Directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to transmit to the House of Representatives certain documents relating to Department of Homeland Security policies and activities related to domestic preparedness and collective response to terrorism and the Department's cybersecurity activities.

— 163 — Department of Homeland Security The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the department that can pull responsive communications quickly. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT (OPE) DHS’s external communications function should be consolidated and reformed so that the President’s agenda can be implemented more effectively. The Office of Partnership and Engagement should be merged into the Office of Public Affairs. In many Cabinet agencies, outreach to companies and partner organizations is similarly performed by the Office of Public Affairs. This would also accomplish a needed DHS organizational and management reform to decrease the number of direct reports to the Secretary. Both public and legislative affairs staff in the components should report directly to their respective headquarters equivalent. This would help to avoid a failure by the department to speak with one voice. It would also allow the component staff to perform more efficiently, overseen by expert managers in their trade. This would also allow DHS to respond to crises effectively by shifting staff as needed to the most pressing issues and better use underutilized staff at less active components. Only political appointees in OLA should interact directly with congressional staff on all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To prevent congres- sional staff from answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components, DHS legislative affairs appropriations staff should be moved from MGMT OCFO into OLA. Regarding components, budget/appropriations staff should move from component budget offices into component legislative affairs offices. Because dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or claim to have jurisdiction over some DHS function, DHS staff from the Secretary on down spend so much time responding to congressional hearing and briefing requests, letters, and questions for the record that they are left with little time to do their assigned job of protecting the homeland. The next President should reach an agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee jurisdiction to one authorizing committee and one appropriations committee in each cham- ber. If congressional leadership will not limit their committees’ jurisdiction over DHS, DHS should identify one authorizing and appropriations committee in each chamber and answer only to it. To focus more precisely on the DHS mission, OLA staff should also identify outdated and needless congressional reporting requirements and notify Congress — 164 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise that DHS will cease reporting on such matters. For other congressional reports, OLA should implement a sunset date so that Congress must regularly demonstrate the need for specific data. In both OPA and OLA, a change in mission and culture is needed. The clients of both components are the President and the Secretary, not the media, external organizations, or Congress. OPA and OLA should change from being compliance correspondents for outside entities airing grievances to serving as messengers and advocates for the President and the Secretary. OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION (OPS) OPS was originally conceived by then-Secretary Jeh Johnson as an entity tasked with coordinating cross-DHS assets on an as-needed basis using a joint operations approach. This role is particularly challenging because of the disparate nature of mission sets across DHS. OPS should absorb a very small number of tactical intelligence professionals from I&A as the rest of I&A is shut down. Such intelligence officers would be a subordinate element within OPS placed within the National Operations Center. The intelligence officers would provide tactical intelligence support for upcoming or ongoing opera- tions in addition to liaising with their agency/component counterparts. There would be no strategic intelligence analysis done as part of OPS or its new I&A sub-element. In addition to facilitating all-of-DHS coordination on a task-by-task basis, OPS would be responsible for ongoing situational awareness for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. In addition to long-term staffing, OPS would have cycling billets from each of the major agencies and components to facilitate its most effective working rela- tionships across DHS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (CRCL) AND PRIVACY OFFICE (PRIV) The Homeland Security Act established only an Officer of CRCL, not an office. The only substantive function Congress then assigned to the officer was to review and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights. Since then, Congress and CRCL itself have significantly expanded CRCL’s scope and size well beyond its original intent or helpful purpose. CRCL now operates and views itself as a quasi- DHS Office of Inspector General. This results in a considerable waste of limited component resources, which are routinely tasked to address redundant, overly burdensome, and uninformed demands from CRCL. It is therefore important to recalibrate CRCL’s scope and reach. The organizational structure of both CRCL and the Privacy Office should be changed to ensure proper alignment with the department’s mission. The Office of General Counsel should absorb both CRCL’s and PRIV’s necessary functions

— 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 171 — 6 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Kiron K. Skinner The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States. Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful. There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision. It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).