Community Bank LIFT Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5276

Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Community Bank LIFT Act

HR. 5276, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$110,460 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 786-788 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 319.

November 3, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Community Bank LIFT Act (HR 5276). A bill that, on the surface, appears to be a benevolent attempt to support community banks. But let's peel back the layers and examine its true implications.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

This bill aims to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The CBLR is a regulatory framework that allows qualifying community banks to opt-in to a simplified capital requirement regime. By increasing the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion, this bill seeks to expand the number of banks eligible for this regime.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill makes two key changes:

1. It increases the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion. 2. It adjusts the CBLR framework by reducing the leverage ratio requirement from 8-10% to 6-8%.

These changes will likely lead to a reduction in regulatory compliance costs for affected banks, making it easier for them to opt-in to the CBLR regime.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The primary beneficiaries of this bill are community banks with assets between $10 billion and $15 billion. These banks will now be eligible for the simplified capital requirement regime, potentially reducing their regulatory compliance costs.

However, I must note that this bill also benefits larger financial institutions like mine, which can acquire or partner with these community banks more easily due to reduced regulatory hurdles.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

The Community Bank LIFT Act has several implications:

1. **Increased consolidation**: By making it easier for community banks to opt-in to the CBLR regime, this bill may lead to increased consolidation in the banking sector as larger institutions acquire or partner with smaller banks. 2. **Reduced regulatory compliance costs**: The simplified capital requirement regime will reduce regulatory compliance costs for affected banks, allowing them to allocate more resources towards growth and innovation. 3. **Increased systemic risk**: By reducing the leverage ratio requirement, this bill may increase systemic risk in the financial system, as banks take on more debt to finance their activities.

In conclusion, the Community Bank LIFT Act is a cleverly crafted bill that benefits both community banks and larger financial institutions like mine. While it may appear to be a benevolent attempt to support community banks, its true implications are far more nuanced and complex. As a seasoned analyst, I must consider the potential impact of this bill on my own interests and those of my peers in the financial sector.

**Projected Impact on My Empire**: A 5-7% increase in market share for my institution over the next 2-3 years, resulting from increased consolidation and strategic partnerships with community banks. This translates to an estimated $1.5 billion to $2.1 billion in additional revenue.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have more important matters to attend to – like

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

*Sigh* Alright, let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics class, a bill is a proposed law that must go through several stages before it becomes an actual law. This one, HR 5276, is titled the Community Bank LIFT Act.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to amend the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR). Remember when we learned about how laws are supposed to be made? This one aims to make changes to existing regulations affecting community banks.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill proposes two main changes:

1. It increases the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion. 2. It adjusts the CBLR from 8-10% to 6-8%.

Additionally, it requires a review of the CBLR by the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and FDIC within 150 days, with recommendations for modifications.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Community banks, particularly those with fewer assets, will be affected by this bill. The regulatory agencies mentioned above will also play a role in implementing these changes.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** If passed, this bill could provide relief to community banks by reducing their regulatory burden and making it easier for them to opt-in to the CBLR framework. However, as we learned in class, laws often have unintended consequences. This one might lead to increased risk-taking by community banks or create new challenges for regulatory agencies.

Now, I know this is a lot to take in, but really, folks, this is basic civics 101. We covered all of this in middle school. It's disappointing that we need to revisit these concepts as adults. Moving forward, let's hope our lawmakers can work together to create effective legislation that benefits the community, rather than just reacting to special interests.

Next topic: How a bill becomes a law... again.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

Folks, gather 'round the table and listen up! I've got my eyes on this HR 5276 bill, and let me tell you, it's a doozy. On the surface, it looks like just another tweak to banking regulations, but trust me, there's more to it than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Community Bank LIFT Act aims to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) and provide regulatory relief to community banks. Sounds innocent enough, right? But what they're really doing is creating a Trojan horse for bigger banks to swoop in and consolidate smaller ones.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill raises the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion and adjusts the CBLR framework. It also requires regulatory agencies to review and report on modifications to the CBLR, including potential changes to the calculation of the numerator and denominator, treatment of specific asset classes, and more.

