China Exchange Rate Transparency Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/2146
Last Updated: December 8, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

ID: M001243

Follow the money

The bill

China Exchange Rate Transparency Act of 2025

S. 2146, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$273,350 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 816-818 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 236.

October 29, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant piece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. The China Exchange Rate Transparency Act of 2025 - because what the world really needs is more transparency from a country that's about as transparent as a brick wall.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to require the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to advocate for increased transparency from China regarding its exchange rate policies. Because, you know, China has been so forthcoming with information in the past. The bill also aims to "enhance multilateral and bilateral surveillance" of China's exchange rate arrangements by the IMF.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the US Executive Director at the IMF to use their voice and vote to advocate for increased transparency from China. It also requires the Department of the Treasury to report to Congress on China's compliance with its obligations under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The main parties affected by this bill are:

* The People's Republic of China (because they're the ones being "encouraged" to be more transparent) * The International Monetary Fund (because they'll have to deal with the US Executive Director's newfound enthusiasm for transparency) * The Department of the Treasury (because they'll have to report on China's compliance)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's get real here. This bill is nothing but a symbolic gesture, a feeble attempt to appear tough on China while accomplishing precisely nothing. China will continue to do what it wants, and the IMF will continue to be toothless in its attempts to enforce transparency.

The real impact of this bill will be to provide a nice soundbite for politicians to tout their "toughness" on China, while actually doing nothing to address the underlying issues. It's a classic case of legislative placebo - it might make you feel better, but it won't actually cure anything.

In short, this bill is a waste of time and resources, a perfect example of the kind of empty posturing that passes for governance in Washington D.C.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$273,350
29 donors
PACs
$2,500
Organizations
$33,250
Committees
$0
Individuals
$237,600
1
SIG SAUER PAC
1 transaction
$2,500
1
SEGURO MEDICO LLC
1 transaction
$10,000
2
CLEMENTS MIDWAY PARTNERS LLC
1 transaction
$10,000
3
BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC
2 transactions
$4,700
4
SUN CENTER LP
1 transaction
$2,500
5
UTILITY ADVISORY GROUP LLC
1 transaction
$1,500
6
MODEVITY LLC
1 transaction
$1,500
7
O'DONNELL PARTNERS LLC
1 transaction
$1,500
8
KRAUSE & ASSOCIATES LP
1 transaction
$1,000
9
GVH PARTNERS
1 transaction
$500
10
MARSHALL LINE FENCE LLC
1 transaction
$50

No committee contributions found

1
ATKINS, PAUL S.
1 transaction
$13,200
2
KUEHNER, CARL
1 transaction
$13,200
3
TSYGANSKIY, IGOR
1 transaction
$13,200
4
SCARAMUCCI, ANTHONY
1 transaction
$13,200
5
REIBEL, JAMES
1 transaction
$13,200
6
CHAI, CHUCKRA
1 transaction
$13,200
7
BREED, ALAN
1 transaction
$13,200
8
DUBIN, GLENN
1 transaction
$13,200
9
MCCORMICK, DOUG
1 transaction
$13,200
10
THOMAS, AMY L.
1 transaction
$13,200
11
WALLACE, JENNIFER A.
1 transaction
$13,200
12
MCGAVICK, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$13,200
13
PATEL, CHIRAG
1 transaction
$13,200
14
PSAROS, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$13,200
15
OBERNDORF, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$13,200
16
MINNIS, CHRISTINA MRS.
1 transaction
$13,200
17
LACKIE, JAMES D. MR.
1 transaction
$13,200
18
KERKO, DAVID
1 transaction
$13,200

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]

ID: C001113

Top Contributors

10

1
LAS VEGAS PAIUTE TRIBE
OrganizationLAS VEGAS, NV
$3,300
Nov 28, 2023
2
MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,500
Dec 20, 2023
3
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,500
Oct 2, 2024
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Apr 26, 2024
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jul 11, 2023
6
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION
OrganizationOKMULGEE, OK
$1,000
Sep 18, 2024
7
MOHEGAN TRIBE OF INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT
OrganizationUNCASVILLE, CT
$1,000
Aug 12, 2024
8
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$550
Oct 2, 2023
9
LONGTIN, LUANN
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$17,325
Jun 30, 2024
10
SLIFKA, ROSALYN
IndividualWALTHAM, MA
$5,800
Jun 30, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 54 nodes and 33 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $280,650

Top Donors - Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC10 Orgs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.70

    Section 3(a)(1) advocates for increased transparency from China regarding its exchange rate policies, including indirect foreign exchange market intervention through Chinese financial institutions, which could impact US banks operating in China or with significant exposure to the Chinese market.

