BUST FENTANYL Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/860
Last Updated: February 23, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

ID: R000584

Follow the money

The bill

BUST FENTANYL Act

S. 860, 119th Congress — read as touching Pharmaceuticals.

The sponsor

Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$69,035 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Justice" section, p. 587-589 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 54.

April 27, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of congressional theater, masquerading as a genuine attempt to address the fentanyl crisis. Let's dissect this farce.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The BUST FENTANYL Act is a laughable attempt to appear tough on China and the opioid epidemic while doing little to actually address the problem. The bill's primary objective is to impose sanctions on countries involved in synthetic opioid production and trafficking, with a focus on China. However, this is merely a smokescreen for the real purpose: to provide politicians with a soundbite to pretend they're taking action.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends existing laws to require reports on fentanyl trafficking from China and other countries, imposes sanctions on individuals involved in opioid production and trafficking, and establishes new DEA offices in China. Oh, wow. Because what's really needed is more bureaucracy and paperwork to "combat" the opioid crisis.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The usual suspects: politicians looking for a photo op, bureaucrats seeking to expand their empires, and lobbyists representing pharmaceutical companies and law enforcement interests. The actual victims of the opioid epidemic? Not so much.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill will have all the impact of a feather in a hurricane. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real issue is the corrupting influence of Big Pharma, lack of meaningful treatment options, and the Sisyphean task of interdicting illicit substances at the border. This bill does nothing to address these underlying issues.

In reality, this legislation is a symptom of a deeper disease: politicians' addiction to grandstanding and their inability to tackle complex problems with meaningful solutions. It's a cynical attempt to appear proactive while maintaining the status quo. I'd give it a 0/10 for actual effectiveness, but a solid 10/10 for providing a great example of legislative theater.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of " Politician-itis" – a disease characterized by an inability to address real problems, coupled with a desperate need for self-aggrandizement. Treatment: None available. Prognosis: Grim.

Related Topics

Public Health & Pandemic ResponseHealthcare & Insurance Reform
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$69,035
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$68,035

No PAC contributions found

1
CRW RESOURCES
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
GRANIERI, ROBERT
2 transactions
$6,600
2
HEGYI, ALBERT
2 transactions
$6,600
3
PFAUTCH, ROY
2 transactions
$6,600
4
SNELL, PETER
1 transaction
$5,000
5
KAYALI, ZEID
1 transaction
$3,500
6
MOORE, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$3,435
7
KTELEH, TAREK
1 transaction
$3,300
8
ALAAMA, ABDUL M.D.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
ASHOURI, DIANA
1 transaction
$3,300
10
DIAB, MOHAMED KHEIR
1 transaction
$3,300
11
MOUJTAHED, SAED
1 transaction
$3,300
12
MONSEN, MARION F
1 transaction
$3,300
13
ABDRABBO, FAWAZ
1 transaction
$3,300
14
HOLDING, CHRISTINE S.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
HOLDING, KATHLEEN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
HOLDING, STEPHEN E.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
MONSEN, PEDER
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]

ID: S001181

Top Contributors

10

1
TILT LANDSCAPE MAINTENANCE LLC
OrganizationPLYMOUTH, MI
$250
Feb 6, 2024
2
HAWASH, NOUR
BLINK TECH INC. • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$6,600
Dec 12, 2024
3
HAWASH, NOUR
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$6,600
Dec 23, 2024
4
HAWASH, NOUR
BLINK TECH INC. • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
5
HAWASH, NOUR
BLINK TECH INC. • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
6
HAWASH, SAFA
ACCLIVITY LLC • BUSINESS CONSULTANT
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$3,300
Dec 11, 2024
7
HAWASH, SAFA
ACCLIVITY LLC • BUSINESS CONSULTANT
IndividualDUNN LORING, VA
$3,300
Dec 11, 2024
8
JONDY, JENAN
N/A • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualFLUSHING, MI
$3,300
Dec 16, 2024
9
KANDIL, MARIAM
SELF-EMPLOYED • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualGREAT FALLS, VA
$3,300
Dec 16, 2024
10
KANDIL, MARIAM
SELF-EMPLOYED • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualGREAT FALLS, VA
$3,300
Dec 16, 2024

Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

ID: H000601

Top Contributors

10

1
WELDON
OrganizationWESTFIELD, NJ
$1,000
Mar 22, 2024
2
CARTER, JOY
AIRTECH INT'L • SALES
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$13,200
Jan 2, 2024
3
FULLER, CHRIS
TRANSCARD • OWNER
IndividualCHATTANOOGA, TN
$10,410
Aug 18, 2023
4
RADER, SALLY
CHILDREN'S CLINIC OF NASHVILLE • NURSE PRACTICTIONER
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$9,400
Mar 10, 2023
5
HALBOWER, JULIE MRS.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$9,400
Jun 24, 2024
6
HALBOWER, MATTHEW
PENTWATER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT • CEO
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$9,400
Jun 24, 2024
7
JOHNSON, CHARLES B. MR.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$9,400
May 16, 2024
8
LES, JASON
RIOT PLATFORMS INC. • CEO
IndividualCOSTA MESA, CA
$9,400
Jul 13, 2024
9
MASIERO, THOMAS
ABG ENERGY LLC • CEO
IndividualPALL MALL, TN
$9,400
Jul 16, 2024
10
PRESTON, TAYLOR
EVELYN CAPITAL • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$9,400
Jul 28, 2024

Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]

