Foreign Military Financing Loan Authorization Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8661
Last Updated: September 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

ID: M001199

Follow the money

The bill

Foreign Military Financing Loan Authorization Act of 2026

HR. 8661, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$98,736 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 37 - 9.

May 12, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Foreign Military Financing Loan Authorization Act of 2026 is a cleverly crafted bill that allows the Secretary of State to provide direct loans and loan guarantees to foreign countries for the procurement of defense articles, services, and design/construction projects. Because what could possibly go wrong with giving billions of dollars in loans to unstable regimes and corrupt governments? The stated objective is to "support United States national security interests," but we all know that's just code for "line the pockets of defense contractors and politicians."

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill authorizes the Secretary of State to establish loan rates, repayment schedules, and terms, because who needs Congressional oversight when it comes to doling out billions in taxpayer dollars? The bill also obligates funds from the Foreign Military Sales Administrative Surcharge Fund, which is just a fancy way of saying "slush fund for defense contractors." And, of course, there's a reporting requirement that will undoubtedly be used to justify future loans and guarantees.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The real beneficiaries of this bill are the defense contractors, who will reap billions in profits from these loans and guarantees. The foreign countries receiving these loans will also benefit, at least until they default on their payments. And let's not forget the politicians, who will get to tout their "support for national security" while lining their campaign coffers with defense industry donations. The only losers here are the American taxpayers, who will be footing the bill for these dubious loans.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the makings of a disaster. It will perpetuate the cycle of debt and dependency among foreign countries, while enriching defense contractors and politicians. The lack of oversight and accountability will ensure that billions of dollars are wasted on corrupt and ineffective projects. And when it all goes wrong, the American taxpayer will be left holding the bag. But hey, at least the politicians will have their soundbites and the defense contractors will have their profits.

In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of how to create a legislative disease that will spread corruption, waste, and inefficiency throughout the system. It's a masterclass in cynical politics, where the only goal is to enrich the powerful at the expense of the powerless. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this train wreck unfold.

Related Topics

Defense Spending & ProcurementForeign Aid & DiplomacyFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$98,736
20 donors
PACs
$6,850
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$91,886
1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
2 transactions
$5,850
2
WINRED
1 transaction
$1,000

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
LEVY, EDWARD JR.
2 transactions
$13,200
2
HART, NANCY MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
3
LIPSCHULTZ, MARC MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
4
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
BLAVATNIK, LEONARD
2 transactions
$6,600
6
PIKE, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,534
7
BAKER, MAXINE
1 transaction
$5,352
8
YOUNKER, MARLIN E.
1 transaction
$5,000
9
DAVIS, GLEEANN
1 transaction
$5,000
10
HILLMAN, TATNALL L. CAPT. RET.
1 transaction
$4,000
11
WEITMAN, AARON
1 transaction
$3,300
12
OBERHELMAN, DIANE A. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
DEZERTZOV, MICHAEL MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
FAITH, KEVIN MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
GEHLSEN, KURT R. MR. M.D. PH.D
1 transaction
$3,300
16
GILMARTIN, GLADYS H. MS.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
LYND, MICHEAL J.
1 transaction
$3,300
18
MALONE, JOHN C.
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]

ID: K000397

Top Contributors

39

1
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Dec 21, 2023
2
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Jul 28, 2023
3
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Jul 28, 2023
4
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
Jul 28, 2023
5
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2024
6
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Jul 25, 2024
7
AT&T INC & ITS AFFLIATES
OrganizationSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,000
Mar 5, 2024
8
ABBVIE PAC - FEDERAL PAC
OrganizationSACRAMENTO, CA
$2,500
Sep 30, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,300
Oct 25, 2024
10
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Oct 28, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 38 nodes and 42 connections

Total contributions: $42

Top Donors - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

2 PACs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.95

    Section 2 authorizes direct loans and loan guarantees for procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services, directly benefiting defense contractors who supply these items.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Very Strong
Vector: 61%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8661 directly enables the Department of State (in coordination with DoD) to provide financial tools for foreign military purchases, which strengthens U.S. alliances, promotes American defense exports, and enhances national security—core objectives emphasized in Project 2025's defense policy section."

Key themes:foreign military financingdefense alliancesU.S. defense industry promotionnational securityloan guarantees

— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8661 aligns strongly with Project 2025's goal of enhancing foreign military sales (FMS) by authorizing direct loans and loan guarantees to allies for purchasing U.S. defense equipment, thereby strengthening alliances and promoting defense exports—core objectives in the DoD section of Project 2025."

Key themes:foreign military salesdefense exportsally supportfinancing mechanismsnational security

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8661 creates a financing mechanism (direct loans and loan guarantees) to facilitate foreign military sales of U.S. defense equipment, directly supporting Project 2025's objectives to enhance exportability, strengthen alliances, and bolster the defense industry, though it does not address specific reforms like ending tiered review or reducing ITAR."

Key themes:foreign military salesdefense export financingalliance strengtheningdefense industry supportfunding mechanism for exportability

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10 — 102 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force. Needed Reforms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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