$33,700

Committees

Individuals

$56,100

No PAC contributions found

SANTA YENEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

3 transactions

$7,700

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

2 transactions

$6,600

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIWOK INDIANS

2 transactions

$4,000

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

2 transactions

$4,000

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE

1 transaction

$3,300

SYCUAN BAND OF KUMEYAAY NATION

1 transaction

$1,500

No committee contributions found

RANCHERIA, SANTA ROSA

1 transaction

$6,600

PEREZ, FRANK

2 transactions

$6,600

FISHER, ROBERT J

1 transaction

$3,300

FISHER, WILLIAM S

1 transaction

$3,300

CORDERO, ALFONSO

1 transaction

$3,300

HARRINGTON, CHRIS

1 transaction

$3,300

CORDERO, MERCY

1 transaction

$3,300

CHALAN, MIKE

1 transaction

$3,300

VALE, SAM

1 transaction

$3,300

ADAMS, GEORGE

1 transaction

$3,300

SHAH, MANAHAR

1 transaction

$3,300

CARRILLO, FRANK

1 transaction

$3,300

SAMIELI, HENRY

1 transaction

$3,300

SAMUELI, SUSAN

1 transaction

$3,300

STAVROS, PETE

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Luttrell, Morgan [R-TX-8]

ID: L000603

Top Contributors

ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE

OrganizationWOODVILLE, TX

$3,300

Dec 21, 2023

TIGUA INDIAN RES.-YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO

OrganizationEL PASO, TX

$3,300

Jun 20, 2023

ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE

OrganizationWOODVILLE, TX

$3,300

Sep 27, 2024

TIGUA INDIAN RES.-YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO

OrganizationEL PASO, TX

$2,500

Sep 20, 2024

GRIFFIN, KENNETH

CITADEL LLC • FOUNDER CEO

IndividualMIAMI BEACH, FL

$6,600

Apr 10, 2023

SINGER, PAUL

ELLIOTT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT • CO-CEO CO-CIO PRESIDENT

IndividualPALM BEACH, FL

$6,600

Apr 10, 2023

STEDMAN, STUART

STEDMAN WEST INTERESTS INC. • INVESTOR/PRESIDENT

IndividualHOUSTON, TX

$6,600

Jun 22, 2023

FISHER, KENNETH

FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

IndividualPLANO, TX

$6,600

May 23, 2024

FISHER, SHERRILYN

PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER

IndividualPLANO, TX

$6,600

May 23, 2024

ERICKSON, MARILYN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPOWELL, TN

$6,600

Jul 6, 2024

Rep. Gillen, Laura [D-NY-4]

ID: G000602

Top Contributors

RALLYE MOTORS

OrganizationROSLYN, NY

$6,000

Jul 18, 2023

RALLYE MOTORS

OrganizationROSLYN, NY

$6,000

Jun 5, 2023

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$1,000

Aug 1, 2024

STONE, JAMES M

PLYMOUTH ROCK COMPANY, INC. • EXECUTIVE

IndividualBOSTON, MA

$5,000

Oct 16, 2024

FAIVUS, HARRY E

SELF-EMPLOYED • OPHTHALMOLOGIST

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$5,000

Nov 1, 2024

STONE, JAMES M

PLYMOUTH ROCK COMPANY, INC. • EXECUTIVE

IndividualBOSTON, MA

$5,000

Oct 16, 2024

HELFER, RICKI

N/A • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualWASHINGTON, DC

$4,000

Sep 10, 2024

ANDEER, KYLE

APPLE INC • ATTORNEY

IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA

$3,300

Mar 27, 2024

BINDER, CHARLES

SELF-EMPLOYED • ATTORNEY

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$3,300

Mar 21, 2024

BURNSTEIN, CLIFFORD

Q PRIME • MANAGER

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$3,300

Mar 28, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Correa, J. Luis [D-CA-46]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 58 nodes and 63 connections

Total contributions: $63

Top Donors - Rep. Correa, J. Luis [D-CA-46]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

8 Orgs1 Committee15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 5 helped.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90
Section 2(a) requires a plan to deploy emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, machine learning, automation, and other advanced technologies to enhance border security operations, which would benefit cybersecurity firms providing such technologies.
+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.90
Section 2(a) explicitly mentions artificial intelligence and machine learning as technologies to be identified, integrated, and deployed for border security, directly benefiting AI and cloud infrastructure providers.
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.85
Section 2(a)(12)(F) includes assessment of communications equipment such as radios, long-term evolution broadband, and miniature satellites, indicating potential procurement that would benefit telecommunications companies.
+Law Enforcement & Surveillance Techconfidence 0.85
Section 2(a)(12)(C) includes mobile surveillance vehicles, tower-based surveillance, and advanced unattended sensors, which align with law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors such as Axon and Palantir.
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a)(12) covers manned aircraft sensors, unmanned aerial systems, surveillance technology, and tunnel detection—areas where defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman are active suppliers.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 171-173AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on modernizing border security through technology, innovation, and public-private collaboration, particularly in enhancing CBP's operational capabilities and addressing capability gaps. Both prioritize leveraging emerging technologies and fostering coordination between government, academia, and the private sector to improve border enforcement efficiency."

