A bill to prohibit funds made available to the Department of Justice from being used to make a personal payment to the President in connection with a claim that is subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act, whether in the form of a settlement or any other payment from the Judgment Fund for the personal benefit of the President.

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/s/4124
Last Updated: March 29, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY]

ID: S000148

Follow the money

The bill

A bill to prohibit funds made available to the Department of Justice from being used to make a personal payment to the President in connection with a claim that is subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act, whether in the form of a settlement or any other payment from the Judgment Fund for the personal benefit of the President.

S. 4124, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$72,050 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 786-788 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 359.

March 17, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this farce and uncover the real disease beneath.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the noble goal of preventing the President from lining their pockets with taxpayer money via tort claims settlements. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a desperate attempt to appear virtuous while doing nothing meaningful. It's like prescribing a placebo to a patient with terminal cancer – it might make them feel better for a hot second, but it won't change the outcome.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits using Department of Justice funds to pay out tort claims settlements directly to the President. Wow, what a bold move! It's not like this is already prohibited by existing law or anything (spoiler alert: it is). This is just a redundant exercise in grandstanding.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The President (who won't be affected because they're already not allowed to receive these payments), the Department of Justice (which will continue to do its thing, unaffected), and the voters (who will be duped into thinking their representatives are doing something meaningful). Lobbyists? Ha! They'll just find new ways to funnel money to their favorite politicians.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Zilch. Zero. Zip. This bill is a non-event, a mere distraction from the real issues plaguing our country. It's like treating a patient with a Band-Aid when they need open-heart surgery. The disease of corruption and cronyism will continue to metastasize, unchecked.

Diagnosis: **Legislative Theater-itis**, a chronic condition characterized by grandstanding, posturing, and a complete lack of substance. Symptoms include meaningless bills, redundant provisions, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.

Treatment: None required. This bill is already DOA. But hey, at least it'll give politicians something to tweet about while they continue to ignore the real problems facing our nation.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$72,050
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$5,850
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,200

No PAC contributions found

1
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$3,300
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$2,000
3
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$550

No committee contributions found

1
MARES, JAN
2 transactions
$6,800
2
MEZZALINGUA, JOHN
2 transactions
$6,600
3
EISENSTADT, STEVEN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
MEZZALINGUA, KIM
2 transactions
$6,600
5
SCHUSTERMAN, LYNN
2 transactions
$6,600
6
SCHUSTERMAN, STACY
2 transactions
$6,600
7
VENKATAKRISHNAN, C.S.
2 transactions
$6,600
8
RIKLIS, MARCIA
1 transaction
$3,300
9
BUHLER, LYNN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
BELL, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
11
LEPRINO, TERRY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
MCPARTLON, JAMES III
1 transaction
$3,300
13
MURPHY, JEAN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 49 nodes and 24 connections (69 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $72,050

Top Donors - Sen. Schumer, Charles E. [D-NY]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs13 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Small Business Administration

Moderate
Vector: 61%
Pages: 786-788AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 SBA section emphasize accountability and preventing misuse of taxpayer funds, though they target different entities (the President vs. SBA loan programs) and different mechanisms (tort claim payments vs. loan fraud cleanup)."

Key themes:government accountabilitytaxpayer fund protectionethics and oversightfraud preventiontransparency

— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55

Federal Communications Commission

Moderate
Vector: 61%
Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy seek to curb potential misuse of Department of Justice authority and funds, emphasizing accountability and preventing personal or political gain from DOJ actions, though they address different substantive areas (tort claims vs. FECA enforcement)."

Key themes:DOJ accountabilitypreventing personal gainethics and transparencyuse of public fundsoversight of executive power

— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.

Department of the Treasury

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 730-732AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on preventing DOJ funds from being used for personal payments to the President, emphasizing ethics and accountability, while the Project 2025 Treasury section centers on tax reform, IRS restructuring, and international tax policy. Both share a concern for taxpayer accountability, but their substantive domains are largely unrelated."

