Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025
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Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
ID: E000295
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another "transparency" bill from the masters of opacity, our beloved Congress. The Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025 - how quaint. How utterly meaningless.
Let's dissect this farce. This bill is an amendment to the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), which was itself a half-hearted attempt at transparency. Now, we're supposed to believe that Congress wants to "stop secret spending" by requiring other transaction agreements (OTAs) to be reported on USAspending.gov.
The total funding amounts? Oh, those are conveniently absent from the bill. We can't have actual numbers getting in the way of a good PR stunt, now can we? But rest assured, the usual suspects will receive their usual handouts: defense contractors, big pharma, and other corporate cronies.
Key programs and agencies receiving funds? Ha! This bill is all about expanding the definition of "other transaction agreements" to include more types of contracts. It's a clever way to funnel money to favored industries without actually increasing transparency. The Department of Defense will likely be the biggest beneficiary, because what's a little secrecy when it comes to national security?
Notable increases or decreases? Don't make me laugh. This bill is all about maintaining the status quo - keeping the gravy train rolling for special interests while pretending to care about accountability.
Riders and policy provisions? Oh boy, there are some doozies in here. Section 3 amends the FFATA to require inspector general reports on OTAs. Wow, I bet that'll keep those corrupt contractors up at night. And let's not forget the "implementation plan" (Section 2(d)), which is just a fancy way of saying "we'll get around to it eventually."
Fiscal impact and deficit implications? *chuckles* You think Congress actually cares about the national debt? This bill will likely increase spending, but who needs fiscal responsibility when you have campaign donors to appease?
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative theater. It's a Potemkin village of transparency, designed to fool the gullible and distract from the real issues. Congress is once again playing doctor, prescribing a placebo to treat the symptoms of corruption while ignoring the underlying disease.
Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity Syndrome (TSS). Symptoms include: excessive use of buzzwords like "transparency" and "accountability," coupled with a complete lack of actual reform. Prognosis: poor. Treatment: none, because who needs treatment when you can just pretend to care?
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Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis. — 705 — Department of the Treasury Treasury must also seriously evaluate U.S. foreign direct investment in China. Particular focus should be paid to investments in CCP or other state-owned enter- prises, investments that result in technology transfers from the U.S. to China, investments that enhance China’s military capacity, and investments that pose risks to critical U.S. supply chains by sourcing critical components or feedstocks in China. An enhanced reporting system is warranted, and greater legal authority and restrictions are appropriate. IMPROVED FINANCIAL REGULATION One of the priorities of the incoming Administration should be to restructure the outdated and cumbersome financial regulatory system in order to promote financial innovation, improve regulator efficiency, reduce regulatory costs, close regulatory gaps, eliminate regulatory arbitrage, provide clear statutory authority, consolidate regulatory agencies or reduce the size of government, and increase transparency. Merging Functions. The new Administration should establish a more stream- lined bank and supervision by supporting legislation to merge the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Reserve’s non-monetary supervisory and regulatory functions. U.S. banking law remains stuck in the 1930s regarding which functions finan- cial companies should perform. It was never a good idea either to restrict banks to taking deposits and making loans or to prevent investment banks from taking deposits. Doing so makes markets less stable. All financial intermediaries function by pooling the financial resources of those who want to save and funneling them to others that are willing and able to pay for additional funds. This underlying principle should guide U.S. financial laws. Policymakers should create new charters for financial firms that eliminate activ- ity restrictions and reduce regulations in return for straightforward higher equity or risk-retention standards. Ultimately, these charters would replace government regulation with competition and market discipline, thereby lowering the risk of future financial crises and improving the ability of individuals to create wealth. Dodd–Frank Revisions. Congress should repeal Title I, Title II, and Title VIII of the Dodd–Frank Act.52 Title I of Dodd–Frank created the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a kind of super-regulator tasked with identifying so-called systemically important financial institutions and singling them out for especially stringent regulation. The problem, of course, is that this process effectively iden- tifies those firms regulators believe are “too big to fail.”53 Title VIII of Dodd–Frank gives the FSOC similarly broad special-designation authority for specialized financial companies known as financial market utilities.54 Title II of Dodd–Frank established the controversial provision known as orderly
Introduction
