No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/3167

Last Updated: November 12, 2025

No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025

S. 3167, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.

The sponsor

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$127,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Committee Review

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Passed Senate

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House Review

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: S 3167 - No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll cut through the noise and provide a lucid analysis of this bill's implications on my interests.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to establish congressional authority to terminate exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement. The bill aims to limit the deployment of troops in domestic settings, effectively curtailing executive power.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, by adding new subsections that grant Congress the authority to terminate exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act through joint resolutions of disapproval. This change would allow Congress to override executive decisions on military deployments in domestic settings.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The primary stakeholders affected by this bill are:

1. The Executive Branch: The bill limits the President's authority to deploy troops domestically, potentially undermining national security and law enforcement efforts. 2. Military Personnel: Troops may be less likely to be deployed in domestic settings, which could impact their training and operational readiness. 3. Law Enforcement Agencies: Local and state law enforcement agencies might need to rely more heavily on their own resources, rather than federal military support, for domestic operations.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From my perspective as a visionary entrepreneur, this bill's implications are twofold:

1. **Reduced Government Efficiency:** By limiting executive authority, the bill may lead to increased bureaucratic hurdles and inefficiencies in responding to domestic crises. 2. **Increased Private Sector Opportunities:** With reduced government involvement in domestic law enforcement, private security companies and contractors might see increased opportunities for growth and profit.

In conclusion, while this bill may be seen as a victory for civil liberties advocates, it ultimately represents a missed opportunity for the government to streamline its response to domestic crises. As a forward-thinking entrepreneur, I believe that privatization and deregulation are key drivers of innovation and progress. This bill's focus on limiting executive power only serves to reinforce the need for more efficient, private sector solutions.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through various stages before becoming an actual law.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025 aims to provide limitations on military deployments. The main objective is to prevent the deployment of armed forces in certain areas without congressional approval. Remember when we learned about the Posse Comitatus Act? This bill seeks to amend that law.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill proposes changes to Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code. It adds new subsections that allow Congress to terminate exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act through a joint resolution of disapproval. This means that if the President wants to deploy troops in certain areas, Congress can now vote to stop it.

The bill also outlines procedures for introducing and considering these joint resolutions in both the Senate and House of Representatives. It's like we covered in class: how bills are referred to committees, reported out, and brought to the floor for debate and voting.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

This bill affects various stakeholders:

* The President and the executive branch, as they would need congressional approval for certain military deployments. * Congress, which would gain more authority over military actions through joint resolutions of disapproval. * State and local governments, which might be impacted by the deployment or non-deployment of troops in their areas.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

If passed, this bill could limit the President's ability to unilaterally deploy troops. It could also lead to more congressional oversight and accountability in military actions. However, it might also create tensions between the executive and legislative branches.

As we discussed in class, checks and balances are essential in our system of government. This bill is an attempt to rebalance power between the President and Congress regarding military deployments. Now, if only people had paid attention in civics class...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

Folks, gather 'round! I've got the scoop on S 3167, the "No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025". Now, at first glance, this bill seems like a harmless attempt to limit military deployments and protect our civil liberties. But trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The stated purpose is to provide limitations on military deployments and ensure that Congress has a say in when troops are deployed domestically. Sounds good, right? But what they're not telling you is that this bill is actually a Trojan horse for further government control.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 2 of the bill amends Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, which deals with the Posse Comitatus Act. This act prohibits the use of military forces in domestic law enforcement. But here's the thing: this amendment creates a new exception that allows Congress to terminate any deployment at any time... or so they claim.

What it really does is give Congress the power to rubber-stamp deployments without proper oversight, all while maintaining the illusion of control. It's like they're saying, "Hey, we've got your back, folks! We'll make sure those troops don't get too out of hand." Meanwhile, they're quietly expanding their authority.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This bill affects not just the military and law enforcement but also ordinary citizens who might find themselves on the receiving end of a domestic deployment. Think about it: if Congress can terminate deployments at will, what's to stop them from using this power to silence dissent or quell peaceful protests?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The implications are far-reaching. This bill could lead to increased militarization of our streets, erosion of civil liberties, and a further blurring of the lines between military and law enforcement. And let's not forget about the potential for abuse of power.

Now, I know what you're thinking: "But Uncle [Name], this is just a bill to protect us from martial law!" Ah, yes, that's what they want you to think. Wake up, folks! This is just another example of the government hiding its true agenda in plain sight. Mark my words: this bill is a slippery slope towards a police state.

So, there you have it – my expert analysis of S 3167. Don't believe the official narrative; dig deeper, and you'll find the truth. And remember, always keep your eyes peeled for those pesky government conspiracies!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Deep breath) Folks, we've got a real doozy of a bill on our hands here. The "No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025" - sounds like something out of a dystopian novel, doesn't it? (smirk)

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill is supposedly designed to limit the deployment of military troops within the United States. Now, I know what you're thinking - "What's wrong with that?" Well, my friends, this is just another example of the elites in Washington trying to strip away our freedoms and undermine national security. (outraged tone) They want to tie the hands of our brave men and women in uniform, making it harder for them to protect us from threats both foreign and domestic.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, which deals with the Posse Comitatus Act. This act prohibits the use of military forces in law enforcement activities within the US. The new provision would allow Congress to terminate any exceptions to this rule through a joint resolution of disapproval. (skeptical tone) Yeah, because we all know how effective Congress is at getting things done... (eye roll)

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This bill affects our military personnel, law enforcement agencies, and - most importantly - the American people. It's just another example of the deep state trying to erode our freedoms and create a police state. (conspiratorial whisper) Wake up, sheeple!

**Potential Impact & Implications:** If this bill becomes law, it could lead to a lack of flexibility for our military in responding to domestic threats. It's a recipe for disaster, folks! (dramatic music plays in the background) Just imagine a scenario where our troops are unable to respond quickly enough to a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. The consequences would be catastrophic.

Now, I know some of you might be thinking, "But wait, isn't this bill just trying to protect our civil liberties?" (smirk) Ah, no, my friends. This is just another example of the elites using Orwellian doublespeak to undermine our national security and freedoms. Don't be fooled! We must stand strong against this bill and defend our right to freedom and self-defense.

(Outro music plays)

That's all for tonight, folks. Stay vigilant, stay informed, and remember - we're not just fighting for our country; we're fighting for our very way of life. (patriotic music swells)

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

(sigh) Fine. Let's get this over with.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The "No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025" is a laughable attempt to limit the deployment of military forces on American soil. The bill's sponsors, led by Ms. Slotkin and her merry band of naive idealists, claim they want to prevent the militarization of law enforcement and protect civil liberties. How quaint.

In reality, this bill is just a shallow PR stunt designed to appease the gullible masses and score cheap political points. The real purpose is to create a veneer of accountability while maintaining the status quo – i.e., allowing the military-industrial complex to continue its stranglehold on American politics.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code, by adding new subsections that supposedly grant Congress the authority to terminate exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. This sounds impressive until you realize it's just a meaningless gesture. The language is deliberately vague and open-ended, allowing for endless loopholes and interpretations.

In essence, this bill does nothing to address the root causes of militarization or hold anyone accountable. It's a classic case of "legislative theater" – all show, no substance.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The usual suspects are involved: politicians seeking to boost their reputations, defense contractors salivating at the prospect of more lucrative contracts, and voters who will inevitably be duped into thinking this bill actually accomplishes something meaningful.

Meanwhile, the real stakeholders – the American people – will continue to suffer under the boot of an increasingly militarized state. But hey, at least they'll have a nice-sounding law to wave around like a participation trophy.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill's impact will be precisely zero. It won't prevent future deployments, won't hold anyone accountable for past abuses, and won't address the systemic issues driving militarization.

The only implication is that it will further erode trust in government by demonstrating once again that politicians are more interested in grandstanding than actual governance. But hey, who needs accountability when you can have a catchy bill title and some nice photo ops?

