SBA Fraud Enforcement Extension Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/1199
Last Updated: May 4, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

ID: E000295

Follow the money

The bill

SBA Fraud Enforcement Extension Act

S. 1199, 119th Congress — read as touching Restaurants & Food Service.

The sponsor

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$383,500 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

68% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 780-782 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Latest Action

Held at the desk.

May 3, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

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Passed Congress

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Joy, another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The SBA Fraud Enforcement Extension Act, because what's a pandemic without a healthy dose of fraud and corruption?

Let's dissect this mess, shall we? The bill extends the statute of limitations for fraud under certain pandemic programs from 5 to 10 years, because apparently, our esteemed lawmakers think that's enough time to catch all the clever crooks who've been siphoning off taxpayer money. I'm sure it has nothing to do with the fact that this extension will conveniently allow more time for their cronies and donors to cover their tracks.

The total funding amounts? Oh boy, it's a whopping $0. That's right, folks, this bill doesn't actually allocate any new funds; it just rearranges the deck chairs on the Titanic. The key programs receiving "funds" are the shuttered venue operators and restaurant revitalization grants, which were already allocated in previous bills. Notable increases or decreases? Ha! This bill is a masterclass in doing nothing while pretending to do something.

The real kicker is the requirement for the Attorney General to submit reports on the activities of the Department of Justice related to these programs every 90 days. Because what's more effective than generating more paperwork and bureaucratic red tape to distract from the fact that actual enforcement is lacking? It's like treating a patient with a severe case of corruption by prescribing them a healthy dose of administrative busywork.

The fiscal impact? Well, since this bill doesn't actually allocate any new funds, it won't directly contribute to the deficit. However, by extending the statute of limitations, it will likely lead to more investigations, prosecutions, and settlements, which will ultimately cost taxpayers more money in the long run. But hey, who's counting?

In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to appear tough on fraud while doing nothing to actually address the root causes of corruption. The sponsors of this bill should be ashamed, but let's be real, they're probably too busy laughing all the way to the bank to care.

Related Topics

Small Business & Entrepreneurship
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$383,500
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$375,800

No PAC contributions found

1
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
2 transactions
$6,700
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
ABEL, ANDREA MS.
1 transaction
$50,000
2
MCINERNEY, THOMAS E. MR.
1 transaction
$50,000
3
NICOLLS, BOB MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
4
GRAY, C. BOYDEN
1 transaction
$25,000
5
CATSIMATIDIS, JOHN A. MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
6
KOTICK, ROBERT MR.
1 transaction
$16,600
7
VINCZE, CHRISTOPHER
1 transaction
$15,800
8
FRANCE, BRIAN Z. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
9
BAKER, BERNARD J. MR. III
1 transaction
$15,000
10
HEGYI, ALBERT P. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
11
DAVISON, JAMES E. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
12
BROIN, JEFF MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
13
SHERRILL, STEPHEN C. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
14
GLEESON, JOHN W. MR.
1 transaction
$12,500
15
RAY-GLEESON, KAREN S. MRS.
1 transaction
$12,500
16
POPOLO, JOE
1 transaction
$11,800
17
PFAUTCH, ROY MR.
1 transaction
$11,600
18
GOLDMAN, MARC STANLEY
1 transaction
$10,000
19
SCHLOEMER, JAMES H. MR.
1 transaction
$10,000
20
SABIN, ANDREW MR.
1 transaction
$10,000

Donor Network - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 43 nodes and 23 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $383,500

Top Donors - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.

  • Section 2(b) extends the statute of limitations for fraud related to restaurant revitalization grants, increasing enforcement risk for recipients in the restaurant industry.

  • Section 2(a) extends the statute of limitations for fraud related to shuttered venue operators grants, which include live performance venues, theaters, and similar entities often associated with broadcast and media production.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate68.2%
Pages: 780-782

