Department of State Policy Provisions Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5300
Last Updated: January 29, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

ID: M001199

Follow the money

The bill

Department of State Policy Provisions Act

HR. 5300, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$98,736 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 229-231 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 24.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The Department of State Policy Provisions Act (HR 5300) is a sprawling mess of bureaucratic busywork, designed to create the illusion of action while serving the interests of various special interest groups.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to "guide the foreign policy of the United States," but don't be fooled. This is a classic case of "legislative diarrhea," where Congress tries to cram as many unrelated provisions into one bill as possible, hoping no one will notice the stench.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This 327-section monstrosity includes a laundry list of changes, from the mundane (e.g., renaming the "Center for Strategy and Solutions") to the marginally interesting (e.g., authorizing demining programs in Southeast Asia). However, most provisions are either redundant, unnecessary, or serve only to further entrench bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Some notable examples include:

* Section 206: Visas for high-ranking officials of Taiwan. Because what's a foreign policy bill without some obligatory pandering to the Taiwanese lobby? * Section 213: Authorized embassies and consulates. A clever way to ensure that our diplomatic outposts continue to serve as symbols of American exceptionalism, while also providing lucrative construction contracts for well-connected firms. * Section 325: Center for conflict analysis, planning, and prevention. Because who needs actual conflict resolution when you can create a new bureaucratic entity to analyze the problem ad infinitum?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are represented here:

* The State Department, which will no doubt appreciate the additional layers of bureaucracy and reporting requirements. * Various foreign governments, which will be thrilled to receive more American aid and "guidance." * Special interest groups, such as the Taiwanese lobby, defense contractors, and construction firms. * And, of course, the American taxpayer, who will foot the bill for this legislative boondoggle.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible, except insofar as it:

* Further entrenches bureaucratic inefficiencies within the State Department. * Provides a windfall for special interest groups and their lobbyists. * Creates new opportunities for corruption and waste. * Demonstrates Congress's continued inability to address actual foreign policy challenges.

In short, HR 5300 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a bloated, self-serving monstrosity that serves only to further erode the public's trust in government. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than dissect this mess further.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsForeign Aid & DiplomacyState & Local Government Affairs
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$98,736
20 donors
PACs
$6,850
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$91,886
1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
2 transactions
$5,850
2
WINRED
1 transaction
$1,000

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
LEVY, EDWARD JR.
2 transactions
$13,200
2
HART, NANCY MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
3
LIPSCHULTZ, MARC MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
4
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
BLAVATNIK, LEONARD
2 transactions
$6,600
6
PIKE, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,534
7
BAKER, MAXINE
1 transaction
$5,352
8
YOUNKER, MARLIN E.
1 transaction
$5,000
9
DAVIS, GLEEANN
1 transaction
$5,000
10
HILLMAN, TATNALL L. CAPT. RET.
1 transaction
$4,000
11
WEITMAN, AARON
1 transaction
$3,300
12
OBERHELMAN, DIANE A. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
DEZERTZOV, MICHAEL MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
FAITH, KEVIN MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
GEHLSEN, KURT R. MR. M.D. PH.D
1 transaction
$3,300
16
GILMARTIN, GLADYS H. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
LYND, MICHEAL J.
1 transaction
$3,300
18
MALONE, JOHN C.
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 39 nodes and 23 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $98,736

Top Donors - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

2 PACs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 24 helped, 1 harmed.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 402 authorizes Department conventional weapons destruction programs, which includes advancing United States business interests related to demining and weapons stockpile security, benefiting defense contractors involved in such programs.

  • Sections 505 and 414 involve studies on geopolitical strategies and verification frameworks for advanced artificial intelligence, and Section 227 establishes a program for language translation capabilities using multi-modal generative AI, directly benefiting AI and cloud infrastructure providers.

  • +Nuclear Powerconfidence 0.90

    Section 412 explicitly aims to strengthen U.S.-European nuclear energy cooperation, assess reactor designs and fuel cycles to reduce Russian influence, and promote U.S. nuclear technologies in Europe, directly benefiting nuclear power companies.

  • Section 216 (Embassy Construction Integrity) and Section 215 (Mandate Use of the Embassy Standard Plan) involve embassy construction and related contracts, which would benefit construction and engineering firms.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 203 (Information Technology Office Consolidation) and Section 204 (Realignment of Regional Technology Officer Program) involve IT and cybersecurity infrastructure, which could benefit telecommunications firms providing related services.

  • +Pharmaceuticalsconfidence 0.80

    Section 605 authorizes participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which involves vaccine development, benefiting pharmaceutical companies.

+ 19 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of State

Strong
Vector: 69%
Pages: 229-231AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns closely with Project 2025's emphasis on advancing U.S. national interest through strategic foreign policy, particularly in areas like countering China, strengthening alliances, promoting economic security, and enhancing diplomatic effectiveness. Both prioritize strategic competition, institutional reform within the State Department, and safeguarding American interests abroad."

