Expressing condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party's persecution of religious minority groups, including Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists and the detention of Pastor "Ezra" Jin Mingri and leaders of the Zion Church, and reaffirming the United States' global commitment to promote religious freedom and tolerance.

— 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception? — 217 — Intelligence Community Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed. China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.

— 817 — Trade Internet memes, fashion, movies, student exchange programs, tourism, and more. China’s leaders are set in their ways, especially with Xi Jinping presumably now in power for life, but the younger generation is more open than their parents were—more individualistic and open to change. Effective outreach to the Chinese people will need the same humility that other sound trade policies require. Government-directed cultural and economic outreach risks being heavy-handed and could backfire. Everyone involved needs to know that the process is generational in scope and will not work overnight. At the very least, Washington should stay out of the way as much as possible when regular people want to contact each other across national, language, and cultural divides. Each of these many components, from tariffs to trade agreements to culture, is a small part of a larger China policy. Many are not attention-grabbing and cannot be put into sound bites. Cultural engagement is not something Washington can plan. China’s own demographic and debt problems, along with aging leadership and growing discontent over the zero-COVID policy, might even cause an internal collapse. American policy must therefore be prepared to face any contingency. CONCLUSION A conservative trade policy needs a conservative vision. America’s found- ing institutions, based on free trade and entrepreneurship, have made America the world’s leading economy and will help keep America strong through the next century. However, recent departures from those principles have hurt America’s econ- omy and weakened alliances that are necessary to contain threats from Russia and China. Reaffirming those principles through policies of openness, dynamism, and free trade will boost America’s economy, make us more resilient against crises, and remove opportunities for progressives and rent-seekers to use the levers of gov- ernment for their own purposes. Rediscovering conservative principles on trade policy and embracing America’s long history as the world’s leading commercial republic are an important part of restoring a government of, by, and for the people. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this analysis could not have been completed without the valuable support of a small, sturdy, and principled community of trade policy experts. Among them, my colleagues at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ryan Young, Iain Murray, and Ivan Osorio were essential. The author alone is responsible for this report. No views herein should be attributed to any other individual or institution. — 818 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Warren E. Buffett and Carol J. Loomis, “America’s Growing Trade Deficit Is Selling the Nation Out from Under Us. Here’s a Way to Fix the Problem—And We Need to Do It Now,” Fortune, November 10, 2003, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/11/10/352872/index.htm (accessed February 25, 2023). 2. 2017 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 115th Congress, 1st Session, November 2017, p. 24, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_ Congress.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 3. JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office, “China Trade: WTO Membership and Most-Favored-Nation Status,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-209, June 17, 1998, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/t- nsiad-98-209.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 4. News release, “U.S. Trade in International Goods and Services, December and Annual 2022,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 7, 2023, https://www.bea.gov/news/2023/us- international-trade-goods-and-services-december-and-annual-2022 (accessed February 25, 2023); “Table 1. U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: Exports, Imports, and Balances,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, last updated November 3, 2022, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-11/trad-time-series-0922.xlsx (accessed February 25, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,” January 15, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/index.html (accessed February 25, 2023); Interim Report, An Analysis of the Origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Minority Oversight Staff, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate, October 2022, https://www.help. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/report_an_analysis_of_the_origins_of_covid-19_102722.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 6. Barmini Chakraborty, “China Hints at Denying Americans Life-Saving Coronavirus Drugs,” Fox News, March 13, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinese-deny-americans-coronavirus-drugs (accessed February 25, 2023). 7. Jim Garamone, “Trump Announces New Whole-of-Government National Security Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1399392/ trump-announces-new-whole-of-government-national-security-strategy/ (accessed February 26, 2023). Emphasis added. 8. “Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address,” The White House, February 5, 2019, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address-2/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 9. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Effects, May 2019, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/RTAReport. pdf?mod=article_inline (accessed February 26, 2023); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Trade Analysis Information System,” https://databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis- information-system-(trains) (accessed February 26, 2023); Trefor Moss, “China to Cut Import Tariff on Autos to 15% from 25%,” The Wall Street Journal, updated May 22, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ china-to-cut-import-tariff-on-autos-to-15-from-25-1526980760 (accessed February 26, 2023); U.S. International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (2019 Revision 3), https://hts.usitc.gov/view/ release?release=2019HTSAREV3 (accessed February 26, 2023). 10. This code is commonly used to determine customs duty classifications for goods internationally. 11. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, The United States Reciprocal Trade Act: Estimated Job & Trade Deficit Effects, p. 15. 12. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, 116th Congress, introduced January 24, 2019, https://www. congress.gov/116/bills/hr764/BILLS-116hr764ih.pdf (accessed February 26, 2023). 13. Harvard Center for American Political Studies and Harris Poll, “Monthly Harvard–Harris Poll: February 2019,” https://harvardharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HHP_Feb2019_RV_topline.pdf (accessed February 26, 2023).

