Critical Infrastructure Manufacturing Feasibility Act
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Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
ID: E000295
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
(sigh) Oh joy, another congressional bill that's about as useful as a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. Let's dissect this mess.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The Critical Infrastructure Manufacturing Feasibility Act (CIMFA) is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak. Its main purpose is to conduct a study – because, you know, the government loves studies almost as much as it loves wasting taxpayer money. The objective? To determine if it's feasible to manufacture products for critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Wow, what a revolutionary idea.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill directs the Secretary of Commerce to conduct this study within one year (because urgency is not exactly Congress's strong suit). It defines "critical infrastructure sector" using an existing presidential directive from 2013 – because who needs original thought? The study will identify products necessary for critical infrastructure, analyze costs and benefits, and recommend manufacturing locations. Oh, and it'll also identify any federal policies that might inhibit manufacturing in the United States. How convenient.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The usual suspects: manufacturers, industry lobbyists, and politicians looking to score points with their constituents. But let's be real – this bill is a gift to special interest groups who will use it to justify protectionist policies and subsidies for their pet industries.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
This bill is a classic case of "legislative theater." It looks like something substantial, but it's just a smokescreen. The study will likely conclude that manufacturing in the United States is feasible (shocker), and then Congress will use this as an excuse to pass more protectionist laws, tariffs, or subsidies for favored industries.
The real disease here is the politicians' addiction to crony capitalism and their inability to address the root causes of America's manufacturing decline. This bill is just a symptom – a feeble attempt to treat the symptoms rather than the underlying illness.
In short, CIMFA is a waste of time and money. It's a cynical ploy to appease special interests and pretend that Congress is doing something about America's manufacturing woes. Don't be fooled – this bill is nothing more than a placebo for the terminally stupid.
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Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 620 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and formula grants, known as obligations, annually in areas ranging from transit systems to road construction to universities and has lent or subsidized more than $60 billion since the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program,3 now managed by the Build America Bureau, was created in 1998. This evolved role as a major, and often primary, funding and financing source is far from the department’s original policy framework. It also removes incentives for state and local officials to ensure that investments are worthwhile, because federal money removes the need to get public buy-in to build and maintain infrastructure projects as funding becomes “someone else’s money.” Despite the department’s tremendous resources, congressional mandates and funding priorities have made it difficult for DOT to focus on the pressing trans- portation challenges that most directly affect average Americans, such as the high cost of personal automobiles, especially in an era of high inflation; unpredictable and expensive commercial shipping by rail, air, and sea; and infrastructure spend- ing that does not match the types of transportation that most Americans prefer. Transforming the department to address the varied needs of all Americans more effectively remains a central challenge. DOT is particularly difficult to manage because its 11 major components—nine modal administrations, the Office of the Secretary, and the Office of the Inspector General—all have their own sets of personnel including administrators, deputy administrators, chiefs of staff, and general counsels. Most grants flow through the modes, such as the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administra- tion, and Federal Aviation Administration. The Office of the Secretary contains its own grantmaking operation that funds research and some special grants, as well as a major lending operation, the Build America Bureau, that functions as an infrastructure bank. The Office of the Sec- retary has department-wide offices for such functions as Budget and Financial Management, the General Counsel, Policy, the Office of Research and Technology, Government Affairs, Administration, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, Public Affairs, Drug and Alcohol Policy and Compliance, and Civil Rights. The modal administrations include the: l Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); l Federal Highway Administration (FHWA); l Federal Railroad Administration (FRA); l National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); l Federal Transit Administration (FTA); — 621 — Department of Transportation l Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (GLS); l Maritime Administration (MARAD); l Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); and l Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). DOT’s fundamental problem is that instead of being able to focus on providing Americans with affordable and abundant transportation, it has become saddled with congressional requirements that reduce the department to a de facto grant- making organization. Yet there is little need for much of this grantmaking, for two reasons: l New technology enables private companies to charge for transportation in many areas, which could transform how innovation is financed. It is vital to consider the role of user fees and other pricing innovations with regard to transportation infrastructure. Airport landing fees for aircraft, toll charges on roads and bridges, and per-gallon taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel are all examples of user charges that affect the decisions of transportation system users. These changes could shift our nation’s transportation away from being a top–down system that is misaligned with the needs of so many Americans. Increasing private-sector financing could revolutionize