Key themes:national interestcountering Chinaalliance strengtheningeconomic securityState Department reform

— 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny. — 198 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “About the U.S. Department of State: Our History,” https://www.state.gov/about/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 2. The balance of employment is 2,149 eligible family members and 50,223 locally employed staff. U.S. Department of State, “GTM Fact Sheet: Facts About Our Most Valuable Asset—Our People,” Global Talent Management, December 31, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GTM_Factsheet1222. pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 3. U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. x, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 4. See Brett D. Schaefer, “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3115, April 20, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/political- process/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign. 5. Historically, roughly one-third of ambassadorial appointments have been political appointments, although Republican Administrations have generally had a higher ratio of political appointments than Democratic Administrations. 6. U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2. 7. News release, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” U.S. Department of State, December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 8. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. Code § 1101 et seq., § 1253. 9. See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as a Global Superpower (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016). 10. For additional context regarding how countering China fits in a more robust U.S. strategy, see James Jay Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3715, July 21, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-policy-strategy-post-biden-era. 11. The Article X for China would follow George Kennan’s Article X for U.S.–Soviet competition. See George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed March 22, 2023). 12. Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 20, 2010, https://www.heritage.org/asia/ report/assessing-beijings-power-blueprint-the-us-response-china-over-the-next-decades. 13. Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2001), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1686&context=vjtl (accessed March 9, 2023). 14. U.S. Department of Defense, Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF- DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed July 28, 2022). 15. See Jeff Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/south-asia-new-strategy. 16. Emma Bryce, “Why Is There So Much Oil in the Arctic?” Live Science, August 3, 2019, https://www.livescience. com/66008-why-oil-in-arctic.html (accessed February 9, 2023). 17. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 26, 2021, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/177 (accessed March 9, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “Snapshot: Overcoming the Tyranny of Distance in the Arctic,” April 20, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/20/ snapshot-overcoming-tyranny-distance-arctic (accessed February 9, 2023). 19. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2021,” September 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023), and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, 2015,” November 1, 2016, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-contributions-to-international-organizations-2015/ (accessed March 9, 2023). 20. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Commission of Inalienable Rights, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023).

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate
Vector: 71%
Pages: 201-204AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on reforming the Department of State to better implement presidential foreign policy priorities, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of making the State Department more responsive to the elected administration's agenda by reducing bureaucratic resistance. Both emphasize strengthening the department's ability to advance national security and foreign policy interests through structural and operational changes."

Key themes:presidential agenda implementationbureaucratic reformnational security advancementdiplomatic effectivenessforeign policy execution

— 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 171 — 6 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Kiron K. Skinner The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States. Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful. There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision. It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

Department of State

Moderate
Vector: 69%
Pages: 208-210AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill shares some thematic overlap with Project 2025's State Department priorities, particularly in strengthening diplomatic coordination, addressing China, and improving visa enforcement, but lacks explicit alignment on key points like agile interagency teamwork, presidential directive adherence, and immigration reform as a national security tool."

Key themes:China policy coordinationvisa enforcementcongressional engagementdiplomatic strategynational security

— 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling — 177 — Department of State of immigration and domestic security issues, which are inextricably related. The State Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are of para- mount importance to the American people, has historically been that they are of lesser importance than other issues and that they can be treated as concessions in broader diplomatic engagements. In other instances in which access to the U.S. in the form of immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas could potentially serve as diplomatic leverage, it is almost never used. To some degree, the State Department and many of its personnel appear to view the U.S. immigra- tion system less as a tool for strengthening the United States and more as a global welfare program. To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of all Americans, this must change. Below are several key areas in which the department’s formal and informal postures must adjust to reflect the current immigration and domestic security environment: l Visa reciprocity. The United States should strictly enforce the doctrine of reciprocity when issuing visas to all foreign nationals. For too long, the U.S. has provided virtually unfettered access to foreign nationals from countries that do not respond in kind—including countries that are actively hostile to U.S. interests and nationals. Mandatory reciprocity will convey the necessary reality that other countries do not have an unfettered right to U.S. access and must reciprocally offer favorable visa-based access to U.S. nationals. The State Department’s reaction time to other countries’ changes in visa policies with respect to the U.S. must be streamlined to ensure it can be updated in real time. l Section 243(d) visa sanctions. Visa sanctions under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),8 enacted into law to motivate countries to accept the return of any nationals who have been ordered removed from the U.S., should be quickly and fully enforced. Recalcitrant countries that do not accept receipt of their returned nationals will risk the suspension of issuance of all immigrant visas, all nonimmigrant visas, or all visas. These country-specific sanctions should remain in place until the sanctioned country accepts the return of all its removal-pending nationals and formally commits to future, regular acceptance of its nationals. Black- letter implementation of this law will demonstrate a heretofore lacking seriousness to the international community that other nations must respect U.S. immigration laws and work with federal authorities to accept returning nationals—or lose access to the United States. l Rightsizing refugee admissions. The Biden Administration has engineered what is nothing short of a collapse of U.S. border security and

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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