  • −Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.60

    Section 3(a)(4) implies increased scrutiny of Hong Kong's financial system, which may impact tech companies with significant operations there, such as those involved in fintech or digital payments.

  • −Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.60

    Section 3(a)(4) mentions increased transparency regarding mechanisms influencing exchange rate arrangements, potentially affecting cryptocurrency markets and exchanges operating in Hong Kong.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 61 contributions
    • WOLFF, CANDIDA PEROTTI$9,900
    • MCINTOSH, BRENT$3,300
    • NICHOLS, ROB$3,300
    • WOLFF, CANDIDA P.$2,500
    • KANE, JEFFREY$2,186
  • from 8 contributions
    • CHOI, EMILIE$13,200
    • GREWAL, PAUL$3,300
    • SHIRZAD, FARYAR$3,300
    • SALITERMAN, ROB$1,000
    • SUAREZ, JUAN$1,000
  • from 2 contributions
    • BROWN, ALMADALE$9,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly targets China's exchange rate practices—a form of currency manipulation highlighted in Project 2025 as a key element of Communist China's economic aggression—by seeking greater transparency through IMF surveillance, thus aligning with the broader goal of countering China's unfair trade policies."

Key themes:currency manipulationChina economic aggressionIMF oversighttrade transparencyexchange rate policy

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut

Trade

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 843-845AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to increase transparency of China's exchange rate policies via IMF surveillance, which supports a multifaceted, long-term approach to addressing China's economic practices—a core element of Project 2025's China policy and its emphasis on using multilateral tools to safeguard U.S. trade and national security interests."

Key themes:China policyeconomic transparencymultilateral surveillancetrade-related national securityIMF oversight

— 810 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is important not to oversell trade’s inflation benefits as a cure-all, but at the margin, it can help. The next Administration should keep this in mind as it tries to cope with this politically volatile issue. Trade and Foreign Policy. We have seen how trade liberalization would boost the domestic economy and make American businesses more competitive, but conservative trade policies also benefit America’s foreign policy interests. Policy- makers should therefore: l Negotiate multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. l Reform the World Trade Organization or build a successor organization with membership limited to liberal democracies. l Repeal the Jones Act to replace Russian energy imports with domestic production. l Develop a multifaceted, long-term China policy that takes seriously America’s biggest foreign policy threat and deals with it on several fronts. National Security. The most persuasive arguments against a market-oriented trade policy come from another national objective: national security. Protection- ism and similar progressive policies tend to weaken American security, but trade creates peace. The more countries trade, the less likely they are to fight one another and the more robust their supply networks will be. Going to war with customers is bad for business. Without a strong economic interest in continued U.S. investment and exports, for example, China’s behavior would likely become increasingly less predictable and more dangerous. Anyone who thinks Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and the government in Beijing are bad actors now—which they are—should consider what would happen if the Chinese convinced liberal countries like the United States to decouple from them, leaving them free to pursue whatever policies they wish without the significant counterweight that America can provide. That is one reason for Xi Jinping’s emphasis on centralization and self-suffi- ciency. He does not like international pressure about his government’s human rights violations and bad-faith trading policies, and decoupling from trading part- ners like America is one way to avoid that pressure. A less constrained China would be poorer but much more unstable and dangerous to its neighbors and to America than it would be if it still had to engage regularly with the rest of the world. Trade Promotion Authority. Trade agreements can take years to negotiate. One way to accelerate the process is for Congress to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). It was first granted under the 1974 Trade Act, which

Trade

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 846-848AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Trade section aim to counter perceived unfair advantages China gains in international trade, but they employ different tools: the bill uses IMF surveillance to increase exchange‑rate transparency, while Project 2025 focuses on WTO status, targeted firm‑level actions, and rejoining regional trade agreements. The overlap lies in the shared goal of leveling the playing field for U.S. businesses and addressing China’s trade‑related practices."

