The bill
To provide for the political affairs authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.
HR. 5246, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
To provide for the political affairs authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/5246
Last Updated: December 14, 2025
Sponsored by
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
ID: S000168
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$139,600 raised
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
63% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 208-210 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 49 - 0.
September 17, 2025
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
🏛️
Committee Review
🗳️
Floor Action
✅
Passed House
🏛️
Senate Review
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another bill, another exercise in futility. Let's dissect this mess and see what we're really dealing with.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The main purpose of HR 5246 is to reorganize the Department of State's political affairs authorities, because apparently, the current structure isn't bloated enough. The objectives are to create new positions, like the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and various Ambassadors-at-Large, all while pretending to improve diplomatic efforts and foreign policy implementation.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill establishes an Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who will be responsible for regional and bilateral diplomacy. Because we didn't have enough bureaucrats already, this new position will "coordinate" with other Under Secretaries and maintain "continuous observation" of foreign policy implementation. Wow, I can barely contain my excitement.
Other key provisions include the creation of Ambassadors-at-Large for the Arctic and Indian Ocean regions, because those areas weren't already covered by existing diplomatic efforts. These new positions will have vague responsibilities like "maintaining continuous observation" and "coordinating efforts." Sounds like a recipe for disaster.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The affected parties include the Department of State, Congress (who gets to pretend they're doing something useful), and various foreign governments who will be subjected to more bureaucratic nonsense. Oh, and let's not forget the taxpayers, who get to foot the bill for this reorganization exercise.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
The potential impact is a further bloating of the Department of State, with even more bureaucrats creating more red tape and inefficiencies. The implications are that our foreign policy will become even more convoluted and ineffective, as these new positions create more opportunities for bureaucratic infighting and turf wars.
But hey, at least we'll have more Ambassadors-at-Large to attend fancy dinners and pretend to care about the Arctic region. And who knows, maybe one of them will actually do something useful, but I wouldn't hold my breath.
In conclusion, HR 5246 is just another example of congressional incompetence, where politicians try to solve problems by creating more bureaucracy and pretending it's a solution. It's like trying to cure a patient with a bad case of bureaucratic cancer by giving them more chemotherapy – it won't work, but hey, at least we tried.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with symptoms including bureaucratic bloat, inefficiency, and a complete lack of understanding of the problem they're trying to solve. Prognosis: Poor.
Related Topics
Foreign Aid & DiplomacyState & Local Government AffairsFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$139,600
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$132,000
No PAC contributions found
1
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
$6,600
2
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE
$1,000
No committee contributions found
1
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
$13,200
2
DIAZ-OLIVER, REMEDIOS MRS.
$6,600
3
FALIC, JANA
$6,600
4
MENDOZA GOMEZ, ROSSY A.
$6,600
5
WEEKLEY, RICHARD
$6,600
6
BARQUET, ROY
$6,600
7
PETERFFY, THOMAS
$6,600
8
ALVAREZ, MAXIMO MR.
$6,600
9
AMIN DAES, CARLOS E.
$6,600
10
AMIN, SAMIR
$6,600
11
DAES, CRISTIAN TADEO MR. JR.
$6,600
12
DAES PEREZ, EVELYN I.
$6,600
13
LOPEZ-CANTERA, AMADA MRS.
$6,600
14
CASCANTE, MARIA
$6,600
15
ALLEN, ROBERT N. MR. JR.
$6,600
16
CAMERON, RONALD
$6,600
17
VANDERSLOOT, BELINDA
$6,600
18
VANDERSLOOT, FRANK
$6,600
19
DERICK, AMY DR.
$6,600
Donor Network - Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 51 nodes and 23 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $139,600
Top Donors - Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
2 Orgs19 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
- +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 304 and Section 305 imply increased diplomatic efforts in the Arctic and Indian Ocean regions, which could lead to increased demand for defense contractors' services in these areas.
- +Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.70
Section 304 mentions energy exploration and development in the Arctic region, which may benefit companies involved in energy infrastructure.
- +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.60
Increased diplomatic efforts in various regions (e.g., Section 305) might require improved telecommunications infrastructure, potentially benefiting telecom companies.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HELPS
- from 1 contribution
- PEDDIBHOTLA, SRIRAM$500
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
Introduction
Moderate62.9%
Pages: 208-210
— 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling — 177 — Department of State of immigration and domestic security issues, which are inextricably related. The State Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are of para- mount importance to the American people, has historically been that they are of lesser importance than other issues and that they can be treated as concessions in broader diplomatic engagements. In other instances in which access to the U.S. in the form of immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas could potentially serve as diplomatic leverage, it is almost never used. To some degree, the State Department and many of its personnel appear to view the U.S. immigra- tion system less as a tool for strengthening the United States and more as a global welfare program. To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of all Americans, this must change. Below are several key areas in which the department’s formal and informal postures must adjust to reflect the current immigration and domestic security environment: l Visa reciprocity. The United States should strictly enforce the doctrine of reciprocity when issuing visas to all foreign nationals. For too long, the U.S. has provided virtually unfettered access to foreign nationals from countries that do not respond in kind—including countries that are actively hostile to U.S. interests and nationals. Mandatory reciprocity will convey the necessary reality that other countries do not have an unfettered right to U.S. access and must reciprocally offer favorable visa-based access to U.S. nationals. The State Department’s reaction time to other countries’ changes in visa policies with respect to the U.S. must be streamlined to ensure it can be updated in real time. l Section 243(d) visa sanctions. Visa sanctions under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),8 enacted into law to motivate countries to accept the return of any nationals who have been ordered removed from the U.S., should be quickly and fully enforced. Recalcitrant countries that do not accept receipt of their returned nationals will risk the suspension of issuance of all immigrant visas, all nonimmigrant visas, or all visas. These country-specific sanctions should remain in place until the sanctioned country accepts the return of all its removal-pending nationals and formally commits to future, regular acceptance of its nationals. Black- letter implementation of this law will demonstrate a heretofore lacking seriousness to the international community that other nations must respect U.S. immigration laws and work with federal authorities to accept returning nationals—or lose access to the United States. l Rightsizing refugee admissions. The Biden Administration has engineered what is nothing short of a collapse of U.S. border security and
Introduction
Moderate60.7%
Pages: 208-210
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the
Introduction
Moderate60.7%
Pages: 208-210
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
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