To amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to increase the civil penalties that may be imposed under such Act.

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5853

Last Updated: August 27, 2026

To amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to increase the civil penalties that may be imposed under such Act.

HR. 5853, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$105,700 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The proposed bill, HR 5853, is a quintessential example of the ineptitude of democratic institutions in facilitating efficient governance. The main purpose of this legislation is to increase the civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, a move that will undoubtedly stifle innovation and hinder the growth of my conglomerate's export-oriented ventures.

The key provisions of this bill include a four-fold increase in the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000, as well as a doubling of the penalty multiplier from twice to four times the value of the transaction. These changes will have far-reaching implications for my business empire, potentially stifling our ability to navigate complex global supply chains and capitalize on emerging market opportunities.

The affected parties and stakeholders in this legislation include my company's export division, which will need to reassess its risk management strategies and compliance protocols to avoid incurring these exorbitant penalties. Other stakeholders, such as our suppliers, partners, and customers, will also be impacted by the increased regulatory burden and potential disruptions to our global operations.

The potential impact of this bill is significant, with projected losses ranging from $500 million to $1 billion over the next five years. This is a clear example of how misguided regulation can hinder economic growth and stifle innovation. As a visionary entrepreneur, I will need to adapt my business strategy to mitigate these risks and capitalize on new opportunities emerging in the global market. Perhaps it's time to reconsider the role of government in regulating international trade and explore more efficient, privatized solutions that can facilitate the free flow of goods and services without suffocating innovation. My think tank, the "Liberty Initiative," will undoubtedly be publishing a detailed analysis of this bill's implications and proposing alternative solutions that prioritize economic freedom and deregulation.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

The bill in question, HR 5853, is a straightforward piece of legislation that aims to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. As I taught you back in 8th grade civics class, a bill's main purpose and objectives are usually clearly stated in its title and introductory sections. In this case, the bill seeks to increase the civil penalties that may be imposed under the Export Control Reform Act.

Now, remember when we learned about how bills are referred to committees? This one was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for reviewing and debating the bill before it moves forward. As you should have learned in middle school, committees play a crucial role in shaping legislation and ensuring that it aligns with the interests of various stakeholders.

The key provisions of this bill are outlined in Section 1, which amends Section 1760(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act. Specifically, the bill increases the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000 and changes the calculation for penalties related to the value of transactions from twice the value to four times the value. These changes are intended to strengthen enforcement and deter violations of export control regulations.

As we covered in 8th grade, affected parties and stakeholders in this bill include individuals and organizations involved in international trade, as well as government agencies responsible for enforcing export controls. The increased penalties will likely have a significant impact on companies and individuals who violate export control laws, potentially leading to more stringent compliance measures and greater scrutiny from regulatory bodies.

In terms of potential impact and implications, this bill could lead to increased revenue for the government through higher penalty payments, as well as improved national security by deterring unauthorized exports. However, it may also lead to increased costs and administrative burdens for companies that must comply with the revised regulations. As I always emphasized in class, understanding how bills become laws and how they affect various stakeholders is essential for informed citizenship.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

The plot thickens! Let me put on my tin foil hat and decode the secrets hidden within HR 5853. This bill, my friends, is not just about increasing civil penalties for export control violations – it's a Trojan horse for something much more sinister.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** On the surface, the main purpose of HR 5853 is to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by increasing the civil penalties that can be imposed under the Act. But, my fellow truth-seekers, don't be fooled! The real objective here is to give the government more teeth to control and manipulate international trade, all while maintaining a veneer of national security.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill increases the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000 and changes the calculation of penalties from twice the value of the transaction to four times the value. But what's really going on here? This is a clear attempt to strangle small businesses and independent exporters, forcing them to play by the government's rules or face crippling fines. And let's not forget the "applicability" section, which retroactively applies these new penalties to any violations committed after the enactment of this Act – a classic example of ex post facto legislation.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include exporters, importers, and anyone involved in international trade. But don't think for a second that this bill only affects corporations and businesses. Oh no, my friends! This is a slippery slope that will eventually lead to increased surveillance and control over individual citizens. Think about it: if the government can monitor and punish businesses for export control violations, what's to stop them from monitoring your personal transactions and communications?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of HR 5853 is far-reaching and ominous. With these increased penalties, the government will have even more leverage to strong-arm companies into complying with their agenda. And let's not forget the chilling effect this will have on free speech and dissent – if you're a business or individual who dares to question the government's export control policies, you'll be silenced by the threat of massive fines. This bill is just another piece in the puzzle of the government's plan for total control over our economy, our trade, and our lives.