Key themes:government accountabilitytaxpayer fundsethics/transparency

— 698 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Fundamental Tax Reform. Achieving fundamental tax reform offers the prospect of a dramatic improvement in American living standards and an equally dramatic reduction in tax compliance costs. Lobbyists, lawyers, benefit consul- tants, accountants, and tax preparers would see their incomes decline, however. The federal income tax system heavily taxes capital and corporate income and discourages work, savings, and investment. The public finance literature is clear that a consumption tax would minimize government’s distortion of private economic decisions and thus be the least eco- nomically harmful way to raise federal tax revenues.28 There are several forms that a consumption tax could take, including a national sales tax, a business transfer tax, a Hall–Rabushka flat tax,29 or a cash flow tax.30 Supermajority to Raise Taxes. Treasury should support legislation instituting a three-fifths vote threshold in the U.S. House and the Senate to raise income or corporate tax rates to create a wall of protection for the new rate structure. Many states have implemented such a supermajority vote requirement. Tax Competition. Tax competition between states and countries is a positive force for liberty and limited government.31 The Biden Administration, under the direction of Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, has pushed for a global minimum corporate tax that would increase taxation and the size of government in the U.S. and around the world. This attempt to “harmonize” global tax rates is an attempt to create a global tax cartel to quash tax competition and to increase the tax burden globally. The U.S. should not outsource its tax policy to international organizations. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Organi- zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with the European Union, has long tried to end financial privacy and impose regulations on countries with low (or no) income taxes. In fact, on tax, environmental, corpo- rate governance and employment issues, the OECD has become little more than a taxpayer-funded left-wing think tank and lobbying organization.32 The United States provides about one-fifth of OECD’s funding.33 The U.S. should end its finan- cial support and withdraw from the OECD. TAX ADMINISTRATION The Internal Revenue Service is a poorly managed, utterly unresponsive and increasingly politicized agency, and has been for at least two decades. It is time for meaningful reform to improve the efficiency and fairness of tax administration, better protect taxpayer rights, and achieve greater transparency and accountability. A substantial number of the problems attributed to the IRS are actually a function of congressional action that has made the Internal Revenue Code ridiculously complex, imposed tremendous administrative burdens on both the public and the IRS, and given massive non-tax missions to the IRS. But the culture, administrative practices, and management at the IRS need to change. — 699 — Department of the Treasury Doubling the IRS? The Inflation Reduction Act contains a radical $80 billion expansion of the IRS—enough to double the size of its workforce.34 Unless Congress reverses this policy, the IRS will become much more intrusive and impose still greater costs on the American people. The Biden Administration has also sought to make the tax system’s adminis- trative burden much worse in other ways. For example, it has proposed creating a comprehensive financial account information reporting regime that would apply to all business and personal accounts with more than $600. Banks would be required to collect the taxpayer identification numbers of and file a revised Form 1099-K for all affected payees, as well as provide additional information.35 This massive increase in the scope and breadth of information reporting should be unequivo- cally opposed. Management. The IRS has approximately 81,000 employees.36 Of those, only two are presidential appointments—the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel.37 As a practical matter, it is impossible for these two officials to overcome bureau- cratic inertia and to implement policy changes that the IRS bureaucracy wants to impede. That is why, notwithstanding decades of sound and fury, almost nothing has changed at the IRS. For the IRS to change and become more accountable, more transparent, and better managed, there is a need to increase the number of Presidential appoint- ments subject to Senate confirmation, and not subject to Senate confirmation, at the IRS. At the very least, Congress should ensure that the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support, the National Taxpayer Advocate, the Commissioner of the Wage and Investment Division, the Commissioner of the Large Business and International Division, the Commissioner of the Small Business Self-Employed Division, and the Com- missioner of the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division are presidential appointees.38 Information Technology. Despite the investment of billions of dollars for at least two decades, IRS information technology (IT) systems remain deficient.39 The IRS inadequately protects taxpayer information, its IT systems do not ade- quately support operations or taxpayer services, and its matching and detection algorithms are antiquated. These problems are not primarily about resources. The IRS has spent approxi- mately $27 billion on IT during the past decade, with $7 billion of that designated as “development, modernization and enhancement.“40 The problem is one of man- agement. The bureaucracy is not up to the task, and neither Congress nor a long line of IRS commissioners has forced changes. A Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support with strong IT management skills should be appointed by the IRS Commissioner or the President (once the position is made a presidential appointment). The various subordinates to the

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills