CCP IP Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/330
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]

ID: C001114

Follow the money

The bill

CCP IP Act

S. 330, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$172,600 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 816-818 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.

July 22, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. The CCP IP Act, or "Combatting China's Pilfering of Intellectual Property Act" - how original.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to impose sanctions on individuals and entities from the People's Republic of China who engage in significant theft of intellectual property (IP) belonging to United States persons. How noble. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to appease corporate interests and create a new tool for the executive branch to wield against China.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the President to impose sanctions on individuals and entities that operate in sectors of the Chinese economy where IP theft has occurred. These sanctions include asset blocking, visa revocation, and penalties for violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The bill also creates a waiver process for the President to exempt certain individuals or entities from these sanctions.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include Chinese nationals and entities operating in sectors where IP theft has occurred, as well as United States persons who have had their IP stolen. However, let's be real - this bill is primarily designed to benefit large corporations with significant IP interests in China. The real stakeholders are the lobbyists and special interest groups that pushed for this legislation.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the makings of a classic case of "legislative placebo." It creates the illusion of action against Chinese IP theft while doing little to address the root causes of the problem. In reality, it will likely lead to more bureaucratic red tape, increased tensions with China, and potentially even more IP theft as companies find ways to circumvent the sanctions.

The real disease here is not Chinese IP theft, but rather the corrupting influence of corporate interests on our legislative process. This bill is a symptom of that disease - a cynical attempt to create a new tool for the executive branch to wield against China while lining the pockets of special interest groups.

In short, this bill is a joke. A poorly written, cynically motivated joke designed to appease corporate interests and create more bureaucratic busywork. But hey, at least it's a good distraction from the real issues plaguing our country.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$172,600
17 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$33,800
Committees
$0
Individuals
$138,800

No PAC contributions found

1
KELLER INVESTMENTS PROPERTIES
1 transaction
$29,800
2
SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE
1 transaction
$1,000
3
TENNIS & SUN LC
1 transaction
$1,000
4
BGR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
5
FUGAL COMMERCIAL SERVICES INC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
STEEL, SHAWN
2 transactions
$20,000
2
BAKER, PAUL
2 transactions
$13,200
3
CORTEZI, NICHOLAS
2 transactions
$13,200
4
EVANS, ROGER
2 transactions
$13,200
5
MCLEAN, TERRENCE
2 transactions
$13,200
6
OSTER, ROBERT
2 transactions
$13,200
7
ROBERTSON, WILHELMINA
2 transactions
$13,200
8
WEINER, KANE
2 transactions
$13,200
9
BERKLEY, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$6,600
10
CROTTY, THOMAS
1 transaction
$6,600
11
RIPPEL, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
12
SMITH, RYAN
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

ID: S001217

Top Contributors

22

1
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 22, 2023
2
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 12, 2024
3
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$90,795
May 31, 2024
4
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$77,714
May 31, 2023
5
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$69,607
Apr 30, 2024
6
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$68,538
Aug 31, 2023
7
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$53,187
Sep 30, 2023
8
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$49,992
Jun 30, 2023
9
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$39,695
Jun 30, 2024
10
SCOTT, RICK
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$34,494
Jan 31, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 43 nodes and 65 connections

Total contributions: $65

Top Donors - Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]

Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount

5 Orgs12 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 5 harmed.

  • −Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2 imposes sanctions on persons operating in sectors of China's economy that engage in significant theft of US intellectual property, which could impact big tech platforms like Meta/Facebook and Google/Alphabet that operate globally and have intellectual property at risk.

  • Section 2 imposes sanctions on persons operating in sectors of China's economy that engage in significant theft of US intellectual property, which could impact semiconductor and hardware companies like Nvidia, Intel, and Qualcomm that have valuable IP.

  • Section 2 imposes sanctions on persons operating in sectors of China's economy that engage in significant theft of US intellectual property, which could impact AI and cloud infrastructure providers like AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud that have global operations and IP at risk.

  • Section 2 imposes sanctions on persons operating in sectors of China's economy that engage in significant theft of US intellectual property, which could impact private equity firms and hedge funds with investments in affected companies.

  • −Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.50

    Section 2 imposes sanctions on persons operating in sectors of China's economy that engage in significant theft of US intellectual property, which could impact crypto and fintech companies with global operations and IP at risk.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Very Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly targets intellectual property theft by Chinese actors, which is a central element of Project 2025's characterization of China's economic aggression, including counterfeiting, piracy, and technology‑forcing policies. By imposing sanctions, the bill implements a trade‑policy tool to counter China's IP‑related aggression and protect U.S. economic interests."

Key themes:intellectual property theftChina economic aggressioncounterfeiting and piracytechnology transfer forcingsanctions as trade policy

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut

Trade

Very Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly targets state-sponsored intellectual property theft by Chinese entities, which is a core component of the Project 2025 policy's description of Communist China's technology-forcing and economic aggression strategies."

