AMERICA Act
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Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
ID: L000577
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The AMERICA Act, or "Advertising Middlemen Endangering Rigorous Internet Competition Accountability Act" - because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this mess and expose the real motivations behind it.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to promote competition in digital advertising by preventing conflicts of interest among middlemen. How noble. In reality, it's just another attempt to regulate an industry that's already being strangled by bureaucratic red tape. The main objective is to create a new layer of regulatory hurdles for companies to navigate, ensuring that only the largest players can afford to comply.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Clayton Act to introduce new definitions and prohibitions on certain business practices in digital advertising. It restricts companies with over $20 billion in digital ad revenue from owning both a buy-side and sell-side brokerage, or a digital advertising exchange. Because, you know, that's exactly what's been holding back competition in the industry - not the fact that Google and Facebook have a stranglehold on the market.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected: big tech companies, ad exchanges, buy-side and sell-side brokerages, and anyone else who dares to operate in the digital advertising space. But let's be real, this bill is designed to benefit one group: lawyers and lobbyists. The added complexity will create a new cottage industry of compliance experts and regulatory consultants.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The AMERICA Act will likely lead to:
* Increased costs for companies trying to comply with the new regulations * Reduced competition in the digital advertising space, as smaller players are priced out by the regulatory burden * More opportunities for lawyers and lobbyists to line their pockets with consulting fees * A further entrenchment of the status quo, where big tech companies continue to dominate the market
In short, this bill is a classic case of "regulatory capture" - where special interests use the regulatory process to maintain their grip on power. It's a disease that's been plaguing our legislative system for far too long.
Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity Syndrome (TSS) - a condition characterized by an inability to recognize the obvious consequences of one's actions, often accompanied by a severe case of cognitive dissonance.
Treatment: None. The patient is beyond help.
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Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
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Total contributions: $72,000
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 872 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise While the explanations for this shift are not clear, what is particularly disturbing is the possibility that these rents are extracted at least in part through regulatory captureâwhich can function as a bar to entrance for new competitors. In addition, the sheer cost of compliance with regulation favors large firms, which can more efficiently spread the cost of regulation over a larger revenue base and have the resources to invest in sophisticated government relations. The FTC must consider, therefore, the role of government itself in maintaining market concentration in areas ranging from pharmaceuticals and healthcare to avionics, banking, and real estate brokerage. Beyond undermining small businesses and reducing their salubrious moral effect on American civil society, concentration of economic power facilitates col- lusion between government and private actors, undermining the rule of law. The continued emergence of evidence documenting collusionâbetween the Big Tech internet platforms and the Biden White House and administrative agenciesâto censor criticism, scientific fact, and uncomfortable political truths demonstrates this unfortunate development. But, there are some caveats. First, the FTC lacks the power to revisit developments in antitrust laws, which have brought an invaluable rigor to the antitrust lawâmat- ters such as analyzing vertical integration, for example. Nor should it. Second, the FTCâs recent rescinding of its 2015 Policy Statement was undoubtedly ill-consid- ered.11 Of course, the consumer welfare standard must guide FTC action, but, in appropriate situations and with strong evidence, this standard must be expanded to include more factors than just price. Further, a similar standard of proof used to establish that a practice challenged by the Commission causes harm to competition must also apply in demonstrating the efficiencies that justify the practices. President Harry Truman reportedly made the famous quip, âGive me a one- handed economist. All my economists say âon the one handâŚâ, then âbut on the other.ââ When it comes to some of the more vexing issues in antitrust regulation, the conservative movement is in the same predicament. Many wish to preserve the productivity and efficiency focus of an economic-based consumer welfare standard approach to antitrust enforcements; others are more willing to look at the effects of business concentration in certain industries on innovation, the institutional resilience of our democracy, and childrenâs development. The following discussion sets forth policy principles and initiatives on which there was agreement among the contributors to this chapter, and notes and explains where there was dissent. NEEDED REFORMS Should the FTC Enforce Antitrustâor Even Continue to Exist? Some conservatives think that antitrust enforcement should be invested solely in the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTCâs commissioners are not removable at will by the President, which many quite reasonably believe violates the Vesting Clause
Introduction
â 872 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise While the explanations for this shift are not clear, what is particularly disturbing is the possibility that these rents are extracted at least in part through regulatory captureâwhich can function as a bar to entrance for new competitors. In addition, the sheer cost of compliance with regulation favors large firms, which can more efficiently spread the cost of regulation over a larger revenue base and have the resources to invest in sophisticated government relations. The FTC must consider, therefore, the role of government itself in maintaining market concentration in areas ranging from pharmaceuticals and healthcare to avionics, banking, and real estate brokerage. Beyond undermining small businesses and reducing their salubrious moral effect on American civil society, concentration of economic power facilitates col- lusion between government and private actors, undermining the rule of law. The continued emergence of evidence documenting collusionâbetween the Big Tech internet platforms and the Biden White House and administrative agenciesâto censor criticism, scientific fact, and uncomfortable political truths demonstrates this unfortunate development. But, there are some caveats. First, the FTC lacks the power to revisit developments in antitrust laws, which have brought an invaluable rigor to the antitrust lawâmat- ters such as analyzing vertical integration, for example. Nor should it. Second, the FTCâs recent rescinding of its 2015 Policy Statement was undoubtedly ill-consid- ered.11 Of course, the consumer welfare standard must guide FTC action, but, in appropriate situations and with strong evidence, this standard must be expanded to include more factors than just price. Further, a similar standard of proof used to establish that a practice challenged by the Commission causes harm to competition must also apply in demonstrating the efficiencies that justify the practices. President Harry Truman reportedly made the famous quip, âGive me a one- handed economist. All my economists say âon the one handâŚâ, then âbut on the other.ââ When it comes to some of the more vexing issues in antitrust regulation, the conservative movement is in the same predicament. Many wish to preserve the productivity and efficiency focus of an economic-based consumer welfare standard approach to antitrust enforcements; others are more willing to look at the effects of business concentration in certain industries on innovation, the institutional resilience of our democracy, and childrenâs development. The following discussion sets forth policy principles and initiatives on which there was agreement among the contributors to this chapter, and notes and explains where there was dissent. NEEDED REFORMS Should the FTC Enforce Antitrustâor Even Continue to Exist? Some conservatives think that antitrust enforcement should be invested solely in the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTCâs commissioners are not removable at will by the President, which many quite reasonably believe violates the Vesting Clause â 873 â Federal Trade Commission of Article II of the Constitution; it is for this reason that conservatives have long believed in either ending law enforcement activities of independent agencies or ending their independent status. The Supreme Court ruling in Humphreyâs Execu- tor12 upholding agency independence seems ripe for revisitingâand perhaps sooner than later.13 Others think that the postâNew Deal expansion of the administrative state has had baleful effects upon our society and earnestly share the hope that it can be greatly curtailed if not eliminatedâor that its authority can be returned to the states and other democratically accountable political institutions. But, until there is a return to a constitutional structure that the Founding Fathers would have rec- ognized and a massive shrinking of the administrative state, conservatives cannot unilaterally disarm and fail to use the power of government to further a conserva- tive agenda. As experience shows, the administrative state will grow and further its own agenda, often at odds with conservative thought, even under conservative leadership. Unless conservatives take a firm hand to the bureaucracy and marshal its power to defend a freedom-promoting agenda, nothing will stop the bureaucra- cyâs antiâfree market, leftist march. ESG Practices as a Cover for Anticompetitive Activity and Possible Unfair Trade Practices. It has long been suspected, and is now increasingly documented, that corporate social advocacy on issues ranging from âDiversity, Equity, and Inclusionâ (DEI) to the âenvironmental, social, and governanceâ (ESG) movement also serves to launder corporate reputation and perhaps obtain favorable treatment from government actors. In a recent Senate Judiciary hear- ing, Senator Josh Hawley asked FTC Chair Lina Khan if the FTC had conditioned merger reviews on ESG or critical race theories adopted by the firms involved. Khan responded by saying that she turned down deals when firms offered social justice policies in return for approving unlawful deals. In response to a similar question from Senator Tom Cotton, Khan responded that firms try to come to the FTC to get out of antitrust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings, but that there is no ESG loophole in the antitrust laws.14 Her comments suggest that there is a movement of firms attempting to use both ESG and DEI as a sort of reputational laundering to avoid enforcement of potentially criminal activity. The FTC should set up an ESG/DEI collusion task force to investigate firmsâparticularly in private equityâto see if they are using the practice as a means to meet targets, fix prices, or reduce output. l Congress should investigate ESG practices as a cover for anticompetitive activity and possible unfair trade practices. The business of American business is business, not ideology. The privileges extended to corporations in American society come with the expectation that
Introduction
â 850 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrudeâ unlawfully in their viewâon the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCCâs roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agencyâs affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumersâ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal governmentâs universal service investmentsâusing those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profitsâthese large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCCâs current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCCâs current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCCâs universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the programâs entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal governmentâs existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting Americaâs National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national â 851 â Federal Communications Commission security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During that time, the FCC eliminated federal subsidies for telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE, thereby greatly reducing the chances of that equipment finding a way into our nationâs communications networks. The FCC also stood up a program to rip and replace insecure network gear to ensure that it did not remain a threat lurking inside our systems. The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. There are, however, additional strong actions that the FCC can and should take to address the CCPâs malign campaign. Specifically: l Address TikTokâs threat to U.S. national security. As law enforcement officials have made clear, TikTok poses a serious and unacceptable risk to Americaâs national security.22 It also provides Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans. As of this writing, the Biden Administrationâs Treasury Department has not announced a final decision concerning its long-pending review of TikTok. If that inaction persists, or if the Administration allows TikTok to continue to operate in the U.S., a new Administration should ban the application on national security grounds. l Expand the FCCâs Covered List. The FCC maintains a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. It is known as the Covered List.23 Huawei is one of the companies on the Covered List, and its inclusion means that the FCC will no longer review or approve new applications from Huawei. Without FCC approval, new Huawei gear cannot be lawfully sold or used in the U.S. However, the FCC must do a better job of ensuring that its Covered List stays up to date and accounts for changes in corporate names and forms. Therefore, a new Administration should create a more regular and timely process for reviewing entities with ties to the CCPâs surveillance state. l End the unregulated end run. As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. in a manner that would require an FCC license or authorization because of the national security risks that those entities pose. However, many of these same entities are still operating in the U.S. and offering services very similar to the ones that they are prohibited from providing. China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or âunregulatedâ basis. A new Administration should work with the FCC to close this loophole. One way to do so would be for the FCC to prohibit any regulated carrier from interconnecting with an insecure provider.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.