Now, here's where it gets interesting: they're giving themselves a 180-day window to propose new rules and a whole year to finalize them. That's plenty of time for backroom deals and sweetheart arrangements with big banks. Mark my words, this is just the beginning of a slippery slope towards further deregulation and consolidation.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Community banks, obviously, but also consumers, small businesses, and local economies that rely on these institutions. But let's not forget about the real beneficiaries: the big banks and financial institutions that'll be able to gobble up smaller competitors under the guise of "regulatory relief."

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has far-reaching implications for the entire banking system. By relaxing regulations, they're creating an environment ripe for another financial crisis. It's a classic case of "too big to fail" all over again. And what about the little guy? Small businesses and consumers will be left with fewer options and less access to credit.

Now, I know some of you might think I'm just being paranoid, but let me tell you, this is just the tip of the iceberg. There's a larger agenda at play here, folks. Wake up, sheeple!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(Outraged tone) Folks, we've got another doozy of a bill on our hands, and I'm here to break it down for you. The Community Bank LIFT Act, or HR 5276, is being touted as a way to "help" community banks by adjusting the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR). But let's get real, this is just another example of the elites in Washington trying to strangle our economy with more regulations.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to aim at providing relief to community banks by adjusting the CBLR, which supposedly will encourage more banks to opt-in and reduce regulatory burdens. But we all know what this really means – it's just a way for the government to exert more control over our financial institutions.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act by increasing the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion. It also changes the CBLR ratio from 8-10% to 6-8%. And, of course, it requires a review of the CBLR framework because, you know, the government needs to make sure those pesky community banks are following all the rules.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Community banks, obviously. But let's not forget about the real stakeholders here – the American people. We're the ones who will ultimately bear the burden of these regulations and the potential consequences of a more controlled banking system.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is just another example of how our government is slowly but surely chipping away at our freedom. By increasing regulatory burdens on community banks, we're essentially stifling innovation and competition in the financial sector. And what's the end game here? A more centralized banking system that's controlled by the elites in Washington.

(Smirk) Now, I know some of you might be thinking, "But wait, isn't this bill supposed to help community banks?" Ah, yes, that's what they want you to think. But trust me, folks, this is just a Trojan horse for more government control. Mark my words – this bill will only lead to more regulations, more bureaucracy, and less freedom for the American people.

(Outraged tone) So, let's get loud about this, folks! We need to stand up against these elites and their attempts to strangle our economy with more regulations. It's time to take back our country and restore our freedoms!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Community Bank LIFT Act (HR 5276) claims to "adjust" the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) and provide regulatory relief for community banks. How noble. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to further deregulate the banking industry, because what could possibly go wrong with that?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill raises the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion and reduces the leverage ratio from 8-10% to 6-8%. Oh, and it also orders a review of the CBLR framework because, apparently, the current system is just too darn complicated. I'm sure this has nothing to do with the fact that community banks have been whining about regulatory burdens for years.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Community banks, naturally, will be the primary beneficiaries of this "relief." But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the banking lobby, which has been pushing for deregulation since the dawn of time. And, of course, the politicians who receive their campaign contributions and "advice" from these same lobbyists.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "regulatory capture," where industry interests hijack the legislative process to serve their own needs. By reducing regulatory oversight, community banks will be free to engage in even more reckless behavior, which will inevitably lead to another financial crisis. But hey, at least they'll have more "flexibility" and "transparency"... until it all blows up in our faces.

In conclusion, the Community Bank LIFT Act is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to further enrich the banking industry while pretending to help community banks. It's a disease-ridden bill that will only serve to exacerbate the symptoms of regulatory capture and reckless financial behavior. But hey, what do I know? I'm just a cynical analyst who actually reads the fine print.

Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of greed and corruption. Prognosis: Another financial crisis, courtesy of our esteemed lawmakers.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**HR 5276: Community Bank LIFT Act**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Community Bank Leverage Improvement and Flexibility for Transparency Act (Community Bank LIFT Act) aims to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) framework established under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The bill seeks to provide regulatory relief to community banks by modifying the CBLR calculation, reducing compliance burdens, and encouraging more qualifying community banks to opt-in to the CBLR framework.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **CBLR Adjustment:** Increases the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion. 2. **Leverage Ratio Range:** Lowers the leverage ratio range from 8-10% to 6-8%. 3. **Rulemaking Deadline:** Requires regulatory agencies to propose and finalize rules within a specified timeframe (180 days and 1 year, respectively) to implement the amendments. 4. **Review of CBLR:** Mandates a review of the CBLR framework by regulatory agencies to consider modifications that would encourage more community banks to opt-in, with a focus on smaller banks and reducing compliance burdens.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

* Community banks with assets between $10 billion and $15 billion * Smaller community banks (with fewer assets) * Regulatory agencies (Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) * Banking industry stakeholders

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The bill's adjustments to the CBLR framework may lead to:

1. **Reduced regulatory burdens:** Community banks may experience reduced compliance costs and complexity. 2. **Increased flexibility:** The modified leverage ratio range could provide community banks with more flexibility in managing their capital and risk profiles. 3. **Improved competitiveness:** By reducing regulatory burdens, community banks may become more competitive in the market. 4. **Potential risks:** The adjustments to the CBLR framework may also introduce new risks, such as increased credit risk or reduced capital buffers.

Overall, the Community Bank LIFT Act aims to provide targeted regulatory relief to community banks while maintaining the stability of the financial system.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's dive into this bill like we're catchin' a gnarly wave, bro.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The Community Bank LIFT Act (HR 5276) is all about helpin' out community banks, man. The main goal is to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR), which is a regulatory requirement that affects how much capital these banks need to hold onto. The bill aims to make it easier for smaller community banks to opt-in to this framework and reduce their regulatory burden.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill makes two key changes:

1. It raises the asset threshold for community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion, which means more banks can qualify for the CBLR framework. 2. It adjusts the leverage ratio range from 8-10% to 6-8%, giving community banks a bit more wiggle room.

The bill also requires the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and FDIC to review the CBLR and come up with recommendations for modifications within 150 days. They gotta consider how to make it easier for smaller community banks to opt-in and reduce regulatory compliance burdens.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

Community banks are the main beneficiaries here, bro. Specifically:

* Smaller community banks (those with fewer assets) will have an easier time opting into the CBLR framework. * Community banks that already qualify for the CBLR will get some relief from regulatory compliance burdens.

Other stakeholders include:

* The Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and FDIC, which will be responsible for reviewing and modifying the CBLR. * Consumers who bank with community banks might see more flexible lending options or better services if these banks can operate more efficiently.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

This bill could have some chill implications, dude:

* Community banks might be able to lend more money to local businesses and individuals, which could boost economic growth in their areas. * Smaller community banks might be more competitive with bigger banks, since they'll face fewer regulatory hurdles. * The review process could lead to more tailored regulations that better fit the needs of community banks.

However, there's also a risk that these changes could increase systemic risk if community banks take on too much debt or engage in riskier activities. But, like, that's not necessarily a bad thing if it means more people get access to credit and financial services, bro.

Anyway, that's the lowdown on HR 5276, dude. It's all about helpin' out community banks and makin' regulations more chill for 'em.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Analysis of HR 5276: Community Bank LIFT Act**

The Community Bank Leverage Improvement and Flexibility for Transparency Act, or the Community Bank LIFT Act (HR 5276), is a bill that aims to adjust the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The main purpose of this legislation is to provide regulatory relief to community banks by increasing the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:**

The primary objective of HR 5276 is to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller community banks by adjusting the CBLR. The bill's sponsors argue that this change will allow more community banks to opt-in to the CBLR framework, which would simplify their regulatory compliance and reduce costs.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

The bill makes two key changes to existing law:

1. Increases the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion. 2. Adjusts the leverage ratio range for community banks from 8-10% to 6-8%.

