The bill
FCRA Liability Harmonization Act
HR. 5775, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]
ID: L000583
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5775, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 23.
June 29, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The FCRA Liability Harmonization Act - because what's more harmonious than limiting consumer protections and lining corporate pockets?
Let's dissect this mess. The bill modifies the Fair Credit Reporting Act to "harmonize" civil liability requirements for class actions. Translation: it restricts consumers' ability to sue credit reporting agencies and other companies for willful or negligent noncompliance with FCRA regulations.
New regulations? Check. The bill creates new limits on damages for class action lawsuits, capping them at $500,000 or 1% of the defendant's net worth. Because, you know, corporations are just so fragile and can't possibly afford to pay more than that for their own mistakes.
Affected industries? Credit reporting agencies, banks, and other financial institutions will be doing the happy dance, as this bill essentially gives them a free pass to screw up without facing significant consequences.
Compliance requirements and timelines? Don't worry, corporations have plenty of time to adjust - or not. The bill doesn't specify any particular timeline for implementation, because who needs deadlines when you're busy making money off consumers' backs?
Enforcement mechanisms and penalties? Ha! The bill limits attorney's fees and costs, ensuring that lawyers won't be too eager to take on these cases. And as for penalties, the caps on damages are so low that companies will just consider them a cost of doing business.
Economic and operational impacts? Consumers will suffer, naturally. With limited recourse against credit reporting agencies, they'll be stuck with inaccurate credit reports and no meaningful way to seek redress. Corporations, on the other hand, will save millions in potential lawsuit payouts. It's a win-win for them!
In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of regulatory capture - where corporations write the rules to benefit themselves at the expense of consumers. The FCRA Liability Harmonization Act is a disease, and its symptoms are corruption, greed, and a healthy dose of contempt for the average American. Diagnosis: terminal stupidity in Congress. Prognosis: more of the same until voters wake up and demand actual change. But let's be real, that's not going to happen anytime soon.
Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: W000812
Top Contributors
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ID: F000471
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20
ID: M001204
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ID: K000397
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ID: H001058
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ID: W000816
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ID: M001236
Top Contributors
20
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 24 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $30
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.
Section 2(a)(1)(D) and Section 2(b)(1) impose liability limits on persons who willfully or negligently fail to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which may increase compliance costs for commercial banks that provide credit reporting services.
Section 2(a)(3) and Section 2(b)(2) introduce class action lawsuit limitations, which may affect private equity and hedge funds that invest in companies providing credit reporting services.
Section 2(a)(1)(D) and Section 2(b)(1) impose liability limits, which may increase costs for insurance companies that provide coverage for credit reporting services.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill seeks to cap damages and attorney fees in FCRA class actions, directly reducing financial liability for businesses under a consumer financial protection statute enforced by the CFPB. This aligns with Project 2025's broader objective of reforming financial regulatory agencies (particularly the CFPB) to limit enforcement burdens and penalties on industry."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the SBA-focused Project 2025 material emphasize reducing regulatory and compliance burdens on businesses, though the bill targets FCRA class-action liability while the SBA section focuses on loan programs, regulatory reform, and small business support."
— 763 — Small Business Administration 40. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Small Business Administration in Fiscal Year 2023, p. iv. 41. H.R. 748, CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, Public Law No. 116-136, 116th Congress, March 27, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ136/PLAW-116publ136.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 42. Sarah McCammon, “Planned Parenthood Asked to Return Funds from Paycheck Protection Program,” NPR, May 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/859991359/planned-parenthood-asked-to-return-funds- from-paycheck-protection-program (accessed February 18, 2023). 43. Letter from William Manger, Associate Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration, to Laura Meyers, Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, “Re: Notice of Investigation and Request for Records,” May 19, 2020, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6922122/SBA-Letter-Planned-Parenthood-DC.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 44. Press release, “Lankford, HSGAC Republicans Demand Details on Illegal PPP Loans to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator James Lankford, April 28, 2022, https://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press- releases/lankford-hsgac-republicans-demand-details-on-illegal-ppp-loans-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates (accessed February 18, 2023). 45. Press release, “Romney, Colleagues Request Information from SBA Administrator Guzman on Illegal PPP Loans Given to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator Mitt Romney, April 28, 2022, https:// www.romney.senate.gov/romney-colleagues-request-information-from-sba-administrator-guzman-on- illegal-ppp-loans-given-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 46. 13 C.F.R. §§ 109.400(b)(11), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/109.400; 123.301(g), https://www.law. cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.301; 123.502(n), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.502; and 123.702(b)(6), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.702 (all accessed February 19, 2023). 47. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Religious Eligibility Worksheet for all 7(a) and 504 Loan Programs” SBA Form 1971, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/sba-form-1971.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 48. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 49. See, for example, Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 50. 