One Agency Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
ID: L000577
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
đ Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đ How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The One Agency Act (S 1059) claims to promote "vigorous, effective, and efficient enforcement" of antitrust laws by transferring responsibility from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The real purpose? Consolidate power, eliminate redundancy, and create a more convenient target for corporate lobbying.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill transfers all FTC antitrust actions, employees, assets, and funding to the DOJ. It also defines terms like "antitrust laws" and "transition period," because, of course, Congress needs to clarify what they mean by "antitrust." The Attorney General gets to determine the transfer dates, restructure the Antitrust Division, and use FTC office space until they can find their own.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
* Corporate America: Will likely rejoice at having a single point of contact for antitrust matters, making it easier to influence policy. * FTC employees: Get to experience the thrill of being transferred to a new agency, with all the uncertainty that comes with it. * DOJ: Gets to absorb more responsibilities, personnel, and funding. Joy. * Taxpayers: Foot the bill for this bureaucratic reshuffling.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic." It won't address the underlying issues with antitrust enforcement but will create new opportunities for:
* Regulatory capture: With a single agency in charge, corporations can focus their lobbying efforts more effectively. * Inefficiencies: The transition period will likely be marked by confusion, delays, and bureaucratic infighting. * Politicization: The Attorney General's newfound powers will make antitrust enforcement even more susceptible to political interference.
In conclusion, the One Agency Act is a solution in search of a problem. It's a thinly veiled attempt to consolidate power, reduce accountability, and create new avenues for corporate influence. But hey, at least it'll keep the lawyers busy.
Related Topics
đ° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
No individual contributions found
Donor Network - Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 31 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $72,000
Top Donors - Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 869 â 30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Adam Candeub MISSION/OVERVIEW Americaâs antitrust laws are over a century old. In 1890, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sherman Act,1 the first federal prohibition on trusts and restraints of trade. The Clayton Act,2 adopted in 1914, builds upon the Sherman Act, outlawing certain practices, such as price fixing, while bringing other business combinations, such as mergers and acquisitions, under regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),3 also adopted in 1914, gives the federal government legal tools to combat anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive practices in the marketplace, empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The FTCA prohibits âunfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.â Sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act empower the FTC to block unlawful tying contracts, unlawful corporate mergers and acquisitions, and inter- locking directorates. Under an amendment to the FTCA, the RobinsonâPatman Act,4 the FTC has authority to prohibit practices involving discriminatory pricing and product promotion. While the FTC has enforcement or administrative respon- sibilities under more than 70 laws, the FTCA and the Clayton Act are the focus of its regulatory energy. FTC actions, therefore, turn on the antitrust principles and market principles it adopts. Modern approaches to antitrust stress that the objective of antitrust law is to assure a competitive economyâwhich in economic terms maximizes both allocative efficiency (optimal distribution of goods and services, taking into account consumerâs preferences, so that prices tend toward marginal cost) and productive â 870 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise efficiency (using the least amount of resources for optimal output)âand thereby maximizes consumer welfare.5 Recently, however, many in the conservative movement have taken a broader view of antitrust. They point out that the authors of our antitrust laws did not intend this purely economic understanding of competitive marketsâand the normative assumptions that undergird itâto guide their legislation. First, these principles were only imperfectly worked out at the time the antitrust laws were passed. Second, contemporaneous statements concerning the Sherman and Clay- ton Acts demonstrate Congressâs concern about the political and economic power of the oil and railroad trusts of the first Gilded Age, and their influence on dem- ocratic institutions and civil society. Antitrust law can combat dominant firmsâ baleful effects on democratic institutions such as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior with government. Republican Senator John Sherman explained to Congress in support of his eponymous legislation: If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.6 Similarly, identifying the institutional threats that market concentration can pose, the former Republican President and future Supreme Court Justice William Howard Taft wrote at the time, The federal antitrust law is one of the most important statutes ever passed in this country. It was a step taken by Congress to meet what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil in combinations between many who had capital employed in a branch of trade, industry, or transportation, to obtain control of it, regulate prices, and make unlimited profit. Taft saw in this economic threat broader implications for American society since âthe building of great and powerful corporations which had, many of them, intervened in politics and through use of corrupt machines and bosses threatened us with a plutocracy.â7 Others in the conservative movement have maintained for numerous decades that an economic justification is the only coherent approach to the antitrust laws. Many view the first 90 years of U.S. antitrust policy as unprincipled in its approach, often resulting in policies that, by trying to protect smaller competitors, ended up
