The bill
Improving Law Enforcement Officer Safety and Wellness Through Data Act
HR. 2240, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
ID: M001236
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2240, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Justice" section, p. 584-586 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
May 18, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose its true intentions.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Improving Law Enforcement Officer Safety and Wellness Through Data Act of 2025 is a classic example of "do something" legislation. Its primary objective is to create the illusion that Congress cares about law enforcement officer safety while actually doing nothing substantial to address the issue. The bill's main purpose is to generate reports, collect data, and provide a veneer of concern for police officers' well-being.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Attorney General to submit a report to Congress within 270 days, detailing various aspects of violent attacks against law enforcement officers. This report will include information on offenders targeting police, incidents reported to the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted Data Collection, Federal responses to ambushes, and recommendations for improving State, local, and Federal responses.
The bill also mandates an analysis of training programs, the effectiveness of protective gear distribution, and the ability to combine data collection systems. Because, you know, what law enforcement officers really need is more paperwork and bureaucratic red tape.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Law enforcement officers, their families, and communities will be affected by this bill's empty promises. The Attorney General, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Institute of Justice, and Criminal Justice Information Services Division will be responsible for generating the report, which will likely become a dusty relic on some bureaucratic shelf.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of "legislative placebo effect." It creates the illusion that Congress is addressing a critical issue while doing nothing to actually improve law enforcement officer safety. The real impact will be:
1. More bureaucracy and paperwork for already overworked law enforcement agencies. 2. A report that will likely collect dust, unimplemented and unread. 3. A false sense of security among police officers and their families, who will believe that Congress is taking meaningful action to protect them.
In conclusion, this bill is a cynical exercise in legislative posturing, designed to appease law enforcement unions and voters while doing nothing to address the real issues facing police officers. It's a classic case of "sound and fury, signifying nothing."
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001063
Top Contributors
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ID: W000814
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ID: S001201
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ID: D000032
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ID: N000193
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ID: F000450
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ID: F000466
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ID: K000399
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 25 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $30
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 3 requires the Attorney General to develop reports relating to violent attacks against law enforcement officers, which may lead to improved safety and wellness for officers, thus benefiting the industry (law_enforcement_surv).
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on renewing the DOJ's emphasis on violent crime and supporting law enforcement through data-driven strategies, accountability, and improved operational effectiveness, particularly in responding to ambushes and violent attacks against officers."
— 551 — Department of Justice The DOJ needs a hard firewall between its legitimate activities (monitoring online activity for potential threats in its mission space, looking at social media profiles for evidence of intent or other criminal activity, etc.) and those in which it must not engage (asking or demanding public forums or publishers to remove material based on the content and/or viewpoints expressed or itself censoring speech). l Streamline the non–law enforcement functions within the FBI, such as its Office of General Counsel, and obtain those services from other offices within the department. The next conservative Administration should eliminate any offices within the FBI that it has the power to eliminate without any action from Congress.34 For example, few Americans know that the FBI maintains a core of approximately 300 attorneys within its Office of General Counsel, an office that has been involved in some of the FBI’s most damaging recent scandals.35 These attorneys are not necessary to the functioning of the FBI in their current capacity. Legal advice should come from attorneys at the DOJ, whether those attorneys are within the Criminal Division, the National Security Division, the Justice Management Division, or the Office of Legal Counsel. Moving legal review outside the FBI would serve as a crucial check on an agency that has recently pushed past legal boundary after legal boundary. Similarly, the FBI does not need its own Office of Congressional Affairs separate and apart from the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs, nor does it need its own Office of Public Affairs. l Emphasize, fund, and reward field offices while shrinking headquarters staff. While the FBI has essential headquarters functions that must be fulfilled and should likely be fulfilled by a team in Washington, D.C., the next conservative Administration should make a priority of deploying, funding, and rewarding the work of the field offices to the greatest extent possible. The Department of Justice must value badges over bureaucracy, must rethink its internal reporting structures, and should aim to realign the FBI’s resources accordingly. l Submit a legislative proposal to Congress to eliminate the 10-year term for the Director. After J. Edgar Hoover’s decades-long term as FBI Director came to an end following his death in 1972, and in light of oversight conducted by Congress into alleged Intelligence Community and FBI abuses in the 1970s, Congress limited the Director’s tenure to one “ten- year term.”36 The realities of the FBI’s abuses and overreach in recent years demonstrate that further reform is still necessary. — 552 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The Director of the FBI must remain politically accountable to the President in the same manner as the head of any