The bill
PEACE in Sudan Act
S. 4726, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
ID: R000584
Follow the money
The bill
S. 4726, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 220-222 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 519.
July 26, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**S. 4726 – PEACE in Sudan Act: A Symptomatic Band-Aid on a Gangrenous Wound**
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The PEACE in Sudan Act purports to “promote efforts to bring about stability and security in Sudan”—a noble-sounding goal that, in practice, amounts to the United States feigning concern while continuing to outsource its moral responsibility to sanctions, reports, and strongly worded memos. Its stated objectives include countering malign foreign interference (read: Russia, UAE, Egypt), holding war criminals accountable, advancing human rights, and supporting a democratic civilian government. In other words, it’s a wishlist written by someone who’s read too many State Department press releases and not enough actual history.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill is less legislation and more a bureaucratic fever dream: it mandates a series of reports (on foreign actors, atrocities, financial assets), requires a Sudan strategy (because we clearly haven’t had one since 2019), calls for assessing whether armed groups should be designated as global terrorists (spoiler: they already should be), authorizes sanctions (the U.S.’s favorite non-solution), creates a Special Envoy for Sudan (a prestigious title for someone who’ll achieve nothing), and directs engagement with international financial institutions and the UN. It also includes a Sudan Business Risk Advisory—because nothing says “peace” like warning corporations not to invest in a war zone unless they want their factories looted. Notably, it terminates after five years, assuming the problem will magically solve itself by 2031 or that we’ll have forgotten Sudan exists by then.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** - **Sudanese civilians:** Supposed beneficiaries, but likely to see more paperwork than protection. - **Armed factions (RSF, SAF, etc.):** May face sanctions or terrorist designations—if the U.S. can stop selling them weapons indirectly through allies. - **Foreign governments (Russia, UAE, Egypt, etc.):** Targeted for “malign interference,” though the U.S. will continue ignoring its own allies’ roles when convenient. - **U.S. defense contractors and lobbyists:** Will profit from increased “security assistance” and advisory contracts, even if nothing changes on the ground. - **Congress:** Gets to look humanitarian without risking actual lives or political capital. - **Taxpayers:** Fund another performative exercise in foreign policy theater.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is diagnostic theater: it identifies every symptom of Sudan’s collapse—atrocities, foreign meddling, economic ruin—but prescribes nothing that would actually treat the disease. Sanctions rarely deter warlords; reports rarely stop bullets; envoys rarely negotiate peace when the parties have no incentive to stop fighting. The real illness isn’t a lack of strategy—it’s that U.S. policy is driven by inertia, election cycles, and the belief that throwing money and mandates at a problem equals leadership. The PEACE in Sudan Act doesn’t challenge that delusion; it embodies it. If passed, it will generate thick binders, solemn speeches, and zero meaningful change—while the war grinds on, and the world looks away. Again.
In short: it’s not a peace bill. It’s a placebo for a conscience that stopped trying years ago.
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001088
Top Contributors
22
ID: C001056
Top Contributors
21
ID: S001181
Top Contributors
21
ID: B001288
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 38 nodes and 41 connections
Total contributions: $41
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 11 harmed.
Section 8 imposes sanctions on foreign persons responsible for supplying arms to the Sudanese Armed Forces or non-state armed groups, which could harm defense contractors involved in such activities.
Section 6(b)(5)(A) mentions securing guarantees for unrestricted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, which could benefit hospitals and health systems.
Section 6(b)(5)(A) mentions securing guarantees for unrestricted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, which could benefit health insurance providers.
Section 8 also imposes sanctions on foreign persons who provide financial support to the Sudanese Armed Forces or non-state armed groups, which could harm private equity and hedge funds involved in such activities.
Section 8 imposes sanctions on foreign persons who provide financial support to the Sudanese Armed Forces or non-state armed groups, which could harm commercial banks involved in such activities.
Section 8(a)(1)(K) imposes sanctions on entities that obstruct the delivery or distribution of humanitarian assistance, which could affect private prisons involved in such activities.
