Electing Members to certain standing committees of the House of Representatives.

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Bill ID: 119/hres/22
Last Updated: February 2, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]

ID: N000191

Follow the money

The bill

Electing Members to certain standing committees of the House of Representatives.

HRES. 22, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$80,000 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Foreword" section, p. 40-42 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

January 8, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another thrilling episode of "Congressional Kabuki Theater"! Let's dissect this appropriations bill, shall we?

HRES 22 is a masterclass in obfuscation, a beautifully crafted exercise in saying nothing while appearing to do something. The title, "Electing Members to certain standing committees of the House of Representatives," is a clever misdirection, like a magician waving a wand to distract from the real trick.

The bill text is a laundry list of committee assignments, because that's what really matters – not the actual funding or policy decisions, but who gets to sit on which committee. It's like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while the ship sinks.

Now, let's get to the "meat" of the bill (if you can call it that). The total funding amounts and budget allocations are conveniently absent from this document. How...convenient. I'm sure it's just an oversight, not a deliberate attempt to hide the numbers. After all, who needs transparency when you're allocating billions of dollars?

Key programs and agencies receiving funds? Ha! Good luck finding that information in this bill. It's like searching for a needle in a haystack while being blindfolded. Notable increases or decreases from previous years? Don't bother looking; it's not there.

But wait, there are some riders and policy provisions attached to funding! Oh boy, I can barely contain my excitement. Let me guess: they're probably unrelated to the actual appropriations and are just cleverly disguised pork barrel projects or favors for special interest groups. Am I right?

Fiscal impact and deficit implications? *chuckles* Don't make me laugh. This bill is a fiscal fantasy, a fairy tale of budgetary magic where numbers don't matter and deficits disappear like magic.

In conclusion, HRES 22 is a textbook example of legislative legerdemain, a masterful exercise in smoke and mirrors designed to confuse, obfuscate, and deceive. It's a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic inability of our elected officials to prioritize transparency, accountability, and responsible governance.

Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity Syndrome (TSS), characterized by an acute lack of intellectual curiosity, a severe case of partisan myopia, and a chronic addiction to special interest group money. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None available; the patient is terminal.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsCongressional Rules & ProceduresExecutive Branch Oversight
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$80,000
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,800
Committees
$0
Individuals
$72,200

No PAC contributions found

1
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$5,800
2
YUROK TRIBE
1 transaction
$1,000
3
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
EKLUND, PAUL
2 transactions
$12,800
2
CARLSON, DAVID K.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
RADOW, LINDA
2 transactions
$6,600
4
RADOW, NORMAN
2 transactions
$6,600
5
BATCHELOR, AMY
2 transactions
$6,600
6
KLARMAN, SETH
1 transaction
$3,300
7
GROSS, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
8
WEAVER, LINDSAY
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BLOOM, BRADLEY
1 transaction
$3,300
10
ZIMLICH, JOE C
1 transaction
$3,300
11
BROWNSTEIN, NORMAN
1 transaction
$3,300
12
BEARD, CYNTHIA
1 transaction
$3,300
13
GLUSTROM, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
14
ABRAMS, MELISSA METTLER
1 transaction
$3,300
15
HEIZER, DEAN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 51 nodes and 24 connections (61 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $80,000

Top Donors - Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs15 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Foreword

Weak
Vector: 62%
Pages: 40-42AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 22 merely assigns members to House committees and does not address the omnibus spending process, delegation of authority to the Administrative State, or the need for greater public scrutiny criticized in the Project 2025 Foreword. Any alignment is only indirect, through potential effects on committee oversight."

Key themes:congressional oversightcommittee authoritylegislative processadministrative state

— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes;

Foreword

Weak
Vector: 60%
Pages: 40-42AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 22 is a procedural resolution assigning members to House committees; it does not directly address the Administrative State or delegate‑power concerns raised in Project 2025, but the resulting committee composition could influence oversight of bureaucratic agencies."

Key themes:congressional oversightadministrative statecommittee authorityseparation of powersbureaucratic accountability

— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes; — 8 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Bureaucrats at the Department of Homeland Security, following the lead of a feckless Administration, order border and immigration enforcement agencies to help migrants criminally enter our country with impunity; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Education inject racist, anti-American, ahistorical propaganda into America’s classrooms; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Justice force school districts to undermine girls’ sports and parents’ rights to satisfy transgender extremists; l Woke bureaucrats at the Pentagon force troops to attend “training” seminars about “white privilege”; and l Bureaucrats at the State Department infuse U.S. foreign aid programs with woke extremism about “intersectionality” and abortion.3 Unaccountable federal spending is the secret lifeblood of the Great Awokening. Nearly every power center held by the Left is funded or supported, one way or another, through the bureaucracy by Congress. Colleges and school districts are funded by tax dollars. The Administrative State holds 100 percent of its power at the sufferance of Congress, and its insulation from presidential discipline is an unconstitutional fairy tale spun by the Washington Establishment to protect its turf. Members of Congress shield themselves from constitutional accountability often when the White House allows them to get away with it. Cultural institutions like public libraries and public health agencies are only as “independent” from public accountability as elected officials and voters permit. Let’s be clear: The most egregious regulations promulgated by the current Administration come from one place: the Oval Office. The President cannot hide behind the agencies; as his many executive orders make clear, his is the respon- sibility for the regulations that threaten American communities, schools, and families. A conservative President must move swiftly to do away with these vast abuses of presidential power and remove the career and political bureaucrats who fuel it. Properly considered, restoring fiscal limits and constitutional accountability to the federal government is a continuation of restoring national sovereignty to the American people. In foreign affairs, global strategy, federal budgeting and pol- icymaking, the same pattern emerges again and again. Ruling elites slash and tear at restrictions and accountability placed on them. They centralize power up and away from the American people: to supra-national treaties and organizations, to left-wing “experts,” to sight-unseen all-or-nothing legislating, to the unelected career bureaucrats of the Administrative State.

