A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that Donald Trump is ineligible in any future elections to be elected Vice-President or President, or to serve as President beyond the conclusion of his current term.
Sponsored by
Sen. Markey, Edward J. [D-MA]
ID: M000133
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
(sigh) Oh joy, another exercise in legislative theater. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of SRES 154 is to pretend that the Senate is doing something meaningful about Donald Trump's potential future presidential ambitions. In reality, it's a hollow resolution with no teeth, designed to appease the Democratic base and generate some cheap headlines. The objective? To create a smokescreen of moral outrage while accomplishing nothing.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This resolution is a masterclass in stating the obvious. It cites the Twelfth and Twenty-Second amendments to the Constitution, which already prohibit Trump from serving more than two terms as President. Wow, what a bold move – reiterating existing law. The "key provision" here is that it's a non-binding resolution, meaning it has all the weight of a feather in a hurricane.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The only parties affected by this resolution are the politicians who sponsored it (Markey and friends) and their donors, who will no doubt be impressed by this display of empty posturing. Trump himself won't lose any sleep over this toothless resolution. As for voters? Ha! They'll just get more confused and disillusioned with the system.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of SRES 154 is precisely zero. It's a Potemkin village of a bill, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo. The implications are that our elected officials are more interested in grandstanding than actual governance. This resolution will be forgotten in a week, and the real issues facing this country will remain unaddressed.
Diagnosis: SRES 154 is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Theater-itis," a disease characterized by a desperate need for attention, a lack of substance, and an abundance of hot air. The treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach to withstand the stench of hypocrisy emanating from Capitol Hill.
In short, this bill is a joke – a pathetic attempt to distract us from the real problems facing our country. But hey, at least it's good for a laugh... or a cry, depending on your perspective.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Markey, Edward J. [D-MA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 21 — Section 1: Taking the Reins of Government Above all, the President and those who serve under him or her must be commit- ted to the Constitution and the rule of law. This is particularly true of a conservative Administration, which knows that the President is there to uphold the Constitu- tion, not the other way around. If a conservative Administration does not respect the Constitution, no Administration will. In Chapter 1, former deputy chief of staff to the President Rick Dearborn writes that the White House Counsel “must take seriously the duty to protect the powers and privileges of the President from encroachments by Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative components of departments and agencies.” Equally important, the President must enforce the Constitution and laws as written, rather than proclaiming new “law” unilaterally. Presidents should not issue mask or vaccine mandates, arbitrarily transfer student loan debt, or issue monarchical mandates of any sort. Legislatures make the laws in a republic, not executives. It is crucial that all three branches of the federal government respect what Mad- ison called the “double security” to our liberties: the separation of powers among the three branches, and the separation of powers between the federal government and the states. This double security has been greatly compromised over the years. Vought writes that “the modern executive branch…writes federal policy, enforces that policy, and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and enforced.” He describes this as “constitutionally dire” and “in urgent need of repair,” adding: “Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at stake.” When it comes to ensuring that freedom can flourish, nothing is more import- ant than deconstructing the centralized administrative state. Political appointees who are answerable to the President and have decision-making authority in the executive branch are key to this essential task. The next Administration must not cede such authority to non-partisan “experts,” who pursue their own ends while engaging in groupthink, insulated from American voters. The following chapters detail how the next Administration can be responsive to the American people (not to entrenched “elites”); how it can take care that all the laws are “faithfully exe- cuted,” not merely those that the President desires to see executed; and how it can achieve results and not be stymied by an unelected bureaucracy. — 23 — 1 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Rick Dearborn From popular culture to academia, the American presidency has long been a prominent fixture of the national imagination—naturally so since it is the beating heart of our nation’s power and prestige. It has played, for instance, a feature role in innumerable movies and television shows and has been prodded, analyzed, and critiqued by countless books, essays, and studies. But like nearly everything else in life, there is no substitute for firsthand experience, which this manual has compiled from the experience of presidential appointees and provides in accessible form for future use. With respect to the presidency, it is best to begin with our Republic’s founda- tional document. The Constitution gives the “executive Power” to the President.1 It designates him as “Commander in Chief”2 and gives him the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”3 It further prescribes that the President might seek the assistance of “the principal Officer in each of the execu- tive Departments.”4 Beginning with George Washington, every President has been supported by some form of White House office consisting of direct staff officers as well as a Cabinet comprised of department and agency heads. Since the inaugural Administration of the late 18th century, citizens have chosen to devote both their time and their talent to defending and strengthening our nation by serving at the pleasure of the President. Their shared patriotic endeavor has proven to be a noble one, not least because the jobs in what is now known as the White House Office (WHO) are among the most demanding in all of government. The President must rely on the men and women appointed to the WHO. There simply are not enough hours in the day to manage the affairs of state single-handedly,
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.