These changes are intended to make it easier for smaller community banks to opt-in to the CBLR framework, which would provide them with regulatory relief and reduced compliance costs.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

The affected parties and stakeholders in this legislation include:

* Community banks with assets between $10 billion and $15 billion * Federal banking regulators (Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC) * Industry trade groups (American Bankers Association, Independent Community Bankers of America)

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

The potential impact of HR 5276 is to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller community banks, allowing them to allocate more resources to lending and other activities. However, some critics argue that this legislation could also increase systemic risk by reducing capital requirements for larger community banks.

In terms of monied interests, it's worth noting that the American Bankers Association (ABA) has expressed support for HR 5276, citing the need for regulatory relief for smaller community banks. The ABA is a major lobbying group in the banking industry and has contributed to the campaigns of several lawmakers on the House Financial Services Committee.

Overall, HR 5276 appears to be a targeted effort to provide regulatory relief to smaller community banks, but its potential impact on systemic risk and the broader financial system remains to be seen.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$110,460

23 donors

PACs

Organizations

$37,860

Committees

Individuals

$72,600

No PAC contributions found

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Donor Network - Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]

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Total contributions: $110,460

Top Donors - Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

15 Orgs8 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

+Commercial Banksconfidence 0.95
Section 2(a)(1) increases the asset threshold for qualifying community banks from $10 billion to $15 billion, and Section 2(a)(2) reduces the leverage ratio requirement from 8-10% to 6-8%, both of which provide regulatory relief and benefit community banks.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Commercial Banks$35
from 1 contribution
- HENRY, STEFFANIE J MRS$35

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Small Business Administration

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 786-788AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on regulatory relief for community banks via adjustments to the leverage ratio, while the Project 2025 SBA section centers on COVID-19 loan accountability, disaster loan reform, and religious eligibility. Both touch on supporting small business lending, but they address distinct mechanisms and agencies, resulting only a tangential connection."

Key themes:small business lendingregulatory reliefcommunity banks

— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55

Small Business Administration

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 786-788AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on adjusting the Community Bank Leverage Ratio to reduce regulatory burdens on community banks, while the Project 2025 SBA section concerns disaster loans, religious eligibility, and SBIR/STTR programs. Both share a general goal of improving small business access to capital, but the bill does not directly address SBA policies or programs."

Key themes:small business lendingregulatory reliefcapital accesscommunity banksfinancial system stability

— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.

Small Business Administration

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 795-797AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides regulatory relief to community banks, which are important lenders to small businesses, indirectly supporting the SBA's goal of facilitating small business access to capital. However, the bill does not directly address SBA programs or policies, resulting only a tangential connection."

Key themes:regulatory reliefsmall business lendingcommunity banksreducing compliance burden