Key themes:border security technologyCBP innovationpublic-private partnershipemerging technologiesoperational efficiency

— 139 — Department of Homeland Security also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel. The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community. A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval. The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time. Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments. CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP. The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000. — 140 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise OT’s function is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart. Combin- ing OT with OFO would achieve streamlined operations and increase OT’s capacity and capability by leveraging OFO’s expansive resources. CBP, ICE, and USCIS all have authority to issue Notices to Appear (NTA) to removable aliens in their presence, which begins removal proceedings. In most instances, CBP should turn illegal aliens over to ICE for detention, and ICE can then issue any needed NTA. CBP should issue NTAs only in limited situations for humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition, CBP should eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR) altogether. CBP’s established national standards of Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) have been widely interpreted and expanded by lower courts. This has resulted in unrealistic and differing detention standards for CBP facilities based on the jurisdiction within which they fall, negatively impacting operations. ICE has suffered similarly. A single nationwide detention standard should be codified that prevents individual states from mandating that federal government agencies adhere to widely expansive and ever-changing sets of standards. Such standards should allow the flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents. The annual costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary facil- ities to address the flow of illegal migration and associated care, transportation, and processing are prohibitive, and CBP’s budget is inadequate. CBP is forced to forgo critical mission-essential endeavors to fund the additional associated costs. Often, this requires the reprogramming of funding at the DHS level, which has a negative impact on other DHS components’ operations. This predictable cost that has to be paid from existing CBP and DHS funding levels reduces CBP’s operational readiness and ability to accomplish its diverse and critical missions to protect the American people. The next President should request a realistic budget that fully pays for these costs. Increased funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel, which would relieve uniformed BP agents from administrative duties associated with processing aliens and allow them to return to their national security mission. Congress should increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports of Entry (POEs), including expanding state-of-the-art technology such as Non-Intru- sive Inspection equipment. Today, the cartels exploit the aging facilities and lack of adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and more successfully through our nation’s POEs. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) Needed Reforms Since the formation of DHS, ICE has increasingly been tasked with auxiliary missions that have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 171-173AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 993 aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on modernizing CBP operations through innovation, technology integration, and enhanced border security capabilities, including leveraging private sector and academic collaboration to address mission gaps."

Key themes:border security modernizationtechnology integrationCBP innovationprivate sector collaborationmission capability enhancement

— 138 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and localities, that would include certification that all components of that government, and not just the applicant agency, are registered with and use E-Verify. l If the applicant is a state or locality, commitment by that state or locality to total information-sharing in the context of both federal law enforcement and immigration enforcement. This would include access to department of motor vehicles and voter registration databases. Non-Use of Discretionary Guest Worker Visa Authorities. To stop facili- tating the availability of cheap foreign labor in order to support American workers (particularly poor and middle-class American workers) and follow congressional intent, the Secretary should explicitly cease using at least two discretionary author- ities as part of his or her broader effort to support American workers. l The Secretary should make it clear that he or she will not use the Secretary’s existing discretionary authority to increase the number of H-2B (seasonal non-agricultural) visas above the statutorily set cap. l The Secretary should not issue any regulations in support of the “H-2 eligible” country list, the effect of which would prevent favoring certain foreign nationals seeking an H-2 guest worker visa based simply on their nationality. Restoration of Honesty and Transparency. The Secretary should use his or her inherent authority as leader of the department to follow up with congressional and other partners to disclose information and provide the transparency that has been obstructed during the Biden Administration. The Secretary should proceed from the assumption that congressional inquiries and public information requests were unfulfilled and then seek to fulfill them. Replacement of the Entire Homeland Security Advisory Committee. The Secretary should plan to quickly remove all current members of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee and replace them as quickly as is feasible. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) If all immigration agencies are not merged, including USCIS and ORR, then an appropriate third alternative would be to consolidate ICE and CBP to form a combined Border Security and Immigration Agency (BSIA). This would inte- grate critical interdiction, enforcement, and investigative resources, enhancing coordination and refocusing collective efforts on the vast and complex cross-bor- der threats impacting our nation’s health, safety, and national security. It would — 139 — Department of Homeland Security also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel. The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community. A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval. The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time. Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments. CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP. The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000.

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy focus on leveraging emerging technologies for national security purposes and emphasize private-sector involvement and technology assessment, though they apply these ideas to different domains (border security vs. export controls)."

Key themes:emerging technologiesprivate sector innovationtechnology assessmentnational securitypublic-private collaboration

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 183-185AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on technological innovation for border security, which aligns with Project 2025's broader goal of enhancing immigration enforcement and border control, though it does not directly address specific enforcement mechanisms like detention, parole restrictions, or work authorization limits outlined in the policy."

Key themes:border securityimmigration enforcementtechnology integrationoperational efficiencyDHS modernization

— 151 — Department of Homeland Security l Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization. Executive Orders l Pathways for border crossers 1. Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately. 2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols. 3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP). 4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens. 5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full. 6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary. 7. Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance. l Enforcement 1. Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. 2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government. — 152 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it has access to national security and law enforcement databases. 4. Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws including those identifying sensitive zones. 5. End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of cases in immigration court. l Averting or curtailing a mass migration event 1. Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 2. Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to avert or curtail the mass migration. Subregulatory Matters l USCIS priorities/structural changes 1. Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants, and fraud detection. 2. Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection and vetting policies. 3. Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with the priorities described in this chapter.

Department of Commerce

Weak

Vector: 64%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both documents address emerging technologies and private sector involvement, but HR 993 focuses on deploying innovative technologies for domestic border security, whereas the Project 2025 excerpt concerns regulating exports of emerging/foundational technologies through Commerce Department processes. The thematic overlap is limited to the general topic of emerging tech innovation."

Key themes:emerging technologiesprivate sector collaborationtechnology assessment

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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