The bill
A bill to improve the safety and security of Members of Congress, immediate family members of Members of Congress, and congressional staff.
S. 2144, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN]
ID: K000367
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2144, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 266-268 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
October 9, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another bill from the esteemed members of Congress, because what they really need is more protection and secrecy. I mean, who doesn't love a good game of "hide the politician's personal info"?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to shield Members of Congress, their families, and congressional staff from the prying eyes of the public. Because, you know, they're just so much more special than everyone else. The objective is to restrict access to their personal information, including home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and social security numbers.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill defines "at-risk individuals" as Members of Congress, their families, and congressional staff. It also establishes a new category of "covered employees" who will be protected under this law. The bill prohibits data brokers from collecting, assembling, or maintaining personal information about these at-risk individuals without their consent.
Oh, but wait, there are exceptions! If you're a journalist or a news organization, you can still collect and publish this information if it's "intended to inform the public on matters of public interest or public concern." Because, clearly, the public has a right to know about the personal lives of their elected officials... unless they don't.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include Members of Congress, their families, congressional staff, and data brokers. But let's be real, the only stakeholders who really matter are the politicians themselves. They're the ones who get to decide what information is "covered" and what isn't.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the makings of a classic case of "legislative theater." It's a feel-good measure that sounds good on paper but accomplishes nothing in reality. The real impact will be to further insulate politicians from accountability and transparency. After all, who needs to know where their elected officials live or how they're spending taxpayer dollars?
The implications are clear: this bill is just another example of Congress's ongoing efforts to shield itself from scrutiny and criticism. It's a symptom of a larger disease – the corruption and self-interest that pervades our political system.
In short, this bill is a joke. A bad joke. The kind of joke that makes you wonder if anyone in Washington actually cares about transparency or accountability. But hey, at least they're trying to protect themselves from us pesky citizens. That's what really matters, right?
Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001098
Top Contributors
52
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 48 nodes and 62 connections
Total contributions: $62
Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section (d)(1)(B)(i) prohibits persons, businesses, or associations (including telecommunications carriers) from publicly posting or displaying covered information on the internet if a written request has been made, imposing compliance costs and restrictions on telecommunications companies that may provide directory assistance or similar services.
Section (d)(1)(B)(i) applies to any person, business, or association, which includes print and broadcast media entities, restricting them from publicly posting covered information online upon request, imposing operational burdens.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on shielding personal information of Members of Congress and staff from data brokers aligns with the Intelligence Community's concern about protecting officials from exploitation and foreign intelligence collection, though it does not directly address core IC reforms or oversight."
— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on shielding personal data of Members of Congress and their families from public disclosure, while the Project 2025 excerpt addresses intelligence community neutrality, FISA reforms, and preventing politicization of intelligence. Both touch on protecting individuals from misuse of information, but their primary objectives and policy domains differ significantly."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on shielding personal data of congressional members and staff, while the Project 2025 DHS section emphasizes broader homeland security priorities such as immigration enforcement and border security; both touch on personal information protection but serve different audiences and objectives."
— 168 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, § 101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 2. See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed March 14, 2023). 3. H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79- Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 4. Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/ PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 5. 8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023). 6. 18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023). 7. 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed March 14, 2023). 8. Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_ Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20 %24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20 President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5. 9. H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW- 110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 10. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/ download (accessed January 18, 2023). 11. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed January 18, 2023). 12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 14. Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023). 15. 5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023). 16. S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 17. H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 18. H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Providing for consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 18) disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to "Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions''; providing for consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 28) disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to ''Defining Larger Participants of a Market for General-Use Digital Consumer Payment Applications''; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1526) to amend title 28, United States Code, to limit the authority of district courts to provide injunctive relief, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 22) to amend the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 to require proof of United States citizenship to register an individual to vote in elections for Federal office, and for other purposes; and for other purposes.
Electing Members to certain standing committees of the House of Representatives.
MY DATA Act of 2025