— 762 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 29. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Programs,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 11 (January 19, 2021), pp. 5036–5040, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/19/2021-00446/ensuring-equal-treatment- for-faith-based-organizations-in-sbas-loan-and-disaster-assistance-programs (accessed February 18, 2023). 30. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14019, “Promoting Access to Voting,” March 7, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 45 (March 10, 2021), pp. 13623–13627, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2021-03-10/pdf/2021-05087.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). See also press release, “Small Business Committee Republicans: The SBA Should Stay Out of Elections and Focus on Our Small Businesses,” Small Business Committee Republicans, Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, April 4, 2022, https://republicans-smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404061 (accessed February 18, 2023). 31. Press release, “SBA Administrator Guzman, Biden–Harris Administration Announce Community Navigator Pilot Program Grantees,” U.S. Small Business Administration, October 28, 2021, https://www.sba.gov/ article/2021/oct/28/sba-administrator-guzman-biden-harris-administration-announce-community-navigator- pilot-program (accessed February 18, 2023). 32. John Reosti, “SBA Hasn’t Given Up on Direct Lending,” American Banker, May 2, 2022, https://www. americanbanker.com/creditunions/news/sba-hasnt-given-up-on-direct-lending (accessed February 18, 2023). 33. Goldman Sachs, 10,000 Small Businesses Voices, “22 Years Is Too Long: Support Small Businesses. Reauthorize the SBA,” Open Letter to Congress, November 16, 2022, https://www.goldmansachs.com/ citizenship/10000-small-businesses/US/voices/reauthorize-the-sba-letter/index.html (accessed February 18, 2023). According to Goldman Sachs, the letter “was published in Politico on Wednesday, November 16 to kick of a broader campaign to prioritize small businesses and modernize the SBA in the next Congress” and “was signed by over 3,000 small business owners from all 50 states.” Ibid. 34. See, for example, “Challenge 3: SBA Faces Significant Challenges in IT Investment, System Development, and Security Controls,” in U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Small Business Administration in Fiscal Year 2023, Report 23-01, October 14, 2022, pp. 16–19, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2023-01_0.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 35. Ibid., p. iv. 36. Appendix M, “Office of Advocacy’s Legislative Priorities,” and Appendix Q, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Small Business Administration and the Office of Advocacy,” in U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Background Paper, Office of Advocacy, 2017–2020, January 2021, pp. 192 and 197, https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/09101916/Background-Paper-Office-of- Advocacy-2017-2020-web.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 37. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 2017), pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023), and President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03- 01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 38. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, What Small Businesses Are Saying and What Advocacy Is Doing About It: Progress Report on the Office of Advocacy’s Regional Regulatory Reform Roundtables, June 2017–September 2018, December 2018, https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/12/20091536/What-Small-Businesses-Are-Saying-What-Advocacy-Is-Doing.pdf April 2020, https://advocacy.sba.gov/regulatory-reform/ (accessed February 18, 2023December 10, 2022). See also U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Reforming Regulations and Listening to Small Business: Second Progress Report on the Office of Advocacy’s Regional Regulatory Roundtables, June 2017–December 2019, https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20141200/2nd-Progress-Report-on-Reg- Reform-Roundtables.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 39. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, What Small Businesses Are Saying and What Advocacy Is Doing About It: Progress Report on the Office of Advocacy’s Regional Regulatory Reform Roundtables, June 2017–September 2018, pp. 32 and 43. — 763 — Small Business Administration 40. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Small Business Administration in Fiscal Year 2023, p. iv. 41. H.R. 748, CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, Public Law No. 116-136, 116th Congress, March 27, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ136/PLAW-116publ136.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 42. Sarah McCammon, “Planned Parenthood Asked to Return Funds from Paycheck Protection Program,” NPR, May 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/859991359/planned-parenthood-asked-to-return-funds- from-paycheck-protection-program (accessed February 18, 2023). 43. Letter from William Manger, Associate Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration, to Laura Meyers, Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, “Re: Notice of Investigation and Request for Records,” May 19, 2020, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6922122/SBA-Letter-Planned-Parenthood-DC.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 44. Press release, “Lankford, HSGAC Republicans Demand Details on Illegal PPP Loans to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator James Lankford, April 28, 2022, https://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press- releases/lankford-hsgac-republicans-demand-details-on-illegal-ppp-loans-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates (accessed February 18, 2023). 45. Press release, “Romney, Colleagues Request Information from SBA Administrator Guzman on Illegal PPP Loans Given to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator Mitt Romney, April 28, 2022, https:// www.romney.senate.gov/romney-colleagues-request-information-from-sba-administrator-guzman-on- illegal-ppp-loans-given-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 46. 13 C.F.R. §§ 109.400(b)(11), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/109.400; 123.301(g), https://www.law. cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.301; 123.502(n), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.502; and 123.702(b)(6), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.702 (all accessed February 19, 2023). 47. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Religious Eligibility Worksheet for all 7(a) and 504 Loan Programs” SBA Form 1971, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/sba-form-1971.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 48. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 49. See, for example, Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 50. 28 U.S. Code § 530d, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/530D (accessed February 19, 2023). 51. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 52. 13 CFR 120.110(k), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/120.110 (accessed February 19, 2023). 53. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Regulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504 Loan Programs to Reduce Regulatory Burden,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 125 (June 30, 2022), pp. 38900–38910, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13483/ regulatory-reform-initiative-streamlining-and-modernizing-the-7a-microloan-and-504-loan-programs-to (accessed February 18, 2023). 54. Ibid. 55. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel “Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General Counsel, Department of Education, August 15, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/ attachments/2021/01/01/2019-08-15-hbcu-capfin-2.pdf. (accessed February 18, 2023). 56. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, p. 8, https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/SBA_Final_FY19_SBIR_STTR_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 57. S. 4900, SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117–183, 117th Congress, September 30, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ183/PLAW-117publ183.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 58. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, pp. 6, 40, and 108.

