Electing a Member to a certain standing committee of the House of Representatives.

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Bill ID: 119/hres/117
Last Updated: June 29, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Walberg, Tim [R-MI-5]

ID: W000798

Follow the money

The bill

Electing a Member to a certain standing committee of the House of Representatives.

HRES. 117, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Walberg, Tim [R-MI-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$214,400 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

40% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

February 5, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh joy, another thrilling episode of "Congressional Theater" for the masses. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** ( rolls eyes ) The main purpose of HRES 117 is to elect a new member to the Committee on Ethics. Wow, how exciting. I'm sure the fate of democracy hangs in the balance. In reality, this bill is just a ceremonial rubber stamp, a meaningless exercise in bureaucratic busywork.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** ( mocking tone ) Oh boy, get ready for some earth-shattering changes! The bill "elects" Mr. Guest as Chair of the Committee on Ethics. That's it. No actual policy changes, no reforms, just a simple name swap. It's like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic – all show, no substance.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** ( condescendingly ) Oh, I'm sure the entire nation is holding its breath, waiting to see who gets appointed to this prestigious committee. The "affected parties" are likely just a handful of insiders and special interest groups who will use this appointment to further their own agendas. Meanwhile, the general public remains blissfully ignorant, too distracted by cat videos to care.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** ( dark humor ) Well, I'm sure this bill will have far-reaching consequences... for Mr. Guest's ego and career advancement prospects. As for actual impact on ethics or governance? Ha! Don't make me laugh. This is just a minor tremor in the earthquake of corruption that is Washington D.C.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from "Legislative Laryngitis" – a chronic condition where politicians pretend to take action while actually accomplishing nothing. The symptoms are clear: empty rhetoric, pointless posturing, and a complete disregard for meaningful reform. Treatment? (shrugs) None needed; the disease is terminal.

In conclusion, HRES 117 is a perfect example of " Congressional Placebo Effect" – a bill that makes voters feel like something is being done while actually doing nothing at all. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to waste everyone's time once again.

Related Topics

Congressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Walberg, Tim [R-MI-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$214,400
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$4,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$210,100

No PAC contributions found

1
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
2
WEIR FARMS
2 transactions
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
HAWORTH, ETHELYN
1 transaction
$47,900
2
HONIG, KEN
1 transaction
$31,600
3
HAWORTH, RICHARD
2 transactions
$21,600
4
DRESNER, LINDA
2 transactions
$13,200
5
LEVY, EDWARD C JR.
2 transactions
$13,200
6
KLARR, GUNNAR
1 transaction
$10,000
7
DEVOS, PAMELLA G
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WEISER, RONALD N
1 transaction
$6,600
9
DEVOS, DOUGLAS L
1 transaction
$6,600
10
DEVOS, SUZANNE C
1 transaction
$6,600
11
DEVOS, ELISABETH
1 transaction
$6,600
12
EHMANN, STEVE
1 transaction
$6,600
13
DEVOS, DANIEL G
1 transaction
$6,600
14
DEVOS, MARIA P
1 transaction
$6,600
15
DEVOS, RICHARD M JR.
1 transaction
$6,600
16
GLICK, RANDAL L
1 transaction
$6,600
17
PEARSON, JOHN E
1 transaction
$6,600

Donor Network - Rep. Walberg, Tim [R-MI-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 37 nodes and 23 connections (41 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $214,400

Top Donors - Rep. Walberg, Tim [R-MI-5]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs17 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Election Commission

Minimal
Vector: 57%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 117 concerns the internal election of a House Ethics Committee chair and does not address the Federal Election Commission, campaign finance, or any of the FEC reforms outlined in Project 2025."

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Department of Education

Minimal
Vector: 56%
Pages: 383-385AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 117 is a routine House resolution electing a member to the Committee on Ethics and contains no provisions related to education policy, school choice, accreditation, or Department of Education reforms outlined in Project 2025."

