Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1736
Last Updated: September 6, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

ID: P000048

Follow the money

The bill

Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act

HR. 1736, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$101,135 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 254-256 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

November 19, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act (HR 1736) claims to address the "national security threat" posed by foreign terrorist organizations using generative artificial intelligence for terrorism. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to justify more surveillance and data collection under the guise of national security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct annual assessments on terrorism threats related to generative AI, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. These assessments will include analyses of incidents involving terrorist organizations using AI for violent extremist messaging and recruitment, as well as recommendations for countermeasures.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other relevant federal agencies. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the tech companies that will benefit from this legislation by selling their AI-powered surveillance tools to the government.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" – it creates the illusion of addressing a threat while actually expanding the surveillance state and enriching private interests. The annual assessments will likely become a rubber stamp for more invasive data collection and monitoring, all under the guise of national security.

The real disease here is the insatiable appetite for power and control that afflicts our politicians. They're using the bogeyman of terrorism to justify their latest power grab, while ignoring the actual risks posed by AI – such as job displacement, bias, and amplification of existing social inequalities.

In short, HR 1736 is a cynical attempt to exploit public fears and further erode civil liberties. It's a legislative placebo, designed to make us feel safer while actually making us more vulnerable to government overreach and corporate exploitation. How quaint.

Related Topics

National Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$101,135
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$93,535

No PAC contributions found

1
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
2
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
WILSON, CELIA R
4 transactions
$22,400
2
PUDWILL, JAMES
2 transactions
$13,200
3
GELBMAN, JOEL
2 transactions
$13,200
4
DIMEMMO, COLETTE
1 transaction
$6,600
5
AUSTIN, RUTH
2 transactions
$6,600
6
WILSON, WORD B
1 transaction
$5,000
7
O'BRIEN, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,435
8
WIDENER, BROCK
1 transaction
$3,300
9
POOL, VALRIE S
1 transaction
$3,300
10
KAMON, KENNETH
1 transaction
$3,300
11
ZALIK, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
12
JENNINGS, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
13
WALKER, TODD
1 transaction
$3,300
14
HIDUKE, MARK
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Guest, Michael [R-MS-3]

ID: G000591

Top Contributors

26

1
RMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC
OrganizationHOOVER, AL
$2,500
Sep 17, 2024
2
DUNAGIN PEST SOLUTIONS LLC
OrganizationHATTIESBURG, MS
$1,650
Sep 17, 2024
3
DUNAGIN PEST SOLUTIONS LLC
OrganizationHATTIESBURG, MS
$1,650
Sep 17, 2024
4
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$1,000
Sep 30, 2023
5
CLAW FORESTRY SERVICES, LLC
OrganizationJACKSON, SC
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
VILLAGE OF MADISON, LLC
OrganizationMADISON, MS
$500
Sep 30, 2024
7
BLACKWELL, DEAN
SELF EMPLOYED • PHYSICIAN
IndividualJACKSON, MS
$3,300
Nov 3, 2024
8
DAVIS, LESLEY
MS ADVOCACY GROUP • PUBLIC POLICY
IndividualFLOWOOD, MS
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
9
DOZIER, ROBERT HUGH
MIPA • EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IndividualRIDGELAND, MS
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
10
DUFF, THOMAS M
SOUTHERN TIRE MART • OWNER
IndividualHATTIESBURG, MS
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Top Contributors

20

1
WRIGHT, ELIZABETH
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Jun 29, 2024
2
WOODWARD, JOHN
SPIERER WOODWARD • ATTORNEY
IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO
$6,600
Sep 19, 2023
3
BERGSTROM, ROBERT
BT CONSTRUCTION • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualFORT LUPTON, CO
$6,600
Oct 13, 2024
4
ERICKSON, GARY
EXECUTIVE CUSTOM CONSTRUCTION • GENERAL CONTRACTOR
IndividualCOLORADO SPRINGS, CO
$6,600
Oct 15, 2024
5
HASELDEN, BYRON
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CEO
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
6
HASELDEN, EDDIE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CHAIRMAN
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
7
HASELDEN, MIKE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CO-CHAIRMAN
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
8
WAGNER, BRUCE
WAGNER EQUIPMENT • PRES
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$5,000
Sep 20, 2024
9
DUKE, D. A.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$5,000
Oct 9, 2024
10
MCDONALD, BRUCE
MCDONALD INSURANCE GROUP • OWNER
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$3,868
Sep 30, 2024

Rescom. Hernández, Pablo Jose [D-PR-At Large]

ID: H001103

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Donor Network - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 40 nodes and 54 connections

Total contributions: $54

Top Donors - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs14 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • Section 3(a)(1) requires annual assessments of terrorism threats posed by generative AI, which will likely increase demand for AI and cloud infrastructure services used to develop, deploy, and analyze such assessments, benefiting providers like AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and AI labs.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.85

    Section 3(b) mandates information sharing and review of terrorism threat data from fusion centers and intelligence community, which will likely increase demand for cybersecurity tools and services to protect and analyze such data, benefiting firms like Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, and Fortinet.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(2)(ii) includes analysis of AI-enhanced development or deployment of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, which may drive demand for defense contractors involved in counter-WMD technologies and threat mitigation, such as Lockheed Martin or Raytheon.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on assessing terrorism threats from generative AI, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening intelligence analysis and improving information sharing within the intelligence community to counter emerging threats. While both address national security and intelligence effectiveness, the bill's specific focus on AI-driven terrorism is narrower than Project 2025's broader strategic goals regarding analytic objectivity, China competition, and intelligence community re"

Key themes:intelligence analysisinformation sharingnational securitycounterterrorismemerging threats

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt emphasize enhancing the intelligence community's role in identifying and countering terrorism threats, but the bill does not address the Project 2025 themes of preventing politicization, FISA reform, or accountability measures."

Key themes:terrorism threat assessmentintelligence community coordinationnational securitycounterterrorismAI-related threats

— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 251-253AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 intelligence community section emphasize enhancing national security through regular threat assessments, interagency coordination (especially between DHS and ODNI/FBI), and addressing emerging technology threats posed by foreign adversaries, though the bill focuses on terrorism while Project 2025 centers on counterintelligence and economic espionage."

Key themes:threat assessmentinteragency coordinationcounterterrorism/counterintelligenceemerging technology threatsintelligence community collaboration

— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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