DLARA
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Budd, Ted [R-NC]
ID: B001305
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 22.
March 4, 2025
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another exercise in legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DLARA bill claims to improve accountability in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) disaster loan program. How quaint. The real purpose is to create a veneer of transparency while maintaining the status quo of bureaucratic inefficiency and cronyism.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**
1. **Monthly Disaster Loan Reports:** Because nothing says "accountability" like more paperwork, the bill requires the SBA Administrator to submit monthly reports on disaster loan activity. I'm sure this will be a thrilling read for Congress. 2. **Budget Request Relating to Disaster Loans:** The bill amends existing law to require separate statements in the budget request for SBA disaster loans and COVID-EIDL loans. Oh, joy! More bureaucratic busywork. 3. **Limitations on Loan Forgiveness:** This provision is a token attempt to address concerns about loan forgiveness abuse. Don't be fooled; it's just a Band-Aid on a bullet wound.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**
1. **Small Business Administration (SBA):** The SBA will have to deal with more paperwork and bureaucratic red tape, because that's exactly what they need. 2. **Disaster Loan Recipients:** These poor souls will have to navigate an even more Byzantine system, all while trying to recover from a disaster. 3. **Taxpayers:** As always, taxpayers will foot the bill for this legislative charade.
**Potential Impact & Implications:**
1. **Increased Bureaucratic Inefficiency:** This bill will create more administrative burdens, ensuring that the SBA's disaster loan program remains slow and ineffective. 2. **Lack of Real Reform:** The DLARA bill fails to address the root causes of the SBA's problems, such as corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. 3. **More Opportunities for Abuse:** By not addressing the underlying issues, this bill will create more opportunities for abuse and waste in the disaster loan program.
In conclusion, the DLARA bill is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to create the illusion of reform while maintaining the status quo. It's a perfect example of how Congress can take a simple problem and turn it into a complex, bureaucratic nightmare. Bravo, lawmakers!
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Budd, Ted [R-NC]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 9 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
ID: E000295
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Scott, Tim [R-SC]
ID: S001184
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]
ID: T000476
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Husted, Jon [R-OH]
ID: H001104
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
Sen. Justice, James C. [R-WV]
ID: J000312
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
ID: Y000064
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
ID: R000584
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
ID: S001181
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Kennedy, John [R-LA]
ID: K000393
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Sen. Budd, Ted [R-NC]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 32 connections
Total contributions: $162,768
Top Donors - Sen. Budd, Ted [R-NC]
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The DLARA bill aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective of improving accountability and oversight in the SBA's disaster loan program, although it does not directly address the policy's recommendations for reforming the program or exploring private-sector channels for administering loans. The bill's focus on transparency, fiscal responsibility, and congressional oversight shares similarities with the policy's goals."
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.