Introduction
â 869 â 30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Adam Candeub MISSION/OVERVIEW Americaâs antitrust laws are over a century old. In 1890, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sherman Act,1 the first federal prohibition on trusts and restraints of trade. The Clayton Act,2 adopted in 1914, builds upon the Sherman Act, outlawing certain practices, such as price fixing, while bringing other business combinations, such as mergers and acquisitions, under regulatory scrutiny. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),3 also adopted in 1914, gives the federal government legal tools to combat anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive practices in the marketplace, empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The FTCA prohibits âunfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.â Sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act empower the FTC to block unlawful tying contracts, unlawful corporate mergers and acquisitions, and inter- locking directorates. Under an amendment to the FTCA, the RobinsonâPatman Act,4 the FTC has authority to prohibit practices involving discriminatory pricing and product promotion. While the FTC has enforcement or administrative respon- sibilities under more than 70 laws, the FTCA and the Clayton Act are the focus of its regulatory energy. FTC actions, therefore, turn on the antitrust principles and market principles it adopts. Modern approaches to antitrust stress that the objective of antitrust law is to assure a competitive economyâwhich in economic terms maximizes both allocative efficiency (optimal distribution of goods and services, taking into account consumerâs preferences, so that prices tend toward marginal cost) and productive
Introduction
â 872 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise While the explanations for this shift are not clear, what is particularly disturbing is the possibility that these rents are extracted at least in part through regulatory captureâwhich can function as a bar to entrance for new competitors. In addition, the sheer cost of compliance with regulation favors large firms, which can more efficiently spread the cost of regulation over a larger revenue base and have the resources to invest in sophisticated government relations. The FTC must consider, therefore, the role of government itself in maintaining market concentration in areas ranging from pharmaceuticals and healthcare to avionics, banking, and real estate brokerage. Beyond undermining small businesses and reducing their salubrious moral effect on American civil society, concentration of economic power facilitates col- lusion between government and private actors, undermining the rule of law. The continued emergence of evidence documenting collusionâbetween the Big Tech internet platforms and the Biden White House and administrative agenciesâto censor criticism, scientific fact, and uncomfortable political truths demonstrates this unfortunate development. But, there are some caveats. First, the FTC lacks the power to revisit developments in antitrust laws, which have brought an invaluable rigor to the antitrust lawâmat- ters such as analyzing vertical integration, for example. Nor should it. Second, the FTCâs recent rescinding of its 2015 Policy Statement was undoubtedly ill-consid- ered.11 Of course, the consumer welfare standard must guide FTC action, but, in appropriate situations and with strong evidence, this standard must be expanded to include more factors than just price. Further, a similar standard of proof used to establish that a practice challenged by the Commission causes harm to competition must also apply in demonstrating the efficiencies that justify the practices. President Harry Truman reportedly made the famous quip, âGive me a one- handed economist. All my economists say âon the one handâŚâ, then âbut on the other.ââ When it comes to some of the more vexing issues in antitrust regulation, the conservative movement is in the same predicament. Many wish to preserve the productivity and efficiency focus of an economic-based consumer welfare standard approach to antitrust enforcements; others are more willing to look at the effects of business concentration in certain industries on innovation, the institutional resilience of our democracy, and childrenâs development. The following discussion sets forth policy principles and initiatives on which there was agreement among the contributors to this chapter, and notes and explains where there was dissent. NEEDED REFORMS Should the FTC Enforce Antitrustâor Even Continue to Exist? Some conservatives think that antitrust enforcement should be invested solely in the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTCâs commissioners are not removable at will by the President, which many quite reasonably believe violates the Vesting Clause
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.