— 600 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of state or local employees are exempt from this filing requirement. These dis- closure requirements help workers and the public understand how union leaders are raising and spending union dues; they also can serve as a vital source of infor- mation that helps workers decide if the unions they are asked to join are good stewards of the funds they collect. DOL, under both George W. Bush and Donald Trump, tried rulemakings (known as the Intermediate Bodies Rule) that would require some government unions to file the same information that is required of private-sector unions. Under President Trump, OLMS required unions to disclose involvement in trusts that they either own a majority stake in or control. In the past, union trust spending has been hidden, and it appears that trust assets have occasionally been corruptly spent for the benefit of private interests in union leadership— such as $30,000 spent on a private party, $37,500 spent on a Montblanc pen, condominiums for those in power, golf outings, and a Ferrari.20 But the Biden DOL eliminated a transparency rule requiring the filing of the T-1 Trust Annual Report. More generally, OLMS, which is charged with enforcing the law of union dis- closure, has historically been underfunded when compared to other DOL agencies. This relative lack of funding has made ensuring disclosure more difficult. l Enact transparency rules. The substance of the Intermediate Bodies Rule should pass into law, either through rulemaking or through legislation. The T-1 Trust Annual Report annual filing requirement should be restored. l Increase funding levels. Congress should expand the funding of the Office of Labor-Management Standards. Duty of Fair Representation. Unions have a duty of fair representation to their members, yet they too often abuse that duty to use their members’ resources on left-wing culture-war issues that are unrelated, and in fact often harmful, to union members’ own interests. l The NLRB should take enforcement or amicus action advancing the position that political conflicts of interest by union leadership can support claims for breach of the duty of fair representation in a manner analogous to financial conflicts of interest and analogous to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in other areas of law. Interpreting “Protected Concerted Activity.” In an effort to prevent employers from retaliating against workers who express a desire to unionize, cer- tain activities are deemed “protected concerted activity” (under §7 of the NLRA). — 601 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies The NLRB has issued extreme interpretations of these activities, such as deter- mining that a business’s requiring its employees to be courteous to customers and one another is an unlawful infringement on the free speech rights implicit in the protected concerted activity protections in the NLRA. l Reverse unreasonable interpretations of “protected concerted activity.” The NLRB should return to the 2019 Alstate Maintenance interpretation of what does and does not constitute protected concerted activity, including listing eight instances of lawful actions by employers. Injunctive Relief and Worker Organizing Activities. Within the confines of the more reasonable definition of protected concerted activity described above, the NLRB should increase its pursuit of reinstatement injunctions. Firing work- ers engaged in concerted activity has an immediate chilling effect on organizing, but remedies under the NLRA typically come only much later and amount only to backpay. In NLRA section 10(j), Congress empowered the NLRB to obtain temporary injunctions that immediately reinstate workers to their jobs in these circumstances. This provides a more meaningful remedy to the worker and creates a significant deterrent to unfair labor practices, because prompt reinstatement will tend to reinforce the legitimacy of the organizing effort. The NLRB overwhelmingly prevails when pursuing an injunction, succeeding 100 percent of the time in 2020 and 91 percent of the time in 2021. l Increase the use of 10(j) injunctive relief. The NLRB should increase its use of 10(j) and should articulate guidelines for situations in which it intends to seek injunctive relief; the board should delegate authority to pursue such injunctions to the general counsel and the general counsel should establish a policy of considering them expeditiously in all retaliation cases identified by regional offices. Dues-Funded Worker Centers. Under current law, both labor unions and unionized employers must file financial disclosures with DOL on an annual basis to ward off potential fraud and corruption of the sort that has been seen recently within the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). However, worker centers, which have grown in number and influ- ence enormously over the past decade, are not required to file these disclosures. l Investigate worker centers and require financial disclosures. DOL should investigate worker centers that look and act like unions and bring enforcement actions to require them to file the same financial disclosures.
Introduction
— 600 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise of state or local employees are exempt from this filing requirement. These dis- closure requirements help workers and the public understand how union leaders are raising and spending union dues; they also can serve as a vital source of infor- mation that helps workers decide if the unions they are asked to join are good stewards of the funds they collect. DOL, under both George W. Bush and Donald Trump, tried rulemakings (known as the Intermediate Bodies Rule) that would require some government unions to file the same information that is required of private-sector unions. Under President Trump, OLMS required unions to disclose involvement in trusts that they either own a majority stake in or control. In the past, union trust spending has been hidden, and it appears that trust assets have occasionally been corruptly spent for the benefit of private interests in union leadership— such as $30,000 spent on a private party, $37,500 spent on a Montblanc pen, condominiums for those in power, golf outings, and a Ferrari.20 But the Biden DOL eliminated a transparency rule requiring the filing of the T-1 Trust Annual Report. More generally, OLMS, which is charged with enforcing the law of union dis- closure, has historically been underfunded when compared to other DOL agencies. This relative lack of funding has made ensuring disclosure more difficult. l Enact transparency rules. The substance of the Intermediate Bodies Rule should pass into law, either through rulemaking or through legislation. The T-1 Trust Annual Report annual filing requirement should be restored. l Increase funding levels. Congress should expand the funding of the Office of Labor-Management Standards. Duty of Fair Representation. Unions have a duty of fair representation to their members, yet they too often abuse that duty to use their members’ resources on left-wing culture-war issues that are unrelated, and in fact often harmful, to union members’ own interests. l The NLRB should take enforcement or amicus action advancing the position that political conflicts of interest by union leadership can support claims for breach of the duty of fair representation in a manner analogous to financial conflicts of interest and analogous to breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in other areas of law. Interpreting “Protected Concerted Activity.” In an effort to prevent employers from retaliating against workers who express a desire to unionize, cer- tain activities are deemed “protected concerted activity” (under §7 of the NLRA).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.