Key themes:intellectual property theftChina economic aggressiontechnology transfersanctionstrade policy

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut — 784 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market—steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China’s mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into “national champi- ons” that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. Communist China also uses a predatory “debt trap” model of economic develop- ment aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Com- munist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. These commodities range from bauxite, copper, and nickel to rarer commodities such as beryllium, titanium, and rare earth minerals. As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Com- munist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. These export restraints thereby restrict access to raw materials such as rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum that are essential in the high-technology production space. The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. American industries that have been affected by Communist China’s export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. Technology-Forcing Policies. Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy’s report on Communist China’s economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West’s technologies to Communist Chinese soil. Formally, Communist Chinese industrial policy seeks to promote the “diges- tion, absorption, and re-innovation” of technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world.22 As noted in Table 6, this policy is carried out, for example, through state-spon- sored IP theft—coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market. Commu- nist China’s looting of American technology is further enhanced by “information harvesting” conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. uni- versities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation. Strategic sectors targeted by Communist Chinese economic espionage have included electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data services, pharmaceuticals, mobile phone

Trade

Very Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly addresses the intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer highlighted in Project 2025 as core elements of China's economic aggression, proposing sanctions to deter and punish such activities."

Key themes:intellectual property thefttechnology transfereconomic espionagesanctions on Chinese entitiesprotection of US innovation

— 784 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of Communist Chinese exports in turn depresses world prices and pushes foreign rivals out of the global market—steel is a major example.20 Industrial policy tools that further reinforce Communist China’s mercantilist and protectionist trade policies include numerous direct and indirect subsidies to boost exports and the consolidation of heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises into “national champi- ons” that can compete with foreign companies in both domestic and global markets. Communist China also uses a predatory “debt trap” model of economic develop- ment aid that proffers substantial financing to developing countries in exchange for their willingness to mortgage their natural resources and allow Communist China access to their markets. The practical effect of this debt trap model is to give Com- munist China a competitive edge internationally that stems from its preferential access to relatively lower-cost commodities needed in the manufacturing process. These commodities range from bauxite, copper, and nickel to rarer commodities such as beryllium, titanium, and rare earth minerals. As a complement to this debt trap gambit and to exploit its commanding share of a wide range of critical raw materials that are essential to the global supply chain and production of high-technology and high-value-added products, Com- munist China strategically uses protectionist export restraints, including export quotas and export duties. These export restraints thereby restrict access to raw materials such as rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum that are essential in the high-technology production space. The result is to drive up world prices and thereby put pressure on American and other foreign downstream producers to move their operations, technologies, and jobs to Communist China. American industries that have been affected by Communist China’s export restraints range from steel, chemicals, and electric cars to wind turbines, lasers, semiconductors, and refrigerants. Technology-Forcing Policies. Table 6, extracted from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy’s report on Communist China’s economic aggression,21 provides a summary of the various policies the Chinese Communist Party uses to force the transfer of the West’s technologies to Communist Chinese soil. Formally, Communist Chinese industrial policy seeks to promote the “diges- tion, absorption, and re-innovation” of technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world.22 As noted in Table 6, this policy is carried out, for example, through state-spon- sored IP theft—coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market. Commu- nist China’s looting of American technology is further enhanced by “information harvesting” conducted by Communist Chinese nationals who infiltrate U.S. uni- versities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation. Strategic sectors targeted by Communist Chinese economic espionage have included electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data services, pharmaceuticals, mobile phone — 785 — Trade services, satellite communications and imagery, and business application software. It has been estimated that the theft of trade secrets alone costs the U.S. “between $180 billion and $540 billion” annually.23 Closely related to Communist China’s espionage campaigns are its state-backed efforts to evade U.S. export control laws. These laws are designed to prevent the export of sensitive technologies with military applications.24 However, a significant problem facing agencies like the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State is the growth of “dual-use” technologies, which have both military and civilian utility. For example, airplane engine technologies have an obvious commercial application. When acquired by a strategic economic and military competitor like Communist China, however, such commercial items can quickly wind up propelling the aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army. As an example of Communist China’s coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force the transfer of foreign technologies and IP to Chinese competitors, foreign companies often must enter into joint ventures or partnerships with minority stakes in exchange for access to the Chinese market. Once a U.S. or foreign company is coerced into entering a joint venture with a Chinese partner, the door is open to the transfer of technology and IP. Similarly, a relentlessly coercive Communist China has forced American patent and technology holders to accept below-market royalty rates in licensing and other forms of below-market compensation for their technologies—and the American government has done little or nothing about it. Information Harvesting. Every year, more than 300,000 Communist Chi- nese nationals attend U.S. universities or are hired at U.S. national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, and think tanks. To put this in perspective, accord- ing to the Chinese Ministry of Education, only 20,000 American nationals were studying abroad at Chinese universities on the mainland in 2018.25 These Chinese nationals—often members (or the sons and daughters of members) of the Chinese Communist Party—now account for approximately one-third of foreign university and college students in the United States and about 25 percent of graduate students specializing in science, technology, engineering, or math (STEM).26 As a Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) report has warned: Academia is an opportune environment for learning about science and technology since the cultural values of U.S. educational institutions reflect an open and free exchange of ideas. As a result, Chinese science and engineering students frequently master technologies that later become critical to key military systems, amounting over time to unintentional violations of U.S. export control laws.27 State-backed Chinese enterprises also increasingly finance joint research programs and the construction of new research facilities on U.S. campuses. For

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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