Department of Education

Weak
Vector: 58%
Pages: 371-373AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HRES 22 is a procedural resolution assigning members to House committees and does not directly address Department of Education policies such as risk‑adjusted outcomes, negotiated rulemaking reform, or federal student aid overhaul. Any alignment is indirect, relying on the potential influence of committee composition on future education‑related legislation."

Key themes:committee compositionlegislative oversighteducation policyfederal fundingregulatory reform

— 339 — Department of Education wages to account for regional differences in earnings and cost of living; and develop a reliable methodology for risk adjusting institutional and program outcomes to more accurately reflect the value added of education programs (as opposed to their admissions selectivity). Currently the Department of Education relies on graduation rates and average earnings as proxies for educational quality. Both of those outcomes, however, are highly dependent upon a student’s socioeconomic background, sex, family status, and other factors. Colleges and universities with selective admissions policies post the strongest outcomes, primarily because they admit mostly low-risk, traditional students. Open enrollment institutions post the weakest outcomes, largely because life is challenging and complicated for low-income and non-traditional students, who may be forced to drop out when a work schedule changes, a child needs more attention, or an unexpected repair or medical bill makes continuing impossible. Such confounding factors make it difficult to isolate the impact of educational qual- ity versus socioeconomic factors on student outcomes. The Department of Health and Human Services faced similar challenges in trying to evaluate healthcare out- comes since social determinants of health result in worse health outcomes among those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, have low educational attainment levels, have struggled with addiction, or have poor diet and exercise habits. Without risk adjustment of outcomes, hospitals treating wealthy patients will always appear to be delivering good care, and hospitals treating low-income patients will appear to be delivering poor care. Higher education outcomes data should be similarly “risk adjusted” to more carefully isolate the impact of educational quality versus socioeconomic status and other factors on college outcomes. Reform the Negotiated Rulemaking Process at ED The U.S. Department of Education is required by statute14 to engage in nego- tiated rulemaking prior to promulgating new regulations under Subchapter 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as well as Subchapters II (Teacher Quality Enhancements) and IV of the Higher Education Act of 1964 (Student Assistance). The purpose of negotiated rulemaking is to engage a committee of stakeholders early in the drafting of proposed regulations to ensure that the reg- ulation can be implemented as written, to understand any potential unintended consequences, and to seek suggestions from stakeholders on alternative solutions. The goal is for the negotiators to reach a consensus, thus smoothing the way to promulgate a new rule. Although it is helpful for the department to receive stakeholder input, the negotiated rulemaking process has become an expensive and time-consuming undertaking. Consensus is only rarely reached, enabling the department to pursue its own path. The department’s master calendar (which requires final rules to be — 340 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise published by October 1 if they are to be implemented by July 1st of the subsequent year) compounds the problem, making it unduly challenging to update regulations as needed to keep pace with changes in education, finance, accounting, pedagogy, and student assessment. In recent decades, negotiated rulemaking has become a veritable three-ring circus, replete with negotiators who use their Twitter accounts and other social media feeds during negotiations to denigrate the process and their peer negoti- ators in real time. A few Members of Congress use the public comment process to deliver political speeches, apparently to raise their own profiles but without adding any new information to the process. Some advocacy groups have latched onto the process for fundraising purposes, sometimes misrepresenting negotiation language to agitate followers and supporters and encourage them to make financial contributions. At times, the department itself has appeared to sabotage consensus, which enables them to write the regulation as they wish and without regard to the concerns raised by negotiators. l The Department of Education should work with Congress to amend the HEA to eliminate the negotiated rulemaking requirement. At a minimum, Congress should allow the department to use public hearings rather than negotiated rulemaking sessions. Reform the Office of Federal Student Aid This proposal urges the new Administration to end the abuse of FSA’s loan for- giveness programs, to manage the federal student loan portfolio in a professional way, and to work with Congress for a long-term overhaul of the program for the benefit of students and taxpayers. l The new Administration must end the prior Administration’s abuse of the agency’s payment pause and HEA loan forgiveness programs, including borrower defense to repayment, closed school discharge, and Public Service Loan Forgiveness. l The new Administration should also take immediate steps to commence the rulemaking process to rescind or substantially modify the prior Administration’s HEA regulations. l The federal government does not have the proper incentives to make sound lending decisions, so the new Administration should consider returning to a system in which private lenders, backed by government guarantees, would compete to offer student loans, including subsidized and unsubsidized, loans. This would allow for

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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