+ 7 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on focusing U.S. engagement on core diplomatic and security objectives in Africa, particularly through targeted support for stability and accountability in Sudan, while avoiding divisive social policies. Both prioritize strategic partnerships and countering malign foreign influence, though the bill does not explicitly address coalition-building with cooperative African nations or baseline engagement with less-fruitful partners as outlined in Project 2"
— 187 — Department of State United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance. l Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise. l Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners. Europe American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions. First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge. Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning — 188 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU. Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. South and Central Asia Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14 Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers. The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on using foreign aid to advance strategic interests, particularly through promoting private-sector partnerships and supporting democratic transitions in Sudan, which overlaps with the policy's focus on leveraging aid for regional stability and countering malign influence. However, the bill's humanitarian and accountability focus does not fully reflect Project 2025's push to redirect aid toward faith-based organizations, ethnic minorities, and private-"
— 273 — Agency for International Development of the agency’s non-health, nonhumanitarian funding as well as almost all of its sectoral appropriations directives, including those that reflect the pet projects of individual Members of Congress. The Bureau is the policy and financial nexus at USAID for most of the Biden Administration’s radical priorities in foreign assis- tance, including gender, climate change, and the promotion of identity-based politics. On the positive side, DDI is also the Bureau in charge of areas that will be crucial to a reorientation of USAID, including trade, economic growth, inno- vation, partnerships with the private sector, and the agency’s relationship with communities of faith. The next conservative Administration should make the rapid staffing of key DDI positions a high priority. Besides the Senate-confirmed Assistant Administrator, the Directors of each of the Centers and Hubs in the Bureau will need political leadership. Almost every one of the agencywide policies that cover DDI’s areas of responsibility will need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central appropriations to fund new priorities, especially working with ethnic and religious minorities and faith-based organizations and joint ventures with the private sector in education and energy. All DDI programs should issue funding opportunities restricted to new and underutilized partners modeled on the NPI. REGIONS Asia. Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against Communist China’s efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for geopolitical gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s approaches to disbursing foreign aid in the region. USAID should intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India so that they can jointly advance private-sector solutions to secure financing for power generation, infrastructure, digital con- nectivity, investment and trade expansion, and other economic activities. USAID enjoys a strong in-country presence in India, buttressed by recent coordination on the global response to COVID-19 as India is a global leader in vaccine produc- tion. Those ties should be expanded. So too should development cooperation with Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared with developing countries. China’s island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct strategic threat to U.S. maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China’s ille- gal fishing. While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital. — 274 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pakistan is a prime example of foreign aid policies disconnected from U.S. national interests. The country has been the recipient of more than $12 billion in U.S. foreign aid since 2010, yet it remains intensely anti-American and corrupt, has backed the Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea’s nuclear bomb program, brutalizes its religious minorities, and is a willing client of China while taking on unrepayable loans from the U.S. taxpayer-funded International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Middle East. The Middle East is far more vulnerable today than it was in 2020 because the Biden Administration’s strategy for the region is adrift. Tunisia has slid into autocracy, Iraq is plummeting further into Iran’s orbit, and U.S. soldiers continue to risk their lives for unclear ends amid the ruins of Syria. Meanwhile, billions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid props up regimes allied with Iran. President Trump’s Abraham Accords signaled the end of the centrality of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which paralyzed U.S. approaches to the region, and focused instead on Iran as the principal threat to America from this region. During the Trump Administration, USAID’s allocations reflected the new opportunities created by the Accords and sought to strengthen regional alliances against Iran through expanded regional trade and investment and to promote genuine polit- ical stability tethered to strong American leadership. USAID formally partnered with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Morocco, Qatar, and Kuwait to catalyze regional partnerships in Africa. Under the Biden Administration, however, USAID has returned to a model that deepens the region’s dependence on aid. A new conservative President should reset USAID’s programming in the Middle East in line with our national security interests and committed to the goal of ending the need for foreign aid through development that is led by the private sector. Specifically: l Foreign aid must advance the Abraham Accords. Increased trade and investment between Israel and its Arab neighbors represent the most effective path toward reducing poverty, fostering the emergence of a middle class, and solidifying peace. USAID should therefore focus its development assistance on countries such as Morocco and Sudan through joint investment collaboration with the more economically advanced economies such as the UAE and Israel. l USAID should consider cutting aid to states allied to Iran, limiting assistance in these countries to the advancement of narrow strategic priorities and support for basic American values, such as aid to persecuted religious minorities. USAID continues to expend hundreds of millions of dollars in nonhumanitarian aid to antagonistic regimes in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. After billions of dollars of aid and many
AI Analysis:
"The PEACE in Sudan Act focuses on conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, accountability, and democratic transition in Sudan, which does not directly align with Project 2025's State Department priorities centered on Iran, the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and countering Chinese and Russian influence in strategic regions. While both documents mention countering malign foreign influence (e.g., Russia, UAE, Egypt in the bill; China and Russia in Project 2025), the geographic focus and prim"
— 185 — Department of State l First, the U.S. must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology and delivery capabilities and more broadly block Iranian ambitions. This means, inter alia, reinstituting and expanding Trump Administration sanctions; providing security assistance for regional partners; supporting, through public diplomacy and otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian people in their revolt against the mullahs; and ensuring Israel has both the military means and the political support and flexibility to take what it deems to be appropriate measures to defend itself against the Iranian regime and its regional proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. l Second, the next Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s diplomatic successes by encouraging other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to enter the Abraham Accords. Related policies should include reversing, as appropriate, the Biden Administration’s degradation of the long-standing partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Authority should be defunded. A further key priority is keeping Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. This includes a vigorous outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from “hedging” toward Russia or China, which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. support for YPG/PKK [People’s Protection Units/Kurdistan Worker’s Party] Kurdish forces, which Ankara believes are an existential threat to its security. For the foreseeable future— and much longer than one new Administration—Middle Eastern oil will play a key role in the world economy. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including China. Relations with Saudi Arabia should be strengthened in a way that seriously curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh. l Third, it is in the U.S. national interest to build a Middle East security pact that includes Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and potentially India, as a second “Quad” arrangement. Protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf and in the Red Sea/Suez Canal is vital to the world economy and therefore to U.S. prosperity as well. In North Africa, security cooperation with European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the Wagner Group. l The U.S. cannot neglect a concern for human rights and minority rights, which must be balanced with strategic and security considerations. Special attention must be paid to challenges of religious freedom, especially the status of Middle Eastern Christians and other religious minorities, as well as the human trafficking endemic to the region. — 186 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Sub-Saharan Africa Africa’s importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategic interests is rising and will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance. Yet as Afri- ca’s strategic significance has grown, the U.S.’s relative influence there has declined. Terrorist activity on the continent has increased, while America’s competitors are making significant gains for their own national interests. The PRC’s companies dominate the African supply chain for certain minerals critical to emerging tech- nologies. African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses—and African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan. The new Administration can correct this strategic failing of existing policy by prioritizing Africa and by undertaking fundamental changes in how the United States works with African nations. At a bare minimum, the next Administration should: l Shift strategic focus from assistance to growth. Reorient the focus of U.S. overseas development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian development aid and toward fostering free market systems in African countries by incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private sector engagement in these countries. Development aid alone does little to develop countries and can fuel corruption and violent conflict. While the United States should always be willing to offer emergency and humanitarian relief, both U.S. and African long-term interests are better served by a free market-based, private growth-focused strategy to Africa’s economic challenges. l Counter malign Chinese activity on the continent. This should include the development of powerful public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese influence campaigns with commitments to freedom of speech and the free flow of information; the creation of a template “digital hygiene” program that African countries can access to sanitize and protect their sensitive communications networks from espionage by the PRC and other hostile actors; the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti; and a focus on supporting American companies involved in industries important to U.S. national interests or that have a competitive advantage in Africa. l Counter the furtherance of terrorism. African country-based terrorist groups like Boko Haram may currently lack the capability to attack the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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