Key themes:China trade policyunfair trade practicestransparencyeconomic pressuremultilateral engagement

— 814 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Its beneficiaries have proven they can get adequate financing from private banks. EXIM’s charter expires at the end of 2026. The agency will close automatically unless Congress and the President decide to extend it. Closing EXIM should be one of the next Administration’s easiest decisions. Adopting a Multi-Pronged China Strategy. An effective American policy toward China needs to take a realistic view of the country, its leaders, their strengths, and the serious challenges they face. It should be comprehensive and flexible. A threatened CCP is dangerous, perhaps now more than at any time since Mao Tse-Tung, as Xi Jinping continues to use strong-arm tactics to consolidate his power and saber-rattling to challenge the international order. At the same time, recent revelations about China’s official statistics overstating its GDP by 30 percent track well with other problems that were already known.77 These include one of the world’s worst demographic aging curves thanks to China’s one-child policy; a population that may already be declining; an unsustainable debt load that is already causing problems; countless failed boondoggles, from empty cities to its underwhelming Belt-and-Road Initiative, that are wasting significant resources; Xi Jinping’s authoritarian turn; increasing state control of the economy; and a zero-COVID policy that has sabotaged the economy and driven away foreign investment.78 America has its problems, but it is in better shape than China on nearly every measure, especially in the long run. While the facts on the ground should inoculate the next Administration against the most strident China fearmongering circulating in the media and in Washington, that does not mean that the government in Beijing is no threat to American interests. The question is: What should we do about it? A serious China policy will require American policymakers to integrate doc- trines, institutional prerogatives, expertise, and realistic objectives. Traditional Cabinet-level bureaucracies like those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce will need to work together to pursue a comprehensive American strat- egy. Scores of incremental, narrowly targeted policies are necessary. They will not make for good soundbites on cable news, and many will operate slowly and out of sight from most news cycles even as progress is made. An effective China policy must also allow for adaptation because the CCP will not sit idly by. As people react to developments, America needs flexible options. Trade isolationism is inherently inflexible because it reduces the number of con- tact points with China. This is a tougher political sell than loud, simplistic jeremiads, but going the extra mile to solve these difficult coordination problems is vital to America’s interests. Trade and engagement with China are necessary if we are to contain the threats that China poses to its neighbors and to the U.S. The next Administration should: — 815 — Trade l End China’s developing-nation status in the WTO and other international organizations. China is an advanced manufacturing economy and should be treated as such, even if its political and legal institutions remain those of a developing nation, to prevent it from exploiting its status to gain special privileges. l Use a target, not a blanket. There should be actions against Chinese firms that are known to have engaged in unfair trade practices such as intellectual property theft. Rather than blanket tariffs or non-tariff barriers aimed at entire Chinese industry sectors, firms that act in bad faith should be targeted individually. This policy was employed to good effect early in the Trump Administration but was abandoned in favor of a less effective blanket tariff policy. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement might have been the Trump Administration’s biggest trade policy mistake. The TPP was already negotiated and would have strengthened an alliance against China, including most of its biggest trading partners in East Asia and the Americas. America’s departure created tensions and infighting, distracting the U.S. and its allies from the goal at hand: countering China. The other 11 TPP countries continue, without American input or influence, under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) to develop a modern institutional framework to contain Chinese commercial imperialism. Rejoining this alliance should be a top priority in the next conservative Administration’s China policy. Accession negotiations are likely to be difficult, given that the CPATPP suspended several clauses that were important to the United States (such as provisions relating to patents and aspects of investor-state dispute resolution) when the U.S. pulled out of the TPP agreement in 2017. Diplomatic and economic pressure against Beijing will be more effective when its largest trading partners work in concert. Beijing’s diplomats will have a hard time employing a divide-and-conquer policy against a united front of the sort that the TPP offers. l Refocus the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity on trade. President Biden began the process to create IPEF in 2022, but any agreement will likely still be under negotiation when the next Administration takes office. IPEF is similar to the TPP, but its member

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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