— 351 — Department of Education as the Educational Choice for Children Act. This bill would create a federal scholarship tax credit that would incentivize donors to contribute to nonprofit scholarship granting organizations (SGOs). Eligible families could then use that funding from the SGOs for their children’s education expenses including private school tuition, tutoring, and instructional materials. ADDITIONAL K–12 REFORMS Allowing States to Opt Out of Federal Education Programs. States should be able to opt out of federal education programs such as the Academic Partnerships Lead Us to Success (APLUS) Act. Much of the red tape and regulations that hinder local school districts are handed down from Washington. This regulatory burden far exceeds the federal government’s less than 10 percent financing share of K–12 education. In the most recent fiscal year (FY 2022), states and localities financed 93 percent of K–12 education costs, and the federal government just 7 percent. That 7 percent share should not allow the federal government to dictate state and local education policy. l To restore state and local control of education and reduce the bureaucratic and compliance burden, Congress should allow states to opt out of the dozens of federal K–12 education programs authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and instead allow states to put their share of federal funding toward any lawful education purpose under state law. This policy has been advanced over the years via a proposal known as the Academic Partnerships Lead Us to Success (APLUS) Act. HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM HEA: Accreditation Reform Congress established two primary responsibilities for the U.S. Department of Education in the HEA: 1) to ensure the “administrative capacity and financial responsibility” of colleges and universities that accept Title IV funds; and 2) to ensure the quality of those institutions. Congress did not endow the Department of Education with the authority to involve itself in academic quality issues relating to colleges and universities that participate in the Title IV student aid program; the HEA allows the agency only to recognize accreditors, which are then supposed to provide quality assurance measures. Unfortunately, the Biden Administration has followed closely in the footsteps of the Obama Administration by engaging in a politically motivated and incon- sistent administration of the accrediting agency recognition process. As a result, accreditors have transformed into de facto government agents. Despite claims by — 352 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise the department and accreditation agencies that accreditation is voluntary, the fact that Americans are denied access to an otherwise widely available entitle- ment benefit if the institution “elects” to not be accredited makes accreditation anything but voluntary. Today, accreditation determines whether Americans can access federal student aid benefits, transfer academic credits, enroll in higher-level degree programs, and even qualify for federal employment. Unnecessarily focused on schools in a specific geographic region, institutional accreditation reviews have also become wildly expensive audits by academic “peers” that stifle innovation and discourage new institutions of higher education. Of par- ticular concern are efforts by many accreditation agencies to leverage their Title IV (student loans and grants) gatekeeper roles to force institutions to adopt policies that have nothing to do with academic quality assurance and student outcomes. One egregious example of this is the extent to which accreditors have forced col- leges and universities, many of them faith-based institutions, to adopt diversity, equity, and inclusion policies that conflict with federal civil rights laws, state laws, and the institutional mission and culture of the schools. Perhaps more distress- ingly, accreditors, while professing support for academic freedom and campus free speech, have presided over a precipitous decline in both over the past decade. Despite maintaining criteria that demand such policies, accreditors have done nothing to dampen the illiberal chill that has swept across American campuses over the past decade. The current system is not working. A radical overhaul of the HEA’s accreditation requirements is thus in order. The next Administration should work with Congress to amend the HEA and should consider the following reforms: l Prohibit accreditation agencies from leveraging their Title IV gatekeeper role to mandate that educational institutions adopt diversity, equity, and inclusion policies. l Protect the sovereignty of states to decide governance and leadership issues for their state-supported colleges and universities by prohibiting accreditation agencies from intruding upon the governance of state-supported educational institutions. l Protect faith-based institutions by prohibiting accreditation agencies from: 1. Requiring standards and criteria that undermine the religious beliefs of, or require policies or conduct that conflict with, the religious mission or religious beliefs of the institution; and

Federal Election Commission

Minimal
Vector: 56%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill deals with electing a Chair to the House Committee on Ethics, an internal House matter, whereas the Project 2025 policy focuses on reforming the Federal Election Commission's litigation authority, term limits, and structure; there is no substantive overlap between the two."

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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