A concurrent resolution to provide for the counting on January 6, 2025, of the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States.

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Bill ID: 119/sconres/2

Last Updated: January 29, 2025

A concurrent resolution to provide for the counting on January 6, 2025, of the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States.

SCONRES. 2, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$102,900 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Executive Office of the President of the United States" section, p. 96-98 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

January 2, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

Let's break down this concurrent resolution, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a concurrent resolution is a type of legislation that doesn't have the force of law but rather expresses the opinion or intention of Congress.

This particular bill, SCONRES 2, deals with the counting of electoral votes for President and Vice President on January 6, 2025. Now, remember when we learned about the Electoral College in middle school? This resolution is essentially outlining the procedures for how those electoral votes will be counted and verified by Congress.

In terms of new regulations being created or modified, this bill doesn't really introduce any significant changes to existing laws or rules. It's more of a procedural document that outlines the steps to be taken on January 6th.

As for affected industries and sectors, it's primarily the government itself that will be impacted by this resolution. Specifically, the Senate and House of Representatives will need to follow these procedures when counting electoral votes.

Compliance requirements and timelines are straightforward: Congress needs to meet in the Hall of the House of Representatives on January 6th at 1 pm to count the electoral votes. The President of the Senate and Speaker of the House will appoint tellers to read out the certificates and papers, which will then be acted upon in alphabetical order.

Enforcement mechanisms and penalties aren't really relevant here, as this is a procedural resolution rather than a law with teeth. If Congress doesn't follow these procedures, it's not like there will be any significant consequences.

In terms of economic and operational impacts, this bill won't have much of an effect on the broader economy or industries outside of government. It's primarily a matter of internal Congressional procedure.

Now, I know some of you might be thinking, "But wait, isn't this just a formality?" And to that, I say... well, yes and no. While it may seem like a routine process, the fact remains that Congress needs to follow these procedures in order to ensure the legitimacy of the electoral process.

As we covered in 8th grade civics, the system is designed to have checks and balances in place to prevent any one branch of government from abusing its power. This resolution is just one small part of that larger system.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$102,900

15 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$102,900

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

BELL, RICHARD R

2 transactions

$16,800

NESS, LARRY F

2 transactions

$11,700

HARMS, DUANE D

2 transactions

$9,700

EVANS, MICHAEL

2 transactions

$8,400

POWELL, JESSE

1 transaction

$6,600

DUHAMEL, KATHARINE B

1 transaction

$6,600

DUHAMEL, WILLIAM F JR.

1 transaction

$6,600

BARATTA, JOSEPH

2 transactions

$6,600

MCINERNEY, PAULA G

1 transaction

$5,000

MILKEN, LOWELL J

1 transaction

$5,000

WHITE, ALAN B

1 transaction

$5,000

HARMS, JEFFREY D

1 transaction

$5,000

MARQUIS, BENJAMIN L

1 transaction

$3,300

MARQUIS, DARRELL L

1 transaction

$3,300

MARQUIS, DUSTIN L

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

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Total contributions: $102,900

Top Donors - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

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15 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on the Vice President's procedural duty to preside over the electoral vote count, while the Project 2025 excerpt emphasizes the Vice President's role in shaping administration policy and serving as a presidential emissary to the Senate. Both mention the Vice President's relationship with the Senate, but the bill does not address policy influence or agenda-setting."

Key themes:Vice PresidentSenatePresidential roleProcedural duties

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill details the Vice President's procedural role as President of the Senate in counting electoral votes, whereas Project 2025 focuses on using the Vice President as a policy lever within the Executive Office; the only overlap is the shared reference to the VP's Senate duties."

Key themes:Vice PresidentPresident of the Senateelectoral vote countingconstitutional duties

— 63 — Executive Office of the President of the United States the President of the Senate and is charged with breaking tie votes in that body. In recent years, the Vice President has been granted office space in the West Wing and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. The OVP is another one of the levers that the President should use to execute his agenda. This is particularly true because there is significant and unique leverage that the Vice President’s leadership of the OVP can evoke to shape policy discus- sions and outcomes. Every other appointed White House official serves at the pleasure of the President, whereas the Vice President is elected, and the process for filling vacancies in that Article II constitutional office, which includes confir- mation of a replacement Vice President by a majority of both Houses of Congress, is governed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.42 The Vice President has his or her own economic advisers, domestic policy and national security staff, and daily intelligence briefings. The Vice President should fill his or her office with strong and sound policy minds to effectively assist the President in fulfilling his agenda. The Vice President is also a statutory member of the National Security Council.43 In theory, in light of the fact that the Vice President is a member of the Smithso- nian Institution’s Board of Regents,44 there is nothing to prevent Congress from assigning the Vice President additional statutory duties. All of the component councils and offices discussed in this chapter include real policy development and implementation authority, and a robust OVP should be fully integrated into all policy-formation procedures. Only a Vice President who is deeply steeped in the interworking of the interagency and policy councils can offer useful advice and prove helpful in accomplishing the President’s agenda. It is also obvious, in view of the fact that many former Vice Presidents have gone on to be elected President in their own right,45 that the Vice Presidency can act as a training ground for presidential office. In the past, the Vice President has been tasked with leading certain initiatives or issues. For example, Mike Pence was tasked with coordinating the federal response to COVID-19, and both Pence and Kamala Harris have chaired the National Space Council. Vice Presidents Richard Cheney and Dan Quayle were also active on the deregulatory front and in imposing regulatory moratoria. However, OVP offi- cials should be fully integrated into each and every process from the start of a new Administration and not have to wait to be invited to join various meetings or working groups on an ad hoc basis. For example, the budget and regulatory review processes are linchpins in the execution of policy, and the OVP should have a seat at the table through every phase of policy development. Past Vice Presidents have also spent significant time abroad serving as a type of brand ambassador for the White House and, more broadly, for the United States, announcing Administration priorities and coordinating with heads of state and other top officials of foreign governments. The Vice President, as President of the — 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett.

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on the procedural role of the Vice President as President of the Senate in counting electoral votes, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes using the Vice President's office to advance the President's agenda and integrate the OVP into policy processes. Both mention the Vice President's constitutional duties, but the bill does not address policy influence or OVP integration."

Key themes:Vice PresidentPresident of the Senateconstitutional dutieselectoral vote counting

Federal Election Commission

Minimal

Vector: 61%

Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 2 outlines the procedural steps for counting electoral votes in Congress and does not address any of the Federal Election Commission reforms, litigation authority, term limits, or campaign finance changes advocated in the Project 2025 policy."

Key themes:electoral processcongressional procedurefederal elections

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal

Vector: 61%

Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 2 outlines the procedural steps for counting electoral votes and does not address the Federal Election Commission, Department of Justice enforcement, or any of the personnel and policy objectives described in the Project 2025 FEC/DOJ section."

Key themes:federal electionscongressional procedure

— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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A concurrent resolution to provide for the counting on January 6, 2025, of the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States.