28 U.S. Code § 530d, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/530D (accessed February 19, 2023). 51. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 52. 13 CFR 120.110(k), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/120.110 (accessed February 19, 2023). 53. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Regulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504 Loan Programs to Reduce Regulatory Burden,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 125 (June 30, 2022), pp. 38900–38910, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13483/ regulatory-reform-initiative-streamlining-and-modernizing-the-7a-microloan-and-504-loan-programs-to (accessed February 18, 2023). 54. Ibid. 55. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel “Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General Counsel, Department of Education, August 15, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/ attachments/2021/01/01/2019-08-15-hbcu-capfin-2.pdf. (accessed February 18, 2023). 56. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, p. 8, https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/SBA_Final_FY19_SBIR_STTR_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 57. S. 4900, SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117–183, 117th Congress, September 30, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ183/PLAW-117publ183.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 58. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, pp. 6, 40, and 108. — 764 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 59. Peter L. Singer, “Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from Federal Support,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 2014, https://wrnjradio.com/ bipartisan-call-to-crack-down-on-covid-19-ppp-eidl-fraud-prosecute-fraudsters-to-the-fullest-extent-of-the- law/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 60. Wells King, “Uncle Sam’s Top-Performing Venture Fund,” American Compass Case Study, November 2022, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AC-Case-Study_SBIR_final2.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 61. Elisabeth B. Reynolds, Hiram M. Samel, and Joyce Lawrence, “Learning by Building: Complementary Assets and the Migration of Capabilities in U.S. Innovative Firms,” MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper No. MIT-IPC-13-001, March 2013, https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2019-01/13-001.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 62. American Compass, “Where’s The Growth? Assessing the Results of the Globalization Experiment,” March 2022, pp. 3–5, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/AC-Atlas-Wheres-the-Growth.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 63. Sridhar Kota and Tom Mahoney, “Innovation Should Be Made in the U.S.A.,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/innovation-should-be-made-in-the-u-s-a-11573833987 (accessed February 18, 2023). 64. S. ___, SBA Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2019, 116th Congress, 1st Session, Title III, § 303, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/80533629-2905-433f-a588-7c4e032f7347/ C096ED9C1EBA68E041CFDA143E01C66C.mir19891.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 65. David Adler, “Financing Advanced Manufacturing: Why VCs Aren’t the Answer,” American Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2 (Summer 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/05/financing-advanced-manufacturing-why-vcs- arent-the-answer/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 66. National Association of Manufacturers, “Overview of the Senate HEALS Act,” July 28, 2020, https://documents. nam.org/comm/HEALSActInfo.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). See also remarks by Senator Mitch McConnell, “HEALS Act,” Congressional Record, Vol. 166, No. 132 (July 27, 2020), pp. S4491–S4492, https:// www.congress.gov/116/crec/2020/07/27/CREC-2020-07-27-pt1-PgS4491-7.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 67. S. 1059, American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, 117th Congress, introduced March 25, 2021, https:// www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-11-trillion-heals-act https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s1059/BILLS-117s1059is.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 68. H.R. 7628, IMPROVE (Improve Management, Programs, Resources, and Oversight for Vital Entrepreneurs) the SBA Act, 117th Congress, introduced April 28, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7628/BILLS- 117hr7628ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 69. S. 1120, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, 116th Congress, introduced April 10, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1120/BILLS-116s1120is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 70. H.R. 3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-121, 104th Congress, March 29, 1996, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ121/PLAW-104publ121.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 71. S. 403, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www. congress.gov/117/bills/s403/BILLS-117s403is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023), and H.R. 1284, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr1284/ BILLS-117hr1284ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023. 72. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14063, “Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects,” February 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 27 (February 9, 2022), pp. 7363–7366, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-09/pdf/2022-02869.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 73. “The JOBS Act 4.0: Section-by-Section,” Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0sectionbysection.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 74. Press release, “Luetkeymeyer: SBA Lacks Infrastructure and Expertise to Expand Number of Small Business Lending Companies,” Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, November 7, 2022, https:// smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404376 (accessed February 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on limiting FCRA class-action liability for credit reporting agencies and financial institutions, which tangentially aligns with Project 2025's broader goal of reducing regulatory burdens on financial entities, though it does not address the Treasury-specific priorities such as GSE privatization, AML reform, or beneficial ownership reporting."
— 706 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the law’s alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next President’s legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae“) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data. — 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.