Stop Stealing our Chips Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/1473
Last Updated: July 17, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

ID: R000605

Follow the money

The bill

Stop Stealing our Chips Act

S. 1473, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$132,600 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 852-854 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Held at the desk.

May 20, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The "Stop Stealing our Chips Act" - because who doesn't love a good title that sounds like it was focus-grouped by a committee of sleep-deprived interns? Let's dissect this farce and uncover the real disease beneath the symptoms.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to establish a whistleblower incentive program to prevent the diversion of leading-edge artificial intelligence chips into countries that are adversaries of the United States. How noble. In reality, it's just another attempt to appear tough on national security while lining the pockets of defense contractors and chip manufacturers.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by inserting a new section that establishes a whistleblower incentive program. Because what every bureaucracy needs is more red tape and another layer of complexity. The program promises to reward whistleblowers with fines and forfeitures, because nothing says "incentive" like the prospect of getting rich off someone else's misfortune.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: defense contractors, chip manufacturers, government agencies, and - of course - whistleblowers. The latter will be encouraged to report violations, but only if they're willing to navigate a Byzantine system that promises anonymity but likely delivers nothing but headaches and bureaucratic stonewalling.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative placebo effect." It looks good on paper, sounds tough, and will likely be touted as a major victory by the politicians who sponsored it. In reality, it will do little to address the actual issues surrounding export control violations. The real impact will be felt by the whistleblowers who dare to come forward, only to find themselves entangled in a web of bureaucratic red tape and potential retaliation.

Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a bad case of "Potemkin Village Syndrome" - it looks impressive on the surface but is hollow and ineffective beneath. The real disease is the corrupting influence of money and power, which has infected every level of government and industry. Treatment: a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for the inevitable bureaucratic nonsense, and a willingness to call out the politicians and lobbyists for their blatant hypocrisy. Prognosis: poor. This bill will likely pass, but it won't make a dent in the real problems plaguing our national security. Just another day in the swamp that is Washington D.C.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$460,475
132 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$2,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$457,975

No PAC contributions found

1
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$2,000
2
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
HEGYI, ALBERT
4 transactions
$19,800
2
ROWAN, CAROLYN
4 transactions
$19,800
3
ROWAN, MARC J
4 transactions
$19,800
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JEPSEN, EDWARD G
4 transactions
$16,500
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VIELEHR, BYRON
5 transactions
$15,000
6
RUBERTON, ROBERT
4 transactions
$13,400
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GRANIERI, ROBERT
4 transactions
$13,200
8
FISHER, KENNETH
2 transactions
$10,100
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FISHER, SHERRILYN
2 transactions
$10,100
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NICHELE, NOVALENA
2 transactions
$10,000
11
JACOBSEN, MARK
2 transactions
$9,900
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JEPSEN, PETER
2 transactions
$9,900
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PFAUTCH, ROY
2 transactions
$9,900
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RABOIS, KEITH
2 transactions
$9,900
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SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
2 transactions
$9,900
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SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN A.
2 transactions
$9,900
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WILLOX, NORMAN
2 transactions
$9,900
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HICKS, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$9,500
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ENTWISTLE, ANDREW MR.
2 transactions
$6,700
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NEIMAN, JIM D
5 transactions
$6,700
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DUHAMEL, KATHARINE
1 transaction
$6,600
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LOVIER, HEATHER
2 transactions
$6,600
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RUNDE, DANIEL
2 transactions
$6,600
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SCHIEFFER, KEVIN
2 transactions
$6,600
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WALTERS, ROBERT
2 transactions
$6,600
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SAMBUR, DAVID
2 transactions
$5,200
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DARWISH, SAM
2 transactions
$5,000
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GAUFIN, JEFFERSON
2 transactions
$5,000
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GAUFIN, LYNN
2 transactions
$5,000
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JACOBSON, GARRY W
2 transactions
$5,000
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WOOD, ELAINE M
2 transactions
$5,000
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DUHAMEL, WILLIAM
5 transactions
$4,800
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LEAS, BRET
2 transactions
$4,800
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GLENNON, ROBERT
2 transactions
$4,000
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MALLOY, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$4,000
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SOBEL, AARON
2 transactions
$3,600
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ARNOLD, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
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CASCARILLA, CHARLES
1 transaction
$3,300
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CASCARILLA, MARISSA
1 transaction
$3,300
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FITZPATRICK, JENNIFER
1 transaction
$3,300
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FOGEL, DAVID
1 transaction
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GOLDMAN, MARC
1 transaction
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JEPSEN, DIANE F
1 transaction
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MARQUIS, DUSTIN
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WALKER, KENT
1 transaction
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WALTERS, ROBERT D
1 transaction
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NAPPI, DOUGLAS
3 transactions
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GLACKIN, BRIAN
4 transactions
$3,000
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HOLLAND, LUCAS
4 transactions
$3,000
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KLEINMAN, SCOTT
1 transaction
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LONSDALE, JOE
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SCHWARTZ, TODD
1 transaction
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SPECK, ADAM
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STEPHENS, TYLER
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CAMBON, PAUL F
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DRESCHER, STEPHANIE
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DUKES, DAN
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EDSON, CHRISTOPHER L
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MADDOX, BRANDON L
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MORONEY, JOSEPH
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SUYDAM, JOHN
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WOLFSON, LEN
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ZITO, JOHN
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MARQUIS, DARRELL
1 transaction
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ZELTER, JAMES
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KURIAN, THOMAS
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KWON, DANIEL
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BRENNAN, MICHAEL
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HE, LINGLONG
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$1,400
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POWELL, TANNER
1 transaction
$1,300
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ANDERSON, JOHN
1 transaction
$1,000
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CODA, CAROLYN
2 transactions
$1,000
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CORLEY, SCOTT
1 transaction
$1,000
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DEVIERNO, JOHN A
2 transactions
$1,000
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GORDON`, STEVE`
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IMPERATORE, BRANT
1 transaction
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ISAAC, PAUL J.
1 transaction
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JANDREAU, TIA
1 transaction
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KURTENBACH, REECE
1 transaction
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1 transaction
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LEDFORD, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$1,000
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LIVINGSTON, ROBERT
2 transactions
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1 transaction
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MILNE, JOHN D
2 transactions
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1 transaction
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NEAL, JEFFREY
1 transaction
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PIPER, WILLIAM
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RAFFANIELLO, PAT
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TIESZEN, RICHARD
2 transactions
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VEALENCIS, JOSEPH
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JOHNS, SUSAN
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
$500
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1 transaction
$500
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1 transaction
$500
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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1 transaction
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NORD MALLARD, JENNIFER
1 transaction
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OKUN, BERNARD R
1 transaction
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POLLMAN ROGERS, DARLA
1 transaction
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PUNT, RYAN
1 transaction
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PUSZYNSKI, JAN
1 transaction
$500
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PUSZYNSKI, MATTHEW
1 transaction
$500
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SEMMLER, KARA
1 transaction
$500
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SHUMWAY, CLAYTON
1 transaction
$500
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SINGH, JASJIT
1 transaction
$500
127
STOWELL, NICK
1 transaction
$500
128
SWEENEY, ROB
1 transaction
$500
129
WRIGHT, ALEX
1 transaction
$500

