The bill
Expanding Whistleblower Protections for Contractors Act of 2026
S. 4631, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI]
ID: P000595
Follow the money
The bill
S. 4631, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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Latest Action
Held at the desk.
May 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Expanding Whistleblower Protections for Contractors Act of 2026 (S. 4631)** *Summary & Cynical Analysis*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** On the surface, this bill aims to shield defense and NASA contractors—and their employees—from retaliation when they report waste, fraud, abuse, or dangers to public health and safety. In reality, it’s a belated admission that the government routinely screws over the very people who try to keep it from stealing blind. The stated goal? Protect whistleblowers. The unspoken one? Make it slightly harder for federal officials to destroy careers when contractors dare to notice that a $200 million drone program is actually just a fancy lawn ornament with delusions of grandeur.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends 10 U.S.C. § 4701 (the National Defense Authorization Act whistleblower provision) to: - Replace the narrow term “employee” with the expansive, legally fuzzy “protected individual,” which now includes contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, *and* their employees—plus state, tribal, and territorial governments acting as contractors. Basically, if you’ve ever breathed near a defense contract, you’re now theoretically covered. - Expand protected disclosures to include refusing illegal orders, reporting gross mismanagement or waste at DoD *or* NASA, and flagging “substantial and specific dangers to public health or safety” (a phrase so vague it could cover anything from toxic rocket fuel to a cafeteria serving expired mystery meat). - Explicitly prohibit executive branch officials from *requesting* reprisals—because apparently, we needed a law to tell people not to order hits on whistleblowers. How comforting. - Require that any official who *does* request a reprisal face disciplinary action. (Translation: “We’ll scold you, maybe make you watch an ethics video.”) - Ban waiver of these rights via employment contracts, arbitration agreements, or fine print—finally acknowledging that “I agree not to sue if you fire me for telling the truth” is about as ethical as a used car salesman’s warranty. - Drop the old subsection (e) and renumber everything, because Congress loves making legal texts harder to read than a IRS form written in Klingon.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Contractors & Grantees:** Finally get nominal protection when they report that their “stealth fighter” can’t fly in rain or that NASA’s Mars rover budget vanished into a black hole labeled “administrative overhead.” - **Federal Employees (Executive Branch):** Now face *mild* bureaucratic inconvenience if caught ordering retaliation—though enforcement will likely be as rare as a honest politician. - **Taxpayers:** Theoretically benefit from less fraud and waste. In practice, they’ll keep funding boondoggles while contractors who speak up get quietly blacklisted—just with slightly better legal theater to pretend otherwise. - **Whistleblower Advocates:** Will celebrate this as progress, blissfully ignoring that without real teeth (like actual prosecutions or meaningful damages), it’s just a placebo for a broken system.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill is a legislative band-aid on a sucking chest wound. It expands coverage on paper but does nothing to fix the core problem: retaliation is rarely prosecuted, and whistleblowers still get destroyed—just more slowly and with more paperwork. The real impact? It lets Congress look like it’s cleaning up corruption while doing nothing to stop the culture that rewards silence and punishes honesty. Expect more press releases, fewer actual protections, and a continued exodus of honest people from government contracting—leaving only the gullible and the corrupt to divide the spoils. In short: a feel-good facade for a system that still eats whistleblowers for breakfast and asks for seconds.
Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000386
Top Contributors
23
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 52 nodes and 74 connections
Total contributions: $74
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2 amends 10 U.S.C. § 4701 to expand whistleblower protections for contractors, subcontractors, grantees, or subgrantees of the Department of Defense and NASA, including employees and personal services contractors, thereby benefiting defense contractors by reducing retaliation risks for disclosures.
Section 3 expands whistleblower protections under 41 U.S.C. § 4712 to contractors, subcontractors, grantees, or subgrantees of the Federal Government, which includes private prison operators contracting with federal agencies (e.g., ICE detention), thus benefiting them by strengthening protections against retaliation for disclosures.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill enhances whistleblower protections for DoD and NASA contractors, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on accountability and oversight within the Department of Defense, particularly in ensuring integrity in defense contracting and acquisitions. While not explicitly cited in the provided Project 2025 text, the bill supports broader goals of reducing waste, fraud, and abuse in defense spending, which are consistent with the reform-oriented themes in the document."
— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill expands whistleblower protections for DoD and NASA contractors, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on accountability and oversight within the Department of Defense, though it does not directly implement any specific mandate from the document. Both share goals of improving integrity and preventing abuse in defense operations."
— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. — 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill expands whistleblower protections for DoD and NASA contractors, while the Project 2025 policy focuses on Department of Energy restructuring, energy security, and eliminating certain DOE offices. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address energy policy, DOE operations, or the specific commissions mentioned in the Project 2025 section."
— 410 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Sean Michael Kerner, “Colonial Pipeline Hack Explained: Everything You Need to Know,” TechTarget, April, 26, 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to- know (accessed February 13, 2023). 2. Jacob Knutson, “N.C. Power Company: Substation Repairs Complete After Alleged Attack,” Axios, December 7, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/12/07/duke-energy-moore-county-substation-attack (accessed February 13, 2023). 3. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 4. H.R. 5376, Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117-169, August 16, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ169/PLAW-117publ169.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 5. S. 826, Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, 95th Congress, August 4, 1977, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-91/STATUTE-91-Pg565.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 6. DOE also promotes domestic energy security by providing research and coordination between government and the private sector on physical and cyber-related threats to energy security. This work should continue and be enhanced under the next Administration. 7. Elimination of OE, NE, FE, and EERE might also be considered; however, there are benefits from having political appointees run separate offices. Specifically, separate program offices can focus on threats that are unique to their energy areas, and having political appointees run separate offices helps to ensure focused, unobstructed pursuit of policy objectives. 8. H.R. 6586, Natural Gas Act, Public Law No. 75-688, 75th Congress, June 21, 1938, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg821a.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Energy, “Promoting Energy Justice,” https://www.energy.gov/promoting-energy-justice (accessed February 13, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, “Justice40 Initiative,” https://www. energy.gov/diversity/justice40-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 11. Press release, “DOE Releases First-Ever Plan to Advance Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 1, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-first-ever-plan- advance-diversity-equity-inclusion-and-accessibility (accessed February 14, 2023). 12. Including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, etc. 13. Table, “Environmental Management: Lifecycle Cost by Project Baseline Summary (PBS) ($M),” in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pd (accessed February 13, 2023). 14. KPMG, “Independent Auditor’s Report, United States Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund Annual Financial Report as of and for the Years Ended September 30, 2022 and 2021,” November 8, 2022, p. 8, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Cyber Assessments and Data Analytics, Audit Report: The Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund’s Fiscal Year 2022 Financial Statement Audit, DOE- OIG-23-05, November 2022, p. 10, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/DOE-OIG-23-05.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 15. See Patty-Jane Geller, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 481–506, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 16. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, pp. 9, 21, 23, and 43, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-03/doe-fy2023-budget-in-brief-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 17. H.R. 4346, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law No. 117-167, 117th Congress, August 9, 2022, https://www. congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ceser/ceser-mission (accessed February 27, 2023). — 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.