Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/3161

Last Updated: November 12, 2025

Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025

S. 3161, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$127,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Introduced

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

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Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

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Passed Congress

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Presidential Action

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025: A Summary**

The Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025, introduced by Senators Slotkin and Ernst, aims to enhance the protection of data affecting operational security of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel. This bill is a prime example of how inefficient democratic processes can stifle innovation and hinder progress.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to strengthen the protection of personal data related to DOD personnel's operational security. The legislation seeks to achieve this by prioritizing the identification and protection of sensitive data, reviewing existing guidance, and implementing new measures for enhanced protection.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Prioritization of Data Protection**: The Secretary of Defense must identify and prioritize the protection of personal data related to operational security. 2. **Review and Issuance of New Guidance**: The Secretary will review existing guidance and issue revised or new guidance for enhanced protection measures by June 1, 2026. 3. **Storage of Data**: Departmental data related to operational security must be stored on DOD servers or cloud services, with exceptions made for contractors or subcontractors with permission from the data subject. 4. **Congressional Notification**: The Secretary must notify Congress of changes to departmental issuances and events related to data protection.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **DOD Personnel**: The bill directly affects DOD personnel, whose personal data will be protected under enhanced measures. 2. **Contractors and Subcontractors**: Companies working with the DOD may need to adapt to new data storage requirements. 3. **Congress**: Lawmakers will receive notifications on changes to departmental issuances and events related to data protection.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Increased Bureaucratic Red Tape**: The bill's emphasis on congressional notification and review processes may lead to increased bureaucratic hurdles, hindering the DOD's ability to adapt quickly to emerging threats. 2. **Costly Compliance Measures**: Contractors and subcontractors may face additional costs in implementing new data storage requirements, potentially leading to decreased competitiveness and innovation. 3. **Limited Impact on National Security**: The bill's focus on protecting personal data may not significantly enhance national security, as more pressing concerns, such as cybersecurity threats, remain unaddressed.

In conclusion, the Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025 is a prime example of how well-intentioned legislation can be misguided and inefficient. By prioritizing bureaucratic processes over innovation and progress, this bill may ultimately hinder the DOD's ability to protect national security interests. As a visionary leader in the tech industry, I would advise policymakers to focus on more effective solutions that promote efficiency, deregulation, and privatization.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$127,700

20 donors

PACs

Organizations

$42,100

Committees

Individuals

$85,600

No PAC contributions found

MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

THE CHICKASAW NATION

2 transactions

$6,600

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

4 transactions

$6,600

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA

1 transaction

$3,300

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE

1 transaction

$3,300

NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI

1 transaction

$3,300

SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IA

1 transaction

$2,500

No committee contributions found

PUGH, BILL

2 transactions

$13,200

DAVIS, MARLENE

2 transactions

$13,200

TISCH, DAVID

2 transactions

$13,200

KAMEN, AL

2 transactions

$10,000

GOLD, LESLIE F

2 transactions

$9,900

PARTIN, LYNN

1 transaction

$6,300

LUSTIGER, KRISTINA INGER

1 transaction

$5,700

SHAFROTH, TRACEY

1 transaction

$5,000

BLAU, LISA

1 transaction

$4,800

HACHIGIAN, NINA

1 transaction

$4,300

Donor Network - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

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Showing 60 nodes and 30 connections (84 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $127,700

Top Donors - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

10 Orgs10 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90
Section 2(f) requires the Secretary of Defense to develop standards, training, reporting, and security debriefing requirements for system owners handling personal data affecting operational security, which will increase demand for cybersecurity services and training.
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85
Section 2(c)(1) allows storage of personal data on non-Department servers or cloud services pursuant to a contract with a Department contractor or subcontractor, creating opportunities for defense contractors to provide compliant data storage solutions.
−AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.80
Section 2(c)(1) limits storage of Department personal data on non-Department servers or cloud services unless under a contract or with data subject permission, which could restrict use of commercial cloud providers (e.g., AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) for DoD data.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Defense Contractors$44,617
from 129 contributions
- MONAHAN, JASON$7,000
- FANNING, ERIC$4,800
- LETTRE, MARCEL$4,800
- O'CONNOR, JENNIFER$4,750
- MINDE, GEORGE$3,770
Cybersecurity$2,600
from 9 contributions
- LIPPARD, JOSHUA$1,150
- BARBER, VICTORIA$500
- HOLLAND, ALEX$250
- RIZZO, MICHAEL$250
- STARZAK, ALISSA$250

Industries this bill HARMS

AI & Cloud Infrastructure$25,953
from 80 contributions
- KWON, JASON$5,000
- ALLHASSANI, MEHDI$4,800
- FISHER, WILLIAM$3,300
- JOHNSON, HOLLY$3,300
- NEULIEP, MARTIN$1,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Strong

Vector: 69%

Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on safeguarding DOD personnel data through enhanced guidance, storage restrictions, oversight, and congressional notification aligns closely with Project 2025's DoD emphasis on accountability, intelligence community oversight, and protecting national security against great‑power competition threats."

Key themes:data protectionoversight and accountabilitynational securityDOD personnel securityguidance issuance

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Department of Defense

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 152-154AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on protecting DOD personnel data from unauthorized access, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of increasing cyber resilience and protecting critical DOD networks, though it does not directly address offensive cyber operations, irregular warfare, or election-related restrictions outlined in the policy."

Key themes:cyber resiliencedata protectionDOD securityoperational security

— 120 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36 4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics. l Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness. 1. Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare. 2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level. 3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level. 4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS). 5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies. 6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37 l Rationalize strategy and doctrine. 1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes. 2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against U.S. infrastructure and citizens. — 121 — Department of Defense SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). Needed Reforms l Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels. 1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.” 2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 68%

Pages: 140-142AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on protecting DOD personnel data from unauthorized access, which is a cybersecurity and privacy measure, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes intelligence reform, accountability, and restoring trust in Defense Intelligence through structural and analytical changes. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address intelligence integrity, independent analysis, or the DIE’s role in policy discussions."

Key themes:Department of Defensenational securitydata protection

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 67%

Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on protecting DOD personnel data and operational security, which is a narrow cybersecurity and privacy concern. Project 2025's DoD section emphasizes nuclear modernization, counterterrorism burden-sharing, and acquisition reform—none of which are directly addressed by the data protection measures in the bill."

Key themes:national securityDepartment of Defenseoperational security

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 140-142AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on protecting DOD personnel data from unauthorized access, which is a cybersecurity and privacy measure, while Project 2025's DoD section emphasizes intelligence reform, accountability, border security, and military readiness—there is minimal thematic overlap."

Key themes:Department of Defensenational securitydata protection

— 107 — Department of Defense 5. Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign targeted disruptions.23 l Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and sustained, officials must be held accountable. 1. Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis, even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views. 2. Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National Intelligence Estimates. l Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision, which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers. This function should be returned to OPM except for military security clearance investigations. — 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Sen. Slotkin, Elissa

No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025

119/s/3167

A bill to provide for interagency tabletop exercises to assess the impacts of Department of Defense decisions during crises and evaluate United States Government tools available to augment Department of Defense capabilities in competition, crisis, and conflict, and for other purposes.

119/s/3160

A bill to require a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States.

119/s/3164