— 748 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise loan credit subsidy costs, and miscellaneous program “enhancements” to support small businesses through economic challenges or circumstances. As noted by the Congressional Research Service: Overall, the SBA’s appropriations have ranged from a high of over $761.9 billion in FY2020 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance to address economic damages caused by major hurricanes and for SBA lending program enhancements to help small businesses access capital during and immediately following recessions. For example, in FY2020, the SBA received over $760.9 billion in supplemental appropriations to assist small businesses adversely affected by the novel coronavirus (COVID- 19) pandemic.18 The CRS further notes that “[o]verall, since FY2000, appropriations for SBA’s other programs, excluding supplemental appropriations, have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation.”19 In terms of current loan volume, the SBA “reached nearly $43 billion in fund- ing to small businesses, providing more than 62,000 traditional loans through its 7(a), 504, and Microloan lending partners and over 1,200 investments through SBA licensed Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.”20 The agency’s total budgetary resources for FY 2022 amount to $44.25 billion, which represents 0.4 percent of the FY 2022 U.S. federal budget.21 HISTORY OF MISMANAGEMENT Throughout its history, various SBA programs and practices have generated negative news headlines and scathing Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) reports that have centered on mismanagement, lack of competent personnel and/or systems, and waste, fraud and abuse.22 From the 8a program23 to Hurricane Katrina24 to the more current COVID-19 (EIDL) program and PPP lending program,25 the SBA has managed to maintain its lending role even when repeated system failures have affected its distribution of funds. Congress has been somewhat responsive, pressuring the SBA to clean up fraud-related matters within its COVID-19 lending and grant programs.26 Repub- licans in the U.S. House of Representatives have gone farther, specifying that the SBA needs to improve transparency and accountability and deal with mission creep, the expansion of unauthorized programs, and structural and reporting deficiencies that have allowed mismanagement and fraud to reoccur, largely through massive supplemental appropriations.27 The SBA is led by an Administrator (currently a member of the President’s Cabinet) and a Deputy Administrator. Senate-confirmed appointees include — 749 — Small Business Administration the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Inspector General. Entrepreneurs and small businesses require limited-government policies that do not impede their risk-taking and growth. A future Administration can leverage and strengthen core SBA functions that have been fairly effective at reining in and calling attention to costly regulations and policies that are harmful to small businesses. This core advocacy function is aided both by statutory authority and by a network of small-business organizations and allies that support limited-gov- ernment policies.28 Moreover, an effective SBA Administrator and leadership team can work and advocate across the federal government to ensure that extreme regulatory poli- cies—or anticompetitive rules and actions that may favor big businesses over small businesses or international competitors over American small businesses—are dismantled or do not progress when proposed. MISSION CREEP AND ENLARGEMENT As noted, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives have evidenced con- cern about SBA mission creep and the need to make a sprawling, unaccountable agency more focused and operationally sound. Moreover, there is unease that the agency has moved from being open to any eligible small business searching for sup- port to being hyperfocused on “disproportionately impacted,” politically favored, or geographically situated small businesses and entrepreneurs. Today, initiatives aimed at “inclusivity” are in fact creating exclusivity and stringent selectivity in deciding what types of small businesses and entities can use SBA programs. For example, even though the SBA under President Donald Trump proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations29 to conform with Supreme Court decisions that have made their unconstitutionality clear, the SBA has not acted on the proposed rule and still uses religious exclusions in determining eligibility for business loans. Several other specific concerns include but are not limited to: l The SBA’s request to become a “designated voter agency” in response to President Biden’s executive order on “Promoting Access to Voting.”30 l The creation of duplicative channels and “pilot programs” for the delivery of business training rather than working through existing counseling partners. The programs are largely duplicative of private, state and local government, and educational system offerings.31 l A push to expand direct government lending.32

Introduction

Moderate60.8%
Pages: 792-794

— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

Introduction

Moderate60.8%
Pages: 792-794

— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 760 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 7953, Small Business Act, Public Law 85-536, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958, § 2, https://uscode.ecfr.io/ statutes/pl/85/536.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), amended by H.R. 4877, One Stop Shop for Small Business Compliance Act of 2021, Public Law 117-188, 117th Congress, October 20, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ188/PLAW-117publ188.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 2. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: Mission,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 3. Michael Faulkender, Robert Jackman, and Stephen I. Miran, “The Job-Preservation Effects of Paycheck Protection Program Loans,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 2020-01, December 2020, p. 9, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Job-Preservation-Effects- Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loans.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Kate Rogers, Scott Zamost, Karina Hernandez, and Jennifer Schlesinger, “As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs,” CNBC, April 15, 2021, https://www.cnbc. com/2021/04/15/as-pandemic-aid-was-rushed-to-main-street-criminals-seized-on-ppp-eidl-.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. Kevin Brewer, “Bills Extend Statute of Limitation for Prosecuting PPP, EIDL Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy, August 10, 2022, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/aug/bills-extend-statute-limitation- prosecuting-ppp-eidl-fraud.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. Sacha Pfeiffer, “Virtually All PPP Loans Have Been Forgiven with Limited Scrutiny,” NPR, October 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/12/1128207464/ppp-loans-loan-forgiveness-small-business#:~:text=As%20 COVID-19%20shutdowns%20threatened,early%20days%20of%20the%20pandemic (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: SBA History,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 8. President Richard Nixon, Executive Order 11518, “Providing for the Increased Representation of the Interests of Small Business Concerns Before Departments and Agencies of the United States Government,” March 20, 1970, in Federal Register, Vol. 35, No. 56 (March 21, 1970), pp. 4939–4940, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ service/ll/fedreg/fr035/fr035056/fr035056.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 9. S. 3331, Small Business Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-386, 93rd Congress, August 23, 1974, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg742.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 10. S. 299, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law No. 96-354, 96th Congress, September 19, 1980, https://www. congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1164.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 11. Maeve P. Carey, “The Regulatory Flex Act: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11900, August 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11900 (accessed February 18, 2023). 12. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “The Regulatory Flexibility Act,” https://advocacy.sba. gov/resources/the-regulatory-flexibility-act/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 13. H.R. 644, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-125, 114th Congress, February 24, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg122.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 14. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “Advocacy Releases Trade Report,” December 21, 2018, https://advocacy.sba.gov/2018/12/21/advocacy-releases-trade-report/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 15. Associated Press, “Reagan Offers $994-Billion ‘Hard-Choices’ 1987 Budget,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1986, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-05-mn-4369-story.html (accessed February 18, 2023). 16. Testimony of Hon. Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, Small Business Administration, in hearing, The President’s FY 2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005, p. 8, https://books.google.com/ books?id=UwD-2ICa8k8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 18, 2023). See also Report No. 109-49, Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities During the 108th Congress, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2005, p. 21, https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt49/CRPT-109srpt49.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).

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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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