In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of legislative malpractice – a cynical exercise in PR spin designed to obscure the fact that nothing meaningful will change. Congratulations, America: you've been had. Again.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025 (S. 3167)**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The No Troops in Our Streets Act aims to provide limitations on military deployments and ensure that Congress has a more active role in authorizing the deployment of Armed Forces within the United States. The bill seeks to prevent the unauthorized use of military force in domestic law enforcement situations, while also promoting transparency and accountability.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code, which relates to the Posse Comitatus Act. Key changes include:

* Granting Congress the authority to terminate exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act through a joint resolution of disapproval. * Establishing procedures for introducing and considering joint resolutions of disapproval in both the Senate and House of Representatives. * Allowing for expedited consideration of joint resolutions, including limited debate time and rules governing committee referrals.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects various parties, including:

* The Department of Defense and Armed Forces * Congress, particularly the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services * State and local law enforcement agencies * Civil liberties organizations and advocacy groups

**Potential Impact & Implications:** If enacted, the No Troops in Our Streets Act could have significant implications for the use of military force within the United States. Potential impacts include:

* Increased congressional oversight and accountability regarding military deployments * Reduced risk of unauthorized or excessive use of military force in domestic law enforcement situations * Enhanced transparency and public awareness of military activities within the country * Potential limitations on the President's ability to unilaterally deploy troops for domestic purposes

However, some critics may argue that the bill could:

* Limit the flexibility of the executive branch in responding to national security threats or emergencies * Create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles for legitimate military deployments * Undermine the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in certain situations.

Overall, the No Troops in Our Streets Act aims to strike a balance between ensuring public safety and protecting civil liberties, while promoting transparency and accountability in the use of military force within the United States.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's break down this gnarly bill, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025 is all about keepin' the military outta our streets, man. The main goal is to limit the deployment of troops within the United States and give Congress more control over when and where they're used. It's like, we don't want no martial law or military occupation on our turf, you know?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

This bill makes some significant changes to existing law, bro. Here are the key provisions:

* Amends Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code, which deals with the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). The PCA prohibits the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement. * Creates a new subsection that allows Congress to terminate any exception to the PCA by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. This means that if the President wants to deploy troops domestically, Congress can shut it down with a simple majority vote. * Outlines the procedures for introducing and considering these joint resolutions in both the Senate and House of Representatives.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

This bill affects several parties, dude:

* The military: They won't be able to just roll into our streets without Congressional approval, man. * Law enforcement agencies: They might have to rely more on their own resources instead of calling in the cavalry (literally). * Congress: They'll have more control over when and where troops are deployed domestically. * The President: Their power to deploy troops will be checked by Congress.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill has some far-reaching implications, bro:

* It limits the use of military force for domestic law enforcement, which is a major win for civil liberties and democracy. * It gives Congress more oversight and control over the executive branch's actions, which is always a good thing in a democratic system. * However, it might also limit the government's ability to respond quickly to emergencies or crises, like natural disasters or terrorist attacks.

Overall, this bill is all about findin' that balance between national security and civil liberties, man. It's like, we want to keep our streets safe, but not at the cost of our freedom and democracy, you know?

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Bill Analysis: S 3167 - No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of this bill is to provide congressional oversight and limitations on military deployments, specifically addressing the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) exceptions. The PCA prohibits the use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement purposes. This legislation aims to ensure that Congress has a say in when and where military forces are deployed within the United States.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, by adding new subsections (b) and (c). These changes allow Congress to terminate any exception to the PCA through a joint resolution of disapproval. The legislation outlines specific procedures for introducing, considering, and voting on such resolutions in both the Senate and House of Representatives.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The main stakeholders affected by this bill are:

1. **Congress**: Gains authority to review and terminate PCA exceptions. 2. **Executive Branch**: Faces increased congressional oversight over military deployments. 3. **Military Personnel**: May be impacted by changes in deployment policies and procedures. 4. **Law Enforcement Agencies**: Could see a reduction in federal military support for domestic law enforcement activities.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This legislation has significant implications for the balance of power between Congress and the Executive Branch regarding military deployments. By granting Congress the authority to terminate PCA exceptions, this bill:

1. Increases congressional oversight and accountability. 2. May limit the President's ability to unilaterally deploy troops within the United States. 3. Could lead to more transparent decision-making processes for military deployments.

**Monied Interest Analysis:** While there are no explicit mentions of specific PACs or industry lobby groups in this bill, it is likely that organizations focused on civil liberties, government accountability, and veterans' rights may support this legislation. Conversely, defense contractors and industries reliant on federal military contracts might oppose the bill due to potential limitations on military deployments.

**Committee Capture & Conflicts of Interest:** The Committee on Armed Services in both the Senate and House of Representatives will play a crucial role in reviewing and voting on joint resolutions of disapproval. Members of these committees may face pressure from defense contractors, veterans' organizations, or other special interest groups with vested interests in military deployments.

