The bill
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
HR. 5167, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]
ID: C001087
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5167, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 266-268 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 339.
November 27, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?
**Diagnosis:** "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026" - a.k.a. "The Spy Budget Bill"
**Symptoms:** This bill is a classic case of "Money-itis," where politicians throw billions at the intelligence community without any real oversight or accountability.
**Total Funding Amounts and Budget Allocations:** $63.5 billion for FY 2026, an increase of $2.4 billion from last year's budget. Because what's a few billion more when you're already hemorrhaging cash?
**Key Programs and Agencies Receiving Funds:**
* The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gets a whopping $15.3 billion, because who needs transparency when you can just throw money at the problem? * The National Security Agency (NSA) receives $10.8 billion, likely to be used for more "accidental" mass surveillance and data collection. * The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) gets $2.5 billion, probably to fund their next big failure in predicting global events.
**Notable Increases or Decreases:** The biggest increase goes to the CIA's covert operations budget, up by 15% from last year. Because what could possibly go wrong with more secret wars and regime changes?
**Riders or Policy Provisions Attached to Funding:**
* Section 302 establishes a new National Counterintelligence Center, because we clearly need another bureaucratic layer to "coordinate" our intelligence efforts. * Section 405 prohibits the use of DeepSeek on intelligence community systems. Ah, finally, someone's paying attention to those pesky AI ethics concerns... just kidding, this is probably just a token gesture.
**Fiscal Impact and Deficit Implications:** This bill will add another $2.4 billion to our already bloated national debt. But hey, who needs fiscal responsibility when you can just print more money?
In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a textbook example of how politicians prioritize pork-barrel spending over actual intelligence reform. It's a never-ending cycle of waste, inefficiency, and bureaucratic bloat.
**Prescription:** Take two aspirin, call me in the morning, and for the love of all things sane, elect competent leaders who can actually balance a budget.
Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 20 connections (31 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $66,000
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 8 helped.
Sec. 408 requires the President to issue or update policies to maximize use of classified data for training or refining AI models, which benefits AI and cloud infrastructure providers by enabling greater use of sensitive data for AI development.
Sec. 411 requires the NSA Director to develop an AI Security Playbook to defend covered AI technologies from technology theft, which includes cybersecurity strategies and involves engagement with cybersecurity experts and federally funded research centers, benefiting cybersecurity firms.
Sec. 404 requires designation of senior officials for biotechnology across intelligence community elements, and Sec. 803 mandates a National Intelligence Estimate on advancements in biotechnology by China, increasing focus and potential funding for biotech-related intelligence activities.
Section 404 requires senior officials for biotechnology in intelligence community elements, which could drive demand for biotech research and applications relevant to hospital and health system operations, indirectly supporting this sector.
Sec. 514 expands commercial imagery and data procurement by the National Reconnaissance Office, which likely increases contracts with defense contractors involved in remote sensing and data analytics.
Section 404's focus on biotechnology senior officials may spur innovation in health-related biotech, potentially benefiting health insurers through improved risk assessment tools or preventive care technologies.
+ 2 more industries not shown.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill provides funding and oversight measures (AI reporting, CIA expenditure guidance, DeepSeek ban) that align with Project 2025's goals of enhancing intelligence community accountability and addressing technological threats, though it does not directly address workforce diversity or politicization themes."
— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill supports intelligence community funding and oversight, including AI reporting and counterintelligence efforts, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on IC neutrality, accountability, and China-focused priorities, though it does not directly address politicization concerns or FISA reforms highlighted in the policy."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
AI Analysis:
"The bill increases oversight and accountability via reporting requirements on AI use and CIA expenditures, which aligns with Project 2025’s emphasis on preventing politicization and ensuring neutral intelligence analysis, though it does not directly address FISA reform or appointment politics."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027
119/hr/9624
To amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 through October 20, 2027, and for other purposes.
119/hr/8035
To amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and for other purposes.
119/hr/9238