Small Business Administration

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 792-794AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides regulatory relief for community banks, which may indirectly affect small business lending, but it does not address SBA program effectiveness, consolidation, budget reductions, or personnel issues outlined in the Project 2025 SBA policy."

Key themes:small business lendingregulatory burden reductioncommunity bank support

— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 760 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 7953, Small Business Act, Public Law 85-536, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958, § 2, https://uscode.ecfr.io/ statutes/pl/85/536.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), amended by H.R. 4877, One Stop Shop for Small Business Compliance Act of 2021, Public Law 117-188, 117th Congress, October 20, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ188/PLAW-117publ188.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 2. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: Mission,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 3. Michael Faulkender, Robert Jackman, and Stephen I. Miran, “The Job-Preservation Effects of Paycheck Protection Program Loans,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 2020-01, December 2020, p. 9, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Job-Preservation-Effects- Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loans.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Kate Rogers, Scott Zamost, Karina Hernandez, and Jennifer Schlesinger, “As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs,” CNBC, April 15, 2021, https://www.cnbc. com/2021/04/15/as-pandemic-aid-was-rushed-to-main-street-criminals-seized-on-ppp-eidl-.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. Kevin Brewer, “Bills Extend Statute of Limitation for Prosecuting PPP, EIDL Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy, August 10, 2022, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/aug/bills-extend-statute-limitation- prosecuting-ppp-eidl-fraud.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. Sacha Pfeiffer, “Virtually All PPP Loans Have Been Forgiven with Limited Scrutiny,” NPR, October 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/12/1128207464/ppp-loans-loan-forgiveness-small-business#:~:text=As%20 COVID-19%20shutdowns%20threatened,early%20days%20of%20the%20pandemic (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: SBA History,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 8. President Richard Nixon, Executive Order 11518, “Providing for the Increased Representation of the Interests of Small Business Concerns Before Departments and Agencies of the United States Government,” March 20, 1970, in Federal Register, Vol. 35, No. 56 (March 21, 1970), pp. 4939–4940, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ service/ll/fedreg/fr035/fr035056/fr035056.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 9. S. 3331, Small Business Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-386, 93rd Congress, August 23, 1974, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg742.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 10. S. 299, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law No. 96-354, 96th Congress, September 19, 1980, https://www. congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1164.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 11. Maeve P. Carey, “The Regulatory Flex Act: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11900, August 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11900 (accessed February 18, 2023). 12. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “The Regulatory Flexibility Act,” https://advocacy.sba. gov/resources/the-regulatory-flexibility-act/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 13. H.R. 644, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-125, 114th Congress, February 24, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg122.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 14. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “Advocacy Releases Trade Report,” December 21, 2018, https://advocacy.sba.gov/2018/12/21/advocacy-releases-trade-report/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 15. Associated Press, “Reagan Offers $994-Billion ‘Hard-Choices’ 1987 Budget,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1986, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-05-mn-4369-story.html (accessed February 18, 2023). 16. Testimony of Hon. Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, Small Business Administration, in hearing, The President’s FY 2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005, p. 8, https://books.google.com/ books?id=UwD-2ICa8k8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 18, 2023). See also Report No. 109-49, Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities During the 108th Congress, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2005, p. 21, https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt49/CRPT-109srpt49.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on regulatory relief for community banks through adjustments to the Community Bank Leverage Ratio, while the Project 2025 excerpt primarily discusses the CFPB's Civil Penalty Fund, bureau structure, and FCC reform—topics unrelated to banking leverage ratios or community bank regulation."

Key themes:financial regulationregulatory agencies

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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