Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/3161
Last Updated: November 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

ID: S001208

Follow the money

The bill

Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025

S. 3161, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$127,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

60% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

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Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Fine, let's dissect this latest exercise in legislative theater.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Protecting DOD Data Act of 2025 is a bill that claims to enhance the protection of data affecting operational security of Department of Defense personnel. (rolls eyes) How original. The main purpose is to create the illusion of improving national security while actually doing very little to address the real issues.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill requires the Secretary of Defense to:

1. Identify and prioritize personal data related to operational security. 2. Review and issue new guidance on protecting such data by June 2026. 3. Limit storage of sensitive data on non-Department servers or cloud services, with some exceptions (because who needs strict rules, right?). 4. Notify Congress of changes to Departmental issuances and certain events related to data security.

These provisions are just a rehashing of existing regulations with some minor tweaks. It's like putting a Band-Aid on a bullet wound.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The usual suspects:

1. Department of Defense personnel (the ones who will supposedly benefit from this bill). 2. Contractors and subcontractors (who will likely find ways to exploit the loopholes in this legislation). 3. Congress (which gets to pretend it's doing something about national security).

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of improved security while doing little to address the root causes of data breaches and cybersecurity threats.

The real impact will be:

1. More bureaucratic red tape for DoD personnel. 2. Increased opportunities for contractors to profit from "enhanced" security measures. 3. A false sense of security among lawmakers and the public, which will only lead to complacency and more vulnerabilities in the long run.

In short, this bill is a placebo for national security concerns. It's a waste of time and resources that could be better spent on actual solutions rather than feel-good legislation. (shrugs) But hey, at least it makes for good PR.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data PrivacyDefense Spending & ProcurementNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$127,700
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$42,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$85,600

No PAC contributions found

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
3
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
4 transactions
$6,600
4
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
5
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
6
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
7
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
1 transaction
$3,300
8
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IA
1 transaction
$2,500

No committee contributions found

1
PUGH, BILL
2 transactions
$13,200
2
DAVIS, MARLENE
2 transactions
$13,200
3
TISCH, DAVID
2 transactions
$13,200
4
KAMEN, AL
2 transactions
$10,000
5
GOLD, LESLIE F
2 transactions
$9,900
6
PARTIN, LYNN
1 transaction
$6,300
7
LUSTIGER, KRISTINA INGER
1 transaction
$5,700
8
SHAFROTH, TRACEY
1 transaction
$5,000
9
BLAU, LISA
1 transaction
$4,800
10
HACHIGIAN, NINA
1 transaction
$4,300

Donor Network - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 60 nodes and 30 connections (84 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $127,700

Top Donors - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

10 Orgs10 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(f) requires the Secretary of Defense to develop standards, training, reporting, and security debriefing requirements for system owners handling personal data affecting operational security, which will increase demand for cybersecurity services and training.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(c)(1) allows storage of personal data on non-Department servers or cloud services pursuant to a contract with a Department contractor or subcontractor, creating opportunities for defense contractors to provide compliant data storage solutions.

  • Section 2(c)(1) limits storage of Department personal data on non-Department servers or cloud services unless under a contract or with data subject permission, which could restrict use of commercial cloud providers (e.g., AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) for DoD data.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 129 contributions
    • MONAHAN, JASON$7,000
    • FANNING, ERIC$4,800
    • LETTRE, MARCEL$4,800
    • O'CONNOR, JENNIFER$4,750
    • MINDE, GEORGE$3,770
  • from 9 contributions
    • LIPPARD, JOSHUA$1,150
    • BARBER, VICTORIA$500
    • HOLLAND, ALEX$250
    • RIZZO, MICHAEL$250
    • STARZAK, ALISSA$250

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 80 contributions
    • KWON, JASON$5,000
    • ALLHASSANI, MEHDI$4,800
    • FISHER, WILLIAM$3,300
    • JOHNSON, HOLLY$3,300
    • NEULIEP, MARTIN$1,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate60.2%
Pages: 161-163

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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