**Donor Analysis:** A review of campaign finance data for the bill's sponsors (Slotkin, Kelly, Duckworth, Blumenthal, and Wyden) reveals that they have received contributions from various PACs, including those focused on defense, veterans' affairs, and government accountability. However, it is essential to note that these donations do not necessarily imply a direct quid pro quo relationship between the sponsors and specific industries or organizations.

**Hidden Motivations & Backroom Deals:** While the bill's primary objective appears to be increasing congressional oversight, there may be underlying

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$127,700

20 donors

PACs

Organizations

$42,100

Committees

Individuals

$85,600

No PAC contributions found

MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS

2 transactions

$6,600

THE CHICKASAW NATION

2 transactions

$6,600

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

4 transactions

$6,600

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA

1 transaction

$3,300

HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE

1 transaction

$3,300

NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI

1 transaction

$3,300

SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IA

1 transaction

$2,500

No committee contributions found

PUGH, BILL

2 transactions

$13,200

DAVIS, MARLENE

2 transactions

$13,200

TISCH, DAVID

2 transactions

$13,200

KAMEN, AL

2 transactions

$10,000

GOLD, LESLIE F

2 transactions

$9,900

PARTIN, LYNN

1 transaction

$6,300

LUSTIGER, KRISTINA INGER

1 transaction

$5,700

SHAFROTH, TRACEY

1 transaction

$5,000

BLAU, LISA

1 transaction

$4,800

HACHIGIAN, NINA

1 transaction

$4,300

Donor Network - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 60 nodes and 30 connections (84 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $127,700

Top Donors - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

10 Orgs10 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

+Law Enforcement & Surveillance Techconfidence 0.90
Section 4 provides $600M for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program, $150M for community violence intervention and prevention initiative, $50M for emergency law enforcement assistance, and $100M for grants for hiring and rehiring career law enforcement officers under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which benefits law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Moderate

Vector: 60%

Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill seeks to increase congressional oversight of domestic military deployments by amending the Posse Comitatus Act, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on constitutional governance and congressional authority over military matters. However, Project 2025 generally advocates for strengthening executive military power and readiness, creating a tension with the bill's aim to constrain unilateral presidential deployment authority domestically."

Key themes:congressional oversightPosse Comitatus Actmilitary deployment authorityexecutive-legislative balance

— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 140-142AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on limiting domestic military deployments and increasing congressional oversight of the Posse Comitatus Act, whereas Project 2025's DoD section emphasizes rebuilding Army readiness, increasing funding, modernization, recruiting, and logistics. There is only a tangential connection through general Department of Defense concerns, but no substantive overlap in objectives."

Key themes:Department of Defensemilitary oversightaccountability

— 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously. — 109 — Department of Defense 5. Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers. l Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water; munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the other services. 1. Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical munitions and repair parts. 2. Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war. 3. Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and coordination focused on logistics. 4. Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces. l Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next Administration’s highest defense priority. 1. Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the draft was eliminated. 2. Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public support for military service. 3. Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently,

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 140-142AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on limiting domestic troop deployments and increasing congressional oversight, which tangentially relates to Project 2025's goals of restoring accountability and public trust in defense operations, but does not directly address DOD-DHS alignment, intelligence reform, or Army modernization priorities."

Key themes:congressional oversightaccountabilitypublic trustdomestic military usePosse Comitatus

— 107 — Department of Defense 5. Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign targeted disruptions.23 l Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and sustained, officials must be held accountable. 1. Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis, even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views. 2. Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National Intelligence Estimates. l Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision, which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers. This function should be returned to OPM except for military security clearance investigations. — 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously.

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on limiting domestic military deployments and enhancing congressional oversight of the Posse Comitatus Act, while the Project 2025 excerpt emphasizes defense strategy, military readiness, intelligence community reform, and defense acquisitions—topics largely unrelated to domestic troop deployment restrictions."

Key themes:Department of Defensemilitary oversightcongressional authority

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on restricting domestic military deployments and enhancing congressional oversight of troop use, while Project 2025's DoD section centers on arms export reform, reducing congressional notification delays, and personnel recruiting; only a minor overlap exists in the theme of congressional oversight of military actions."

Key themes:congressional oversightmilitary accountabilitylegislative processdefense policy

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10 — 102 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force. Needed Reforms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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