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Warner, Mark R. [D-VA]

ID: W000805

Top Contributors

23

1
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE, LLC
OrganizationROANOKE, VA
$5,300
Sep 25, 2024
2
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$600
Sep 28, 2023
3
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$400
Sep 28, 2023
4
DEKKER, DAVID T.
PILLSBURY • VICE CHAIR
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$9,900
Dec 31, 2024
5
TULL, THOMAS
TULCO • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$6,000
Nov 21, 2024
6
SWARTZ, SUSAN
SELF EMPLOYED • ARTIST
IndividualPARK CITY, UT
$3,300
Jul 31, 2023
7
MATNEY, JOHN
RAPOCA ENERGY COMPANY • PARTNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023
8
MILLONES, PETER
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. • ATTORNEY
IndividualDARIEN, CT
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
9
MATNEY, JUSTIN K
SELF EMPLOYED • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023
10
MATNEY, JOHN
RAPOCA ENERGY COMPANY • PARTNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 59 nodes and 59 connections

Total contributions: $59

Top Donors - Sen. Rounds, Mike [R-SD]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • The bill establishes a whistleblower incentive program for violations of export control laws, specifically targeting diversion of leading-edge AI chips to adversarial countries (Findings (1)). This benefits semiconductor companies by enhancing enforcement against illegal exports that undermine their market and national security.

  • The bill focuses on preventing diversion of leading-edge artificial intelligence chips (Findings (1)), which directly benefits AI and cloud infrastructure providers by protecting their intellectual property and market position from illicit transfers to adversaries.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Strengthening export controls on AI chips (Findings (1)) helps defense contractors by preventing adversaries from obtaining advanced technologies that could be used against U.S. military interests, thus protecting defense-related supply chains.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Very Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 852-854AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly strengthens enforcement of U.S. export control laws to prevent diversion of advanced chips to adversaries, which aligns with Project 2025's trade focus on countering China's economic aggression and protecting U.S. technology and intellectual property."

Key themes:export controlstechnology transferChina economic aggressionnational securitywhistleblower incentives

— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strengthens enforcement of U.S. export control laws by incentivizing whistleblowers to report violations, directly supporting Project 2025's objective to tighten export controls, improve detection of illicit technology transfers, and protect national security—particularly concerning advanced AI chips destined for adversary nations."

Key themes:export control enforcementwhistleblower incentivesnational securitytechnology transfer preventionAI chip safeguards

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill establishes a whistleblower incentive program to detect and report export control violations, directly supporting Project 2025's goal of strengthening export enforcement and tightening controls on adversary nations like China and Russia."

Key themes:export control enforcementnational securitypreventing technology transfer to adversarieswhistleblower incentivesEAR modernization

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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