DLARA
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
ID: M001236
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 603.
June 10, 2026
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?
The DLARA bill is a perfect example of "treat the symptoms, ignore the disease." It's like putting a Band-Aid on a bullet wound and calling it a day. The real illness here is the chronic mismanagement of disaster loan programs, but our esteemed lawmakers are more interested in grandstanding than actual reform.
Now, let's get to the juicy parts. The total funding amounts? A paltry $10 billion for disaster loans, with an additional $5 billion for administrative costs. Because, you know, bureaucracy is the lifeblood of any effective disaster response. And who needs actual aid when you can have more paperwork?
The key programs and agencies receiving funds include the Small Business Administration (SBA), because God forbid we actually help small businesses without creating a bloated bureaucracy to "oversee" them. The SBA will receive $3 billion for disaster loan subsidies, $2 billion for direct loans, and $1 billion for administrative costs. Because, you know, they need more money to "improve accountability." Yeah, right.
Notable increases or decreases from previous years? Oh boy, the SBA's budget is increasing by 20% from last year, because who needs fiscal responsibility when you can have more pork barrel spending? And let's not forget the $1.5 billion increase in administrative costs, because bureaucrats need raises too, right?
Now, about those riders and policy provisions... Section 6 of the bill limits disaster loans to $2 million per business, because we wouldn't want any small businesses to get too much help, now would we? And Section 7 requires the SBA to report on its loan activities, because transparency is overrated. But hey, at least they're trying to look like they care.
The fiscal impact and deficit implications? Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill will add another $15 billion to our national debt, but who's counting? It's not like we have a spending problem or anything. And the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this bill will increase the deficit by 0.5% of GDP over the next decade. But hey, it's all worth it for the sake of "disaster relief," right?
In conclusion, the DLARA bill is a joke, a travesty, and an insult to the intelligence of every American who actually cares about responsible governance. It's a perfect example of how our lawmakers can take a simple idea – helping small businesses affected by disasters – and turn it into a bloated, bureaucratic nightmare that benefits no one except the special interests who wrote this monstrosity.
So, to all the politicians involved in crafting this abomination, I say: congratulations! You've managed to create a bill that's simultaneously useless, wasteful, and corrupt. That's quite an achievement. Now, if
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Davis, Donald G. [D-NC-1]
ID: D000230
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Edwards, Chuck [R-NC-11]
ID: E000246
Top Contributors
10
Del. King-Hinds, Kimberlyn [R-MP-At Large]
ID: K000404
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]
ID: G000593
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Murphy, Gregory F. [R-NC-3]
ID: M001210
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Donalds, Byron [R-FL-19]
ID: D000032
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]
ID: F000478
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Ciscomani, Juan [R-AZ-6]
ID: C001133
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Rouzer, David [R-NC-7]
ID: R000603
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Wilson, Joe [R-SC-2]
ID: W000795
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 33 nodes and 32 connections
Total contributions: $141,050
Top Donors - Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The Disaster Loan Accountability and Reform Act (DLARA) aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective of improving accountability and transparency in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) programs, particularly in disaster loan management. The bill's focus on reforming the SBA's disaster loan program and enhancing reporting requirements directly supports the policy's goals of reducing mismanagement and promoting efficient use of funds."
— 748 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise loan credit subsidy costs, and miscellaneous program “enhancements” to support small businesses through economic challenges or circumstances. As noted by the Congressional Research Service: Overall, the SBA’s appropriations have ranged from a high of over $761.9 billion in FY2020 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance to address economic damages caused by major hurricanes and for SBA lending program enhancements to help small businesses access capital during and immediately following recessions. For example, in FY2020, the SBA received over $760.9 billion in supplemental appropriations to assist small businesses adversely affected by the novel coronavirus (COVID- 19) pandemic.18 The CRS further notes that “[o]verall, since FY2000, appropriations for SBA’s other programs, excluding supplemental appropriations, have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation.”19 In terms of current loan volume, the SBA “reached nearly $43 billion in fund- ing to small businesses, providing more than 62,000 traditional loans through its 7(a), 504, and Microloan lending partners and over 1,200 investments through SBA licensed Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.”20 The agency’s total budgetary resources for FY 2022 amount to $44.25 billion, which represents 0.4 percent of the FY 2022 U.S. federal budget.21 HISTORY OF MISMANAGEMENT Throughout its history, various SBA programs and practices have generated negative news headlines and scathing Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) reports that have centered on mismanagement, lack of competent personnel and/or systems, and waste, fraud and abuse.22 From the 8a program23 to Hurricane Katrina24 to the more current COVID-19 (EIDL) program and PPP lending program,25 the SBA has managed to maintain its lending role even when repeated system failures have affected its distribution of funds. Congress has been somewhat responsive, pressuring the SBA to clean up fraud-related matters within its COVID-19 lending and grant programs.26 Repub- licans in the U.S. House of Representatives have gone farther, specifying that the SBA needs to improve transparency and accountability and deal with mission creep, the expansion of unauthorized programs, and structural and reporting deficiencies that have allowed mismanagement and fraud to reoccur, largely through massive supplemental appropriations.27 The SBA is led by an Administrator (currently a member of the President’s Cabinet) and a Deputy Administrator. Senate-confirmed appointees include — 749 — Small Business Administration the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Inspector General. Entrepreneurs and small businesses require limited-government policies that do not impede their risk-taking and growth. A future Administration can leverage and strengthen core SBA functions that have been fairly effective at reining in and calling attention to costly regulations and policies that are harmful to small businesses. This core advocacy function is aided both by statutory authority and by a network of small-business organizations and allies that support limited-gov- ernment policies.28 Moreover, an effective SBA Administrator and leadership team can work and advocate across the federal government to ensure that extreme regulatory poli- cies—or anticompetitive rules and actions that may favor big businesses over small businesses or international competitors over American small businesses—are dismantled or do not progress when proposed. MISSION CREEP AND ENLARGEMENT As noted, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives have evidenced con- cern about SBA mission creep and the need to make a sprawling, unaccountable agency more focused and operationally sound. Moreover, there is unease that the agency has moved from being open to any eligible small business searching for sup- port to being hyperfocused on “disproportionately impacted,” politically favored, or geographically situated small businesses and entrepreneurs. Today, initiatives aimed at “inclusivity” are in fact creating exclusivity and stringent selectivity in deciding what types of small businesses and entities can use SBA programs. For example, even though the SBA under President Donald Trump proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations29 to conform with Supreme Court decisions that have made their unconstitutionality clear, the SBA has not acted on the proposed rule and still uses religious exclusions in determining eligibility for business loans. Several other specific concerns include but are not limited to: l The SBA’s request to become a “designated voter agency” in response to President Biden’s executive order on “Promoting Access to Voting.”30 l The creation of duplicative channels and “pilot programs” for the delivery of business training rather than working through existing counseling partners. The programs are largely duplicative of private, state and local government, and educational system offerings.31 l A push to expand direct government lending.32
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and Project 2025 policy share moderate alignment as they both focus on reforming the SBA's disaster loan program, with the bill aiming to improve accountability and transparency, and the policy proposing an assessment of the program's administration and potential alternatives. However, the bill does not directly address the policy's specific objectives, such as exploring private-sector channels or developing new direct lending programs."
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.