SAFE Bet Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/1033
Last Updated: January 1, 1970

Sponsored by

Sen. Blumenthal, Richard [D-CT]

ID: B001277

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Floor Action

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Passed Senate

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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senator Blumenthal and his cohorts. The SAFE Bet Act - because what's safer than letting the government regulate your sports betting habits? (Sarcasm alert.)

Let's dissect this monstrosity:

**New regulations being created or modified:** Oh boy, where do I even start? This bill establishes minimum federal standards for sports betting, which is just a euphemism for "we want to control every aspect of the industry." It creates new definitions, such as "anonymized sports wagering data" and "gambling disorder," because who needs personal responsibility when you can have government-mandated nannying?

**Affected industries and sectors:** Sports betting operators, online platforms, licensed gaming facilities, Indian tribes - basically anyone involved in the sports betting ecosystem. And by "involved," I mean "about to be strangled by regulatory red tape."

**Compliance requirements and timelines:** The bill requires states to establish their own sports wagering programs within two years of enactment. Because what's a little rushed legislation when you're trying to create a whole new regulatory framework? Operators will need to comply with a laundry list of standards, including data collection, self-exclusion lists, and "reasonable lender standards" - whatever that means.

**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ah, the fun part! The bill authorizes the Attorney General to investigate and prosecute any violations. Penalties include fines up to $1 million and imprisonment for up to five years. Because nothing says "responsible governance" like threatening people with prison time for not following your Byzantine regulations.

**Economic and operational impacts:** This bill will create a whole new industry of compliance consultants, lawyers, and bureaucrats - because that's exactly what we need more of. Operators will need to invest heavily in infrastructure and personnel to meet the new standards, which will inevitably lead to increased costs for consumers. And let's not forget the "unintended consequences" - like driving sports betting underground, where it'll be even harder to regulate.

In conclusion, the SAFE Bet Act is a perfect example of legislative overreach, driven by a toxic mix of moral panic, bureaucratic empire-building, and good old-fashioned greed. It's a solution in search of a problem, designed to enrich special interests at the expense of individual freedom and common sense.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of regulatory hubris, with symptoms including an inflated sense of self-importance, a complete disregard for unintended consequences, and a severe allergy to personal responsibility. Prognosis: Grim.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations Small Business & Entrepreneurship Transportation & Infrastructure State & Local Government Affairs Congressional Rules & Procedures Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement National Security & Intelligence Civil Rights & Liberties Government Operations & Accountability
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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 42.1%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Low 42.1%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Introduction

Low 42.1%
Pages: 905-907

— 872 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise While the explanations for this shift are not clear, what is particularly disturbing is the possibility that these rents are extracted at least in part through regulatory capture—which can function as a bar to entrance for new competitors. In addition, the sheer cost of compliance with regulation favors large firms, which can more efficiently spread the cost of regulation over a larger revenue base and have the resources to invest in sophisticated government relations. The FTC must consider, therefore, the role of government itself in maintaining market concentration in areas ranging from pharmaceuticals and healthcare to avionics, banking, and real estate brokerage. Beyond undermining small businesses and reducing their salubrious moral effect on American civil society, concentration of economic power facilitates col- lusion between government and private actors, undermining the rule of law. The continued emergence of evidence documenting collusion—between the Big Tech internet platforms and the Biden White House and administrative agencies—to censor criticism, scientific fact, and uncomfortable political truths demonstrates this unfortunate development. But, there are some caveats. First, the FTC lacks the power to revisit developments in antitrust laws, which have brought an invaluable rigor to the antitrust law—mat- ters such as analyzing vertical integration, for example. Nor should it. Second, the FTC’s recent rescinding of its 2015 Policy Statement was undoubtedly ill-consid- ered.11 Of course, the consumer welfare standard must guide FTC action, but, in appropriate situations and with strong evidence, this standard must be expanded to include more factors than just price. Further, a similar standard of proof used to establish that a practice challenged by the Commission causes harm to competition must also apply in demonstrating the efficiencies that justify the practices. President Harry Truman reportedly made the famous quip, “Give me a one- handed economist. All my economists say ‘on the one hand…’, then ‘but on the other.’” When it comes to some of the more vexing issues in antitrust regulation, the conservative movement is in the same predicament. Many wish to preserve the productivity and efficiency focus of an economic-based consumer welfare standard approach to antitrust enforcements; others are more willing to look at the effects of business concentration in certain industries on innovation, the institutional resilience of our democracy, and children’s development. The following discussion sets forth policy principles and initiatives on which there was agreement among the contributors to this chapter, and notes and explains where there was dissent. NEEDED REFORMS Should the FTC Enforce Antitrust—or Even Continue to Exist? Some conservatives think that antitrust enforcement should be invested solely in the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTC’s commissioners are not removable at will by the President, which many quite reasonably believe violates the Vesting Clause — 873 — Federal Trade Commission of Article II of the Constitution; it is for this reason that conservatives have long believed in either ending law enforcement activities of independent agencies or ending their independent status. The Supreme Court ruling in Humphrey’s Execu- tor12 upholding agency independence seems ripe for revisiting—and perhaps sooner than later.13 Others think that the post–New Deal expansion of the administrative state has had baleful effects upon our society and earnestly share the hope that it can be greatly curtailed if not eliminated—or that its authority can be returned to the states and other democratically accountable political institutions. But, until there is a return to a constitutional structure that the Founding Fathers would have rec- ognized and a massive shrinking of the administrative state, conservatives cannot unilaterally disarm and fail to use the power of government to further a conserva- tive agenda. As experience shows, the administrative state will grow and further its own agenda, often at odds with conservative thought, even under conservative leadership. Unless conservatives take a firm hand to the bureaucracy and marshal its power to defend a freedom-promoting agenda, nothing will stop the bureaucra- cy’s anti–free market, leftist march. ESG Practices as a Cover for Anticompetitive Activity and Possible Unfair Trade Practices. It has long been suspected, and is now increasingly documented, that corporate social advocacy on issues ranging from “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (DEI) to the “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) movement also serves to launder corporate reputation and perhaps obtain favorable treatment from government actors. In a recent Senate Judiciary hear- ing, Senator Josh Hawley asked FTC Chair Lina Khan if the FTC had conditioned merger reviews on ESG or critical race theories adopted by the firms involved. Khan responded by saying that she turned down deals when firms offered social justice policies in return for approving unlawful deals. In response to a similar question from Senator Tom Cotton, Khan responded that firms try to come to the FTC to get out of antitrust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings, but that there is no ESG loophole in the antitrust laws.14 Her comments suggest that there is a movement of firms attempting to use both ESG and DEI as a sort of reputational laundering to avoid enforcement of potentially criminal activity. The FTC should set up an ESG/DEI collusion task force to investigate firms—particularly in private equity—to see if they are using the practice as a means to meet targets, fix prices, or reduce output. l Congress should investigate ESG practices as a cover for anticompetitive activity and possible unfair trade practices. The business of American business is business, not ideology. The privileges extended to corporations in American society come with the expectation that

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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