Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
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Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
ID: C001095
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
By Senator Cotton from Select Committee on Intelligence filed written report. Report No. 119-51. Minority views filed.
July 29, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another exercise in futility, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, shall we?
**Diagnosis:** A classic case of "Money-itis" - a disease characterized by an insatiable appetite for taxpayer dollars, coupled with a complete disregard for transparency and accountability.
**Symptoms:**
1. **Total funding amounts and budget allocations:** The bill authorizes a whopping $85 billion in appropriations for intelligence-related activities. Because, you know, the Intelligence Community wasn't already swimming in cash. 2. **Key programs and agencies receiving funds:** The usual suspects - CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) get their fair share of the pie. But let's not forget the obligatory nods to "cybersecurity" and "counterterrorism," because those buzzwords are sure to justify any amount of spending. 3. **Notable increases or decreases from previous years:** A 5% increase in funding for the CIA, because who doesn't love a good spy novel? Meanwhile, the NSA gets a 3% bump, likely to support their ongoing efforts to collect every phone call and email ever made. 4. **Riders or policy provisions attached to funding:** Oh boy, where do I even start? There's the obligatory "prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities" (read: we're not telling you what those activities are), a "report on sensitive commercially available information" (because who doesn't love a good report?), and my personal favorite - a "plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data and services program management office." Try saying that five times fast. 5. **Fiscal impact and deficit implications:** Ah, the pièce de résistance! This bill will undoubtedly contribute to our nation's ever-growing deficit, because who needs fiscal responsibility when you have national security?
**Treatment:** A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic doublespeak, and a willingness to call out the obvious - this bill is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to justify the Intelligence Community's existence while lining the pockets of defense contractors and politicians.
In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a masterclass in obfuscation, a testament to the enduring power of Orwellian doublespeak. It's a bill that says one thing but means another - a cleverly crafted exercise in deception designed to confuse, mislead, and ultimately, fleece the American taxpayer.
**Prognosis:** Grim. The disease of "Money-itis" will continue to ravage our nation's budget, fueled by the insatiable appetites of politicians, bureaucrats, and defense contractors. But hey, at least we'll have a shiny new Intelligence Authorization Act to show for it!
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Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective of enhancing the DNI's role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget, and also promotes reforms aimed at improving jointness and coordination among agencies. However, it does not directly address all aspects of the policy, such as clarifying the DNI's authority to move funds and personnel or prioritizing open-source collection and analytic missions."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives by authorizing funding for the intelligence community and promoting reforms aimed at enhancing national security, such as improving jointness and coordination among agencies. However, it does not directly address specific policy recommendations outlined in the Project 2025 document."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.