The bill
504 Credit Risk Management Improvement Act of 2025
S. 2659, 119th Congress — read as touching Construction & Engineering.
Sponsored by
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
ID: Y000064
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2659, 119th Congress — read as touching Construction & Engineering.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 869-871 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
September 16, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senators Young and Klobuchar. The 504 Credit Risk Management Improvement Act of 2025 is a bill that's about as exciting as a lecture on crop rotation. But don't be fooled – beneath the dull exterior lies a web of bureaucratic overreach, cronyism, and good old-fashioned pork-barrel politics.
Let's dissect this monstrosity:
**New Regulations:** The Office of Credit Risk Management gets a shiny new set of teeth, courtesy of Section 511. This behemoth of an office will now be responsible for "supervising" certified development companies (CDCs), conducting file reviews, and doling out enforcement actions like candy at a kindergarten party.
**Affected Industries:** Small businesses, CDCs, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) are all in the crosshairs. Expect a tidal wave of new compliance requirements, because who doesn't love filling out more forms?
**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:** CDCs will need to navigate a maze of new regulations, including file reviews, loan closing oversight, and "correcting deficiencies" within 45 business days (because who needs weekends or holidays?). The SBA gets to develop timelines for reviewing CDCs, because nothing says "efficient government" like creating more bureaucratic red tape.
**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** The Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management can now take informal enforcement actions against CDCs, which is code for "we'll slap you on the wrist and make you promise to be good." Formal enforcement actions require approval from the Lender Oversight Committee (because who doesn't love a good committee?), but don't worry – they'll only use their newfound powers for good... or at least that's what they claim.
**Economic and Operational Impacts:** Small businesses will bear the brunt of these new regulations, as CDCs pass on compliance costs to their clients. Expect higher fees, more paperwork, and a general sense of unease among entrepreneurs who thought they were already drowning in red tape. The SBA gets to expand its empire, because nothing says "small business support" like creating more bureaucratic hurdles.
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in regulatory overreach, designed to strangle small businesses with an avalanche of new requirements and compliance costs. Senators Young and Klobuchar should be proud – they've managed to create a bill that's as exciting as a root canal without anesthesia. Bravo, folks!
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000367
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 55 nodes and 23 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $133,600
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(g) allows the Office of Credit Risk Management to collect fees from certified development companies to cover oversight costs, which could increase costs for CDCs that finance construction projects, potentially affecting construction engineering firms that rely on CDC financing. However, the bill's primary aim is to enhance oversight of the 504 loan program, which provides long-term financing for major fixed assets like real estate and equipment, thereby supporting construction and engi
The bill enhances oversight of the SBA 504 loan program, which provides financing for real estate and equipment purchases by small businesses. By improving credit risk management and requiring environmental compliance rules for certified development companies (Section 3), the bill aims to increase the reliability and integrity of the 504 program, which could expand access to financing for real estate development and acquisition. This is a potential benefit to the real estate industry, particular
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.