— 787 — Trade attempts to negotiate with the CCP to strategically decoupling economically and financially from Communist China. The Fruitlessness of Further Negotiations. If the past is prologue, and as we learned during the Trump Administration, any further negotiations with Com- munist China are likely to be both fruitless and dangerous: fruitless because the CCP now has a very well-established reputation for bargaining in bad faith and dangerous because as long as the CCP’s aggression continues, it will further weaken America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base and global supply chains. The record regarding Communist China’s bad-faith negotiating is clear. In September 2015, President Barack Obama stood with Xi Jinping in the White House Rose Garden where Xi solemnly promised not to militarize the South China Sea and agreed that Communist China would not conduct knowingly cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.31 Within a year, the first promise would be broken.32 As for Communist China’s cyberattacks on American busi- nesses, they have never stopped. Upon taking office in 2017, President Trump put on hold his 2016 campaign promise to put high tariffs on Chinese products immediately. Instead, as a gesture of good faith, he sought to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with China that would have addressed many of the issues raised in this discussion. By the middle of 2018, it was clear that the CCP had no intention of bargaining in good faith. As a result, on June 15, President Trump began to impose a series of tariffs33 on Chinese products that would eventually rise to cover more than $500 billion of Chinese imports. These tariffs would lead Communist China’s lead nego- tiator, Vice Premier Liu He, to agree tentatively in April of 2019 to what would have been the most comprehensive trade deal in global history.34 On May 3, 2019, however, Liu would renege on that 150-page deal and seek its drastic re-trading.35 Finally, on January 15, 2020, the U.S. and Communist China signed a “Phase One” deal that was a pale shadow of the original deal.36 This so-called Skinny Deal (as it was derisively and rightly called) combined proposed modest Communist Chinese reforms on issues related to forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft with promises of large-scale purchases of agricultural, manufactur- ing, and energy products. To date, this deal has been a predictable bust: Communist China has failed to consummate a significant fraction of its promised purchases and has made little or no progress on reforming its mercantilist, protectionist, and technology transfer–forcing policies. The clear lesson learned in both the Obama and Trump Administrations is that Communist China will never bargain in good faith with the U.S. to stop its aggres- sion. An equally clear lesson learned by President Trump, which he was ready to implement in a second term, was that the better policy option was to decouple both economically and financially from Communist China as further negotiations would indeed be both fruitless and dangerous. — 788 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise TABLE 6 Vectors of Communist China’s Economic Aggression in the Technology and IP Space 1. Physical Theft and Cyber-Enabled Theft of Technologies and IP • Physical Theft of Technologies and IP Through Economic Espionage • Cyber-Enabled Espionage and Theft • Evasion of U.S. Export Control Laws • Counterfeiting and Piracy • Reverse Engineering 2. Coercive and Intrusive Regulatory Gambits • Foreign Ownership Restrictions • Adverse Administrative Approvals and Licensing Requirements • Discriminatory Patent and Other IP Rights Restrictions • Security Reviews Force Technology and IP Transfers • Secure and Controllable Technology Standards • Data Localization Mandates • Burdensome and Intrusive Testing • Discriminatory Catalogues and Lists • Government Procurement Restrictions • Indigenous Technology Standards that Deviate from International Norms • Forced Research and Development • Antimonopoly Law Extortion • Expert Review Panels Force Disclosure of Proprietary Information • Chinese Communist Party Co-opts Corporate Governance • Placement of Chinese Employees with Foreign Joint Ventures 3. Economic Coercion • Export Restraints Restrict Access to Raw Materials • Monopsony Purchasing Power 4. Information Harvesting • Open-Source Collection of Science and Technology Information • Chinese Nationals in U.S. as Non-Traditional Information Collectors • Recruitment of Science, Technology, Business, and Finance Talent 5. State-Sponsored, Technology-Seeking Investment • Chinese State Actors Involved in Technology-Seeking FDI • Chinese Investment Vehicles Used to Acquire and Transfer U.S. Technologies and IP – Mergers and Acquisitions – Greenfi eld Investments – Seed and Venture Funding SOURCE: White House Offi ce of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org