travel and increase everyday mobility to its greatest potential in a way that Americans prefer. Doing so would keep transportation decisions out of the hands of bureaucrats in Washington, D.C., who are far removed from local problems and preferences. l If funding must be federal, it would be more efficient for the U.S. Congress to send transportation grants to each of the 50 states and allow each state to purchase the transportation services that it thinks are best. Such an approach would enable states to prioritize different types of transportation according to the needs of their citizens. States that rely more on automotive transportation, for example, could use their funding to meet those needs. Meanwhile, many Americans continue to confront serious challenges with their day-to-day transportation, including costs that have increased dramati- cally in recent years. DOT in its current form is insufficiently equipped to address those problems. DOT’s discretionary grant-making processes should be abol- ished, and funding should be focused on formulaic distributions to the states, which know best their transportation needs and are incentivized to think of the
Introduction
— 804 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise CHART 2 Total U.S. Industrial Production INDEX 2017=100 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Industrial Production: Total Index,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO (accessed March 2, 2023). A heritage.org Federal Reserve research shows that the tariffs have cost about 75,000 manufac- turing jobs while creating only about 1,000 jobs in the steel industry—not including the effects of the retaliatory tariffs described above.58 Higher steel prices added an average of $250 to the price of new cars, and larger trucks—the vehicle of choice in rural America—were hit even more dramatically.59 Trade is generally a win-win for both participants. Tariffs are a lose-lose-lose game, with the tariff raiser losing affordable goods, the tariff target losing exports, and the tariff raiser losing again from retaliatory tariffs. Tariffs also have an addi- tional overlooked hidden cost: Companies redirect resources to dodge tariffs by redesigning products, switching to more expensive suppliers, using lower-qual- ity materials, and lobbying. This might be good for lawyers, but it is bad for the economy. These resources could have been used instead to make a better product more cheaply. — 805 — Trade Conservatives warned against retaliation from the beginning: It was exactly what happened after the 1930 Smoot–Hawley tariffs that worsened the Great Depression.60 Undoing the Normalization of Protectionism. Inertia is one of the strongest forces in politics. Radical new policies can become the new normal very quickly and are extremely difficult to unwind if they backfire. This happened with the Trump Administration’s progressive turn on protectionism. The Biden Administration quickly undid the Trump Administration’s conservative regulatory reforms but left its progressive, self-defeating trade policies in place—in many cases even strengthening them. Two presidential Administrations is a long time in politics, and the next conser- vative Administration will have a tough time getting tariff relief past a bureaucracy that dislikes change and special interests that will fight hard to preserve their special privileges. But given the stakes for future American prosperity, it will be worth it. Dealing with Disruption. It is true that trade is disruptive. Though its long- run effect on employment is approximately zero, in the short run it can cost jobs and even depopulate towns.61 America’s resilience depends on its ability to adjust, but successful and timely adaptation is generally spontaneous in nature—the work of human action but not human design. Planned adjustment by governments has a much poorer track record. Context is also important to adjustment efforts. Technological change costs approximately six times more jobs as does trade (though, again, only in the short run).62 Any argument made against trade’s disruptive effects applies even more strongly to technological change, yet no one seriously argues for reversing the dramatic changes the Internet has wrought. More than 11 million American jobs turn over through hirings, firings, retire- ments, layoffs, and resignations every month,63 and nearly 85 percent of all jobs turn over in the course of a year. Yet America has suffered only four bouts of double-digit unemployment during the past century. Two of them, the Great Depression and the comedown from the 1970s stagflation, were due to monetary mismanagement, not trade.64 The third, the Great Recession, was due to a financial crisis worsened by monetary mismanagement, not trade.65 The fourth was due to COVID-19 lockdowns, not trade.66 Using trade restrictions to slow this churn is a mistake for two reasons: (1) trade is at best a minor contributor to job churn compared to other factors like tech- nology, changing consumer tastes, inflation, and business cycles, and (2) churn is evidence of a healthy economy. Agricultural economies have low job churn and low living standards. When people see better opportunities, they should be allowed to pursue them. To do otherwise slows economic growth, harms individual dignity, removes
Introduction
— 804 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise CHART 2 Total U.S. Industrial Production INDEX 2017=100 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Industrial Production: Total Index,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO (accessed March 2, 2023). A heritage.org Federal Reserve research shows that the tariffs have cost about 75,000 manufac- turing jobs while creating only about 1,000 jobs in the steel industry—not including the effects of the retaliatory tariffs described above.58 Higher steel prices added an average of $250 to the price of new cars, and larger trucks—the vehicle of choice in rural America—were hit even more dramatically.59 Trade is generally a win-win for both participants. Tariffs are a lose-lose-lose game, with the tariff raiser losing affordable goods, the tariff target losing exports, and the tariff raiser losing again from retaliatory tariffs. Tariffs also have an addi- tional overlooked hidden cost: Companies redirect resources to dodge tariffs by redesigning products, switching to more expensive suppliers, using lower-qual- ity materials, and lobbying. This might be good for lawyers, but it is bad for the economy. These resources could have been used instead to make a better product more cheaply.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.