Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
ID: C001088
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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Latest Action
Held at the desk.
December 11, 2025
Introduced
š Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
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Passed Senate
House Review
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Became Law
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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and uncover the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted bill that claims to improve the bankruptcy system by increasing compensation for chapter 7 trustees and extending the term of certain temporary offices of bankruptcy judges. But, as we all know, the real purpose is to line the pockets of special interest groups and maintain the status quo.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill increases the compensation of chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees from $60 to $120 per case, because apparently, they've been struggling to make ends meet on their meager $60 stipend. It also extends the term of certain temporary offices of bankruptcy judges and modifies the funding mechanism for the United States Trustee System Fund.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this charade:
* Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees, who will receive a whopping 100% increase in compensation (because they're clearly underpaid). * Bankruptcy courts and judges, who will benefit from the extended term of temporary offices. * The United States Trustee System Fund, which will receive increased funding through modified fees. * And, of course, the special interest groups that have been lobbying for these changes, such as the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees (NABT) and the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI).
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic example of regulatory capture, where special interest groups use their influence to shape legislation that benefits them directly. The increased compensation for chapter 7 trustees will likely lead to higher costs for debtors and creditors, which could have a ripple effect throughout the bankruptcy system.
But don't worry, the real winners here are the politicians who sponsored this bill and the lobbyists who pushed for these changes. They'll be rewarded with campaign donations and other forms of "appreciation" from the special interest groups they've helped.
**Diagnosis:** This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Special Interest-itis," a disease characterized by an excessive focus on pleasing powerful lobby groups at the expense of the general public. The symptoms include:
* Increased compensation for chapter 7 trustees, which will likely lead to higher costs for debtors and creditors. * Extended term of temporary offices of bankruptcy judges, which could perpetuate inefficiencies in the system. * Modified funding mechanism for the United States Trustee System Fund, which may benefit special interest groups at the expense of taxpayers.
**Treatment:** The only cure for this disease is a healthy dose of transparency and accountability. We need to shine a light on the special interest groups driving these changes and hold politicians accountable for their actions. Until then, we'll continue to see legislation like this bill, which prioritizes the interests of powerful lobby groups over those of the American people.
**Progn
Related Topics
š° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
Congress 119 ā¢ 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Graham, Lindsey [R-SC]
ID: G000359
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Booker, Cory A. [D-NJ]
ID: B001288
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
ID: B001243
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 31 connections
Total contributions: $101,883
Top Donors - Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
ā 706 ā Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the lawās alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next Presidentās legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (āGinnie Maeā) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data. ā 707 ā Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is wellābut that even more onerous requirements are neededāare not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN
Introduction
ā 706 ā Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the lawās alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next Presidentās legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (āGinnie Maeā) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data.
Introduction
ā 837 ā Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHORāS NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the DoddāFrank Act.32 Since the Bureauās inception, its status as an āinde- pendentā agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investorās Business Daily accused the CFPB of ādiverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Partyā and plan- ning āto create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutionsā that would use āramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigationsā to ābankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.ā34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as āa victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.ā39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of DoddāFrank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and ā 838 ā Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite āconsumer educationā and āfinancial literacyā programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what āconsumer educationā or āfinancial literacy programsā to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPBās leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because ā[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.ā46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPBās āperpetual insulation from Congressās appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau āno longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountableā to Congress and, ultimately, to the peopleā48 and that ā[b]y abandoning its āmost complete and effectualā check on āthe overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the governmentāāindeed, by enabling them in the Bureauās caseāCongress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.ā49 The Court further remarked that the CFPBās ācapacious portfolio of authority acts āas a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.āā50
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.