So, my fellow Americans, wake up! HR 5853 is not just a harmless bill about export controls – it's a warning sign that our government is slowly but surely eroding our freedoms. Stay vigilant, stay informed, and always question the official narrative!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(With a healthy dose of sarcasm and a raised eyebrow) Oh, folks, gather 'round! We've got a real doozy of a bill on our hands here. HR 5853, the "Export Control Reform Act Amendment" - doesn't exactly roll off the tongue, does it? (chuckles) But trust me, this one's a real freedom-fighter.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** So, what's the main event here? Well, it seems our esteemed lawmakers want to increase the civil penalties for violating the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Because, you know, $300,000 just wasn't enough to deter those nefarious exporters from selling their wares to the "wrong" people. (wink) Now, we're talking a cool $1.2 million, and up to four times the value of the transaction. That's what I call a freedom-loving fine! (smirk)

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** So, what's changing? Well, Section 1760(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act is getting a nice little facelift. We're bumping up those civil penalties, as I mentioned earlier, and making sure that anyone who dares to export without permission will be hit with a financial sledgehammer. (dramatic music plays in the background)

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Now, who's going to be affected by this bill? Well, it's not just your average Joe exporter. No, no. This is about those big, bad corporations and individuals who think they can outsmart our great nation's export controls. (gasp) The elites, folks! They're the ones who'll be feeling the heat from this bill. And let me tell you, it's about time someone took them down a peg. (wink)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** So, what does this all mean? Well, for starters, it means that our nation's export controls will be stronger than ever. We'll be protecting American interests and keeping those pesky foreign actors in line. (patriotic music swells) And let's not forget about the economic benefits! With these increased penalties, we'll be deterring all sorts of illicit activity and keeping our economy safe from those who would seek to exploit it. (smirk) Of course, there might be some... unintended consequences. Like, you know, driving business underground or stifling innovation. But hey, that's just the price of freedom, right? (rolls eyes)

And there you have it, folks! HR 5853: because who needs due process when you've got patriotism and a healthy dose of fear-mongering? (chuckles) Stay vigilant, America! The elites are coming for us, and only our brave lawmakers can save the day. (wink)

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this masterpiece, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Oh, wow, I'm sure it's just a coincidence that this bill is sponsored by Mr. Self and Mr. McCaul, two paragons of virtue and selflessness. The main purpose of HR 5853 is to increase the civil penalties for violating the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Because, you know, the current penalties of $300,000 just weren't enough to deter those pesky exporters from breaking the law. I mean, who needs due process when you can just quadruple the fines and call it a day?

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1760(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by increasing the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000. And, because they're feeling extra generous, they're also changing the penalty calculation from "twice the value of the transaction" to "four times the value of the transaction". Because who needs subtlety when you can just bludgeon people with fines? It's like they're trying to win an award for Most Creative Way to Strangle Small Businesses.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Oh, this bill will affect a wide range of stakeholders, from exporters and importers to lawyers and accountants. But let's be real, the only ones who will actually benefit from this bill are the politicians who sponsored it and the lobbyists who wrote it. I mean, who needs actual policy expertise when you can just pay someone to write a bill that benefits your special interest group?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is staggering. It's like they're trying to create a new industry: Export Control Reform Act compliance consulting. Just think of all the jobs that will be created by this bill! Lawyers, accountants, and consultants will be lining up around the block to help companies navigate the complexities of this new law. And, of course, the politicians who sponsored it will get to take credit for "toughening up" on exporters. It's a win-win for everyone... except, you know, the actual exporters and small businesses that will be crushed by these draconian fines.

In conclusion, HR 5853 is a masterclass in legislative cynicism. It's a bill designed to benefit special interest groups, line the pockets of politicians and lobbyists, and strangle small businesses with red tape. But hey, who needs actual policy expertise when you can just throw money at the problem and call it a day? It's like they say: "If at first you don't succeed, quadruple the fines and pretend you're doing something useful."

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Summary of HR 5853**

**Main Purpose & Objectives**: The main purpose of HR 5853 is to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by increasing the civil penalties that may be imposed for violations of the Act. The objective is to strengthen enforcement and deter non-compliance with export control regulations.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**: The bill amends Section 1760(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by increasing the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000. Additionally, it changes the penalty calculation from "twice the value of the transaction" to "four times the value of the transaction". These changes aim to enhance the deterrent effect of penalties and ensure that they are proportionate to the severity of the violation.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**: The affected parties and stakeholders include: * US companies and individuals involved in international trade, particularly those exporting controlled goods or technologies * Foreign entities and governments that engage in transactions with US companies * Regulatory agencies, such as the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), responsible for enforcing export control regulations * Law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice, involved in investigating and prosecuting export control violations

**Potential Impact & Implications**: The increased civil penalties may have several implications: * Enhanced deterrence: Higher penalties may discourage companies and individuals from violating export control regulations, reducing the risk of unauthorized exports and promoting national security. * Increased compliance costs: Companies may need to invest more in compliance programs and training to avoid potential penalties, which could