The bill
DISRUPT Act
S. 1883, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
ID: C001088
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1883, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 155-157 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 99.
June 17, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DISRUPT Act (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) aims to "disrupt growing cooperation" among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – the usual suspects in the US foreign policy rogues' gallery. The bill's sponsors claim it will help mitigate risks posed by these countries to the United States. How quaint.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the executive branch to develop a "whole-of-government strategy" (read: more bureaucratic jargon) to counter the alleged threats from these nations. It also cites various existing laws and definitions, because who doesn't love a good game of legislative Mad Libs? The key provisions are:
* Requiring the executive branch to submit a report on its strategy within 180 days * Mandating regular briefings to Congress on the implementation of this strategy * Creating a new "whole-of-government" approach (yawn) to counter these countries' cooperation
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
* The US government, which will get to spend more taxpayer dollars on bureaucratic exercises and reports * China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who will likely just laugh at this feeble attempt to "disrupt" their cooperation * Various defense contractors and lobbyists, who will salivate over the prospect of new funding for counter-measures and "strategic partnerships"
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of legislative placebo effect. It's designed to make Congress look like it's doing something about the perceived threats from these countries, while actually accomplishing nothing concrete.
The real impact will be:
* More bureaucratic red tape and reports that will collect dust on some shelf in Washington * Increased funding for defense contractors and lobbyists, who will use this bill as a justification for more pork-barrel spending * A further erosion of US credibility on the world stage, as other nations realize that Congress is more interested in grandstanding than actual diplomacy
In short, the DISRUPT Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice – a feel-good measure designed to appease voters and special interests, rather than addressing any real problems. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001243
Top Contributors
10
ID: K000367
Top Contributors
10
ID: C001056
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001198
Top Contributors
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ID: B001267
Top Contributors
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ID: M001190
Top Contributors
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ID: S001208
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 59 nodes and 37 connections (55 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $340,647
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped, 2 harmed.
Section 4(c)(2)(D) mentions increasing United States and allied munitions stockpiles and facilitating collaborative efforts with allies for the co-production of critical munitions, which would benefit defense contractors.
Section 3 mentions using the threat of sanctions and export controls to disrupt cooperation among adversaries, which could negatively impact private equity and hedge funds invested in these countries.
The bill's focus on disrupting adversary cooperation and mitigating risks to the United States includes addressing cyber threats, which would benefit cybersecurity companies.
Section 4(c)(2)(D) mentions co-production and co-sustainment of critical platforms required by the United States and allies, which could include aerospace companies.
Section 4(c) mentions ensuring the integrity of United States methods of economic statecraft, including sanctions and export control enforcement, which could affect big-box retail companies with international supply chains.
Section 4(c)(2)(D) mentions co-production and co-sustainment of critical platforms, which could include telecommunications infrastructure.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next — 124 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. 1. Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft. 2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM. 3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370. l Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade. l Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. 1. Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned. 2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis. 3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. l Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons.
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.