other federal department or agency. To ensure prompt political accountability and to rein in perceived or actual abuses, the next conservative Administration should seek a legislative change to align the FBI Director’s position with those of the heads of all other major departments and agencies. RENEWING THE DEPARTMENT’S FOCUS ON VIOLENT CRIME Despite the DOJ’s pronouncements that violent crime continues to be a top pri- ority, it has increased across the United States. The department’s leadership must make actually reducing violent crime a priority across the United States—and it must do so in partnership with state and local officials in a manner that is tailored to the needs and conditions in those states and localities. Targeting Violent and Career Criminals, Not Parents. The next conserva- tive Administration must ensure that the Department of Justice devotes significant effort to reducing violent crime nationwide. The Attorney General should require all U.S. Attorneys to develop a jurisdictional-specific plan—whenever possible in coordination with state and local law enforcement—to reduce violent crime within each of their districts. Then the Attorney General should hold each U.S. Attorney accountable for achieving actual results. In recent years, federal and state officials have succumbed to calls from anti–law enforcement advocates for so-called criminal justice reform. The pleas- ant-sounding terminology of reform masks the darker reality of this movement, which is one that has supported dismantling effective federal, state, and local law enforcement and stripped away some of the most fundamental tools that law enforcement has long had at its disposal. This campaign is not just ill-advised; it has clearly had real-world consequences in the form of catastrophic increases in crime—particularly violent crime—nationwide. As discussed in the next section, the Department of Justice has a special obligation to restore law and order in such districts.37 Juxtaposed against this increase in violent crime are things like Attorney Gen- eral Merrick Garland’s October 4, 2021, memorandum directing the commitment of significant resources and energies to combating imaginary, politically conve- nient threats of violence toward members of school boards and their staffs during the heat of the Virginia gubernatorial race.38 There was no similar effort to inves- tigate elected officials and other public officers who conspired with outside allies to target and harass parents who were merely exercising their constitutional and statutory rights.39 If we are to continue to have informed and civil dialogue in the United States on issues of public concern, the DOJ must enforce applicable civil rights laws in an even-handed way when citizens’ livelihoods are threatened merely because they have exercised their rights.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on law enforcement officer safety through data collection on violent attacks, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt emphasizes Department of Defense strategy, intelligence community structure, and defense support of civil authorities. There is minimal direct overlap, though both involve federal coordination and responses to domestic security incidents."
— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on DOJ-led data collection and reporting to improve law enforcement officer safety, whereas the Project 2025 DHS excerpt concerns internal DHS management reforms, reporting structures, and elimination of certain offices; there is only a tangential connection through general law enforcement safety concerns."
— 160 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15 Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented. To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging. Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out- side of the executive branch. OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY) Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights. — 161 — Department of Homeland Security PLCY should likewise do a complete inventory, analysis, and evaluation of any of the department’s work, in coordination with social media outlets, to censor or otherwise change or affect Americans’ speech. PLCY should comprehensively report on and publish this history in full so that the American people can know the facts. The department should remove all personnel who participated in any of this activity. The department has significant authority and budget to provide grants for var- ious purposes. This effort is diffused across components and lacks central policy thought and coordination. PLCY should set a departmentwide policy that estab- lishes how granting choices are to be made and is consistent with the President’s priorities. PLCY should clear all granting decisions to ensure that they are con- sistent with the new policy. PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY should work with Congress to streamline the department’s reporting requirements. Because there has not been a departmen- tal reauthorization bill and these requirements have been added piecemeal over two decades, they significantly overlap and even conflict—wasting resources and distracting from the department’s mission. PLCY should seek the elimination of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Issue-Area Reforms. PLCY should bolster its Immigration Statistics program and make it the one-stop shop for the timely production of all department immi- gration statistics and analysis. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should be eliminated both because it has not added value and because it has been weaponized for domestic politi- cal purposes. The Intelligence Community (IC) already provides raw intelligence to DHS components. In addition, the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, and other agencies where necessary already provide holistic threat assessment products to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector entities at both the classified and unclassified levels where appropriate. I&A’s work as an interlocuter between the IC and DHS components’ individual intelligence operations on the one hand and government and the private sector on the other, as well as between the IC and the components, is at best duplicative. At worst, it is used and discussed in the media as a political tool, resulting in more harm than good to the U.S. government and IC writ large. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is not a member of the IC, should create cyber intelligence products in a collaborative fashion with the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Such efforts would lead to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders that exceed the quality and capability of I&A’s efforts. This same principle applies to other
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.