ID: C001088

Top Contributors

10

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Dec 27, 2023
2
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,700
Dec 27, 2023
3
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
4
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024
5
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
6
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
7
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
8
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
9
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
10
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 49 nodes and 30 connections (41 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $115,395

Top Donors - Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

1 Org17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • −Pharmaceuticalsconfidence 0.90

    Section 4(1)(B)(i) prioritizes identification of 'any entity involved in the production of pharmaceuticals' for sanctions related to fentanyl trafficking, imposing regulatory scrutiny and potential sanctions on pharmaceutical entities involved in precursor supply chains.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Justice

Strong
Vector: 71%
Pages: 587-589AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The BUST FENTANYL Act directly targets fentanyl precursors from China, enhances law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and addresses border-related drug trafficking—core elements of the Project 2025 DOJ policy on combating drug trafficking, securing the border, and revitalizing the China Initiative."

Key themes:fentanyl traffickingChina precursorsborder securitylaw enforcement sanctionsinternational cooperation

— 555 — Department of Justice 1. Rigorously prosecute as much interstate drug activity as possible, including simple possession of distributable quantities.46 Recent efforts to create the impression that drug possession crimes are not serious offenses has contributed to the explosion of criminal organization activities in the United States. 2. Aggressively deploy the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),47 which Congress expressly created to empower the Department of Justice to treat patterns of intrastate- level crimes, such as robbery, extortion, and murder, as federal criminal conduct for criminal organizations and networks. The next Administration can use existing tools while it works with Congress to develop new tools. l Secure the border,48 which is the key entry point for many criminal organizations and their supplies, products, and employees. Mexico— which is arguably functioning as a failed state run by drug cartels—is the main point of transit for illegal drugs produced in Central and South America, fentanyl precursors from the Chinese Communist Party–led People’s Republic of China,49 weapons, human smuggling and trafficking, and other contraband. Mexican drug cartels, including the dominant Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), are the main drivers of fentanyl production and distribution in the United States. The southwestern land border is sufficiently porous that Mexican drug cartels have operational control of large sections of the border, which facilitates easy movement of product and personnel. These cartels are also violent and not afraid to demonstrate force on both sides of the border. Their conduct represents a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens. In addition to finalizing the southwestern land border wall, the next Administration should take a creative and aggressive approach to tackling these dangerous criminal organizations at the border. This could include use of active-duty military personnel and National Guardsmen to assist in arrest operations along the border—something that has not yet been done. A new and forceful approach to interdiction will have a ripple effect on the operations of these criminal organizations, which currently operate freely without concern for criminal prosecution, and will lay the necessary groundwork for initial prosecutions of these organizations and their leaders. It is critical that the federal government staunch the flow of drugs by preventing the far-too-easy access to the United States that now exists. — 556 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise There can be no serious dispute that the Biden Administration has opened the southwest border to whomever wants to enter and that some of those entrants are smuggling fentanyl into the country. More than 100,000 Americans died in a one-year period from opioid overdoses, and many of them died specifically from having used fentanyl.50 The federal government should treat this problem as aggressively as necessary. Enforcing the customs and immigration laws is a matter of life and death. PURSUING A NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA AIMED AT EXTERNAL STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS, NOT U.S. CITIZENS EXERCISING THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS The Department of Justice plays a vital role in protecting our national security, and it must not refrain from engaging in public initiatives that identify our adver- saries and educate the American people about their activities. The DOJ’s China Initiative under President Trump reflected the department’s priority of combating Chinese threats to our national security.51 Because China was accountable for approximately 80 percent of all prosecutions for economic espionage and approximately 60 percent of all thefts of trade secrets, then-At- torney General Jeff Sessions set key goals for the China Initiative that included development of an enforcement strategy concerning researchers in labs and universities who were being coopted into stealing critical U.S. technologies, iden- tification of opportunities to address supply-chain threats more effectively, and education of colleges and universities about potential threats from Chinese influ- ence efforts on campus. In February 2022, the Biden Administration terminated the department’s China Initiative largely out of a concern for poor “optics.”52 While the Biden Administra- tion correctly identified China as America’s “only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it,”53 it folded in the face of political cor- rectness and sent the message that liberal sensitivities outweighed bringing justice to threats from China. The next conservative Administration should therefore: l Restart the China Initiative. l Pursue other programs to educate the American people about the real and dangerous threats to our national security and economic security that are posed by actors across the globe, most notably China and Iran. l Ensure that it is agile enough to devote sufficient resources and attention to other emerging threats that involve federal interests

Department of the Treasury

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 736-738AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The BUST FENTANYL Act focuses on combating fentanyl trafficking through sanctions, international cooperation, and law enforcement, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on using Treasury-led tools like CFIUS and financial warfare to counter China-related threats. However, the bill does not directly address CFIUS reform, greenfield investments, or financial weapons development as outlined in the Project 2025 Treasury section."

Key themes:China as a geopolitical threatTreasury-led national security toolsFinancial sanctionsInternational cooperationCountering illicit flows

— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.

Department of the Treasury

Moderate
Vector: 61%
Pages: 736-738AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Treasury section aim to counter China-related threats using financial enforcement tools, but the bill focuses on fentanyl trafficking sanctions while Project 2025 centers on CFIUS oversight, penalty schedules, and greenfield investment coverage, resulting in only partial thematic overlap."

Key themes:China sanctionsfinancial enforcementmoney launderingnational security threatTreasury role

— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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