Establishing the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2025 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2026 through 2034.

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Bill ID: 119/hconres/14
Last Updated: February 3, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19]

ID: A000375

Follow the money

The bill

Establishing the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2025 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2026 through 2034.

HCONRES. 14, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.

The sponsor

Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$69,200 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 128-130 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Star Print ordered on the reported concurrent resolution.

May 19, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?

**Diagnosis:** Chronic fiscal irresponsibility with a severe case of budgetary schizophrenia.

The bill allocates a whopping $4.6 trillion for FY 2025, with increases in subsequent years, because who needs fiscal discipline when you can just print more money? The "recommended levels" are nothing but a farce, as they're based on rosy assumptions and cooked books. I mean, who actually believes the government will magically reduce deficits by $150 billion each year?

**Symptoms:**

* **National Defense:** A whopping 20% of the budget goes to defense spending ($933 billion in FY 2025), because nothing says "fiscal responsibility" like throwing money at the military-industrial complex. * **Social Security and Medicare:** These programs get a token increase, but let's be real, they're just being propped up until the inevitable collapse. It's like putting a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. * **Riders and policy provisions:** Ah, the usual suspects: pork barrel projects, special interest handouts, and vague promises of "reform" that will never materialize.

**Notable increases or decreases:**

* **Debt held by the public:** Up, up, and away! From $29 trillion in FY 2025 to a staggering $43.5 trillion by FY 2034. Because who needs a stable currency when you can just inflate your way out of debt? * **Deficits:** A mere $936 billion in FY 2025, but don't worry, it'll balloon to over $1.4 trillion by FY 2034. Just peachy.

**Fiscal impact and deficit implications:**

This bill is a recipe for disaster. The projected deficits will continue to balloon, and the national debt will become an unsustainable burden on future generations. But hey, who cares about the long-term consequences when you can just kick the can down the road?

In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a masterclass in fiscal malpractice. It's a testament to the boundless incompetence of our elected officials and their willingness to sacrifice the country's financial stability for short-term gains.

**Prognosis:** Terminal fiscal irresponsibility with no cure in sight.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsDefense Spending & Procurement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$69,200
17 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$67,700

No PAC contributions found

1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000
2
1349 FOOD & FIBER
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
KIMBER, SHELDON
2 transactions
$8,300
2
ZAFFIRINI, CARLOS
2 transactions
$6,600
3
HUNT, RAY L. MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
4
PICKERING, DOROTHY
2 transactions
$6,600
5
STEPHENS, STEVE MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
6
LEPRINO, TERRY
1 transaction
$3,300
7
JOHNSON, CLAY
1 transaction
$3,300
8
STENSON, ERIC
1 transaction
$3,300
9
MCCLELLAND, GAY L.
1 transaction
$3,300
10
MCCLELLAND, MARK
1 transaction
$3,300
11
PAYNE, WARREN
1 transaction
$3,300
12
COOK, JACK MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
AGARWAL, ARUN
1 transaction
$3,300
14
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$3,300
15
STRAWBRIDGE, SEAN
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 43 nodes and 22 connections (46 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $69,200

Top Donors - Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19]

Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 13 helped, 12 harmed.

  • +Oil & Gasconfidence 0.90

    Title V, Section 5001(b)(2) states policy to 'expand American energy production,' which benefits oil and gas industry.

  • Title III, Section 3005 creates a deficit-neutral reserve fund for protecting Medicare and Medicaid, which could reduce reimbursement rates or funding for hospitals and health systems that rely on these programs, implying potential harm.

  • +Coal Miningconfidence 0.85

    Title V, Section 5001(b)(2) policy to 'expand American energy production' includes coal as part of domestic energy production.

  • −Agribusinessconfidence 0.85

    Title I, Section 1102(6) shows significant reduction in Agriculture budget authority from $58.457B in FY2025 to $28.163B in FY2026, indicating potential cuts to agribusiness programs.

  • −Crop Producersconfidence 0.85

    Title I, Section 1102(6) Agriculture category reductions from $58.457B to $28.163B in FY2026 directly impact crop producer subsidies and support programs.

  • −Health Insuranceconfidence 0.85

    Title III, Section 3005's deficit-neutral reserve fund for protecting Medicare and Medicaid may lead to reduced federal spending on health programs, potentially decreasing enrollment or reimbursement in private health insurance markets tied to public programs.

+ 19 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Arrington, Jodey C. [R-TX-19])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 61%
Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill sets overall defense spending levels and includes a reserve fund for spending reductions, which aligns broadly with Project 2025's goals of adequately funding defense and reforming acquisition, but it does not contain specific provisions for nuclear modernization, counterterrorism burden-sharing, or detailed acquisition reforms."

Key themes:defense budgetnational defenseacquisition reformdefense industrial base

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 60%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill allocates significant funding for National Defense ($933 billion in FY 2025), which aligns with the Project 2025 Department of Defense focus on strengthening military capabilities, but it does not detail specific defense policy reforms or objectives outlined in the Project 2025 text."

Key themes:National Defense fundingDefense budget allocationMilitary readinessFiscal framework for defense

— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. — 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 146-148AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill establishes overall defense spending levels but does not include the specific Air Force-focused reforms, pass-through funding elimination, or targeted budget increases called for in the Project 2025 policy."

Key themes:National Defense budgetdefense spendingbudget authority

— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades. — 114 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force. l Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats. 1. Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year. 2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems. 3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific. 4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints. 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout. 6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. l Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries. 1. Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise. 2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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