A bill to require the heads of Federal agencies to submit to Congress an annual report regarding official time authorized under title 5, United States Code, and for other purposes.

Bill ID: 119/s/1170
Last Updated: April 4, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

ID: E000295

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senators Ernst and Blackburn. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Taxpayer-Funded Union Time Transparency Act" (because who doesn't love a good oxymoron?) claims to promote transparency in the use of official time by federal agencies for labor-related activities. In reality, its purpose is to harass and intimidate unions, making it more difficult for them to negotiate fair contracts.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires federal agencies to submit an annual report detailing various aspects of their labor relations, including the cost of official time, employee compensation, and expenses related to collective bargaining. It's a laundry list of bureaucratic busywork designed to overwhelm unions with paperwork and scrutiny.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Federal agencies, labor organizations, and employees who dare to exercise their right to collective bargaining will be affected by this bill. Unions will face increased administrative burdens, while federal agencies will enjoy the thrill of micromanaging every aspect of labor relations.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a thinly veiled attempt to weaken unions and undermine workers' rights. By creating an onerous reporting requirement, it aims to discourage federal employees from participating in collective bargaining and limit their ability to negotiate fair contracts. The real beneficiaries will be corporate interests and anti-union ideologues who've been salivating at the prospect of dismantling public sector unions.

Now, let's get to the diagnosis:

**Disease:** Unionophobia (a.k.a. "I'm-a-conservative-but-only-when-it-suits-me-itis") **Symptoms:** Irrational fear of collective bargaining, excessive reporting requirements, and a general disdain for workers' rights. **Treatment:** A healthy dose of reality, a pinch of empathy, and a strong antidote to partisan hackery.

In conclusion, this bill is a cynical exercise in union-bashing, dressed up as "transparency" and "accountability." It's a waste of time, money, and legislative bandwidth. But hey, who needs effective governance when you can indulge in ideological posturing?

Related Topics

Civil Rights & Liberties State & Local Government Affairs Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability National Security & Intelligence Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Federal Budget & Appropriations Congressional Rules & Procedures
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$406,600
29 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$398,900

No PAC contributions found

1
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ABEL, ANDREA MS.
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MCINERNEY, THOMAS E. MR.
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GRAY, C. BOYDEN
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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 57.8%
Pages: 636-638

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others — 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by

Introduction

Low 57.8%
Pages: 636-638

— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others

Introduction

Low 52.7%
Pages: 633-635

— 600 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of state or local employees are exempt from this filing requirement. These dis- closure requirements help workers and the public understand how union leaders are raising and spending union dues; they also can serve as a vital source of infor- mation that helps workers decide if the unions they are asked to join are good stewards of the funds they collect. DOL, under both George W. Bush and Donald Trump, tried rulemakings (known as the Intermediate Bodies Rule) that would require some government unions to file the same information that is required of private-sector unions. Under President Trump, OLMS required unions to disclose involvement in trusts that they either own a majority stake in or control. In the past, union trust spending has been hidden, and it appears that trust assets have occasionally been corruptly spent for the benefit of private interests in union leadership— such as $30,000 spent on a private party, $37,500 spent on a Montblanc pen, condominiums for those in power, golf outings, and a Ferrari.20 But the Biden DOL eliminated a transparency rule requiring the filing of the T-1 Trust Annual Report. More generally, OLMS, which is charged with enforcing the law of union dis- closure, has historically been underfunded when compared to other DOL agencies. This relative lack of funding has made ensuring disclosure more difficult. l Enact transparency rules. The substance of the Intermediate Bodies Rule should pass into law, either through rulemaking or through legislation. The T-1 Trust Annual Report annual filing requirement should be restored. l Increase funding levels. Congress should expand the funding of the Office of Labor-Management Standards. Duty of Fair Representation. Unions have a duty of fair representation to their members, yet they too often abuse that duty to use their members’ resources on left-wing culture-war issues that are unrelated, and in fact often harmful, to union members’ own interests. l The NLRB should take enforcement or amicus action advancing the position that political conflicts of interest by union leadership can support claims for breach of the duty of fair representation in a manner analogous to financial conflicts of interest and analogous to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in other areas of law. Interpreting “Protected Concerted Activity.” In an effort to prevent employers from retaliating against workers who express a desire to unionize, cer- tain activities are deemed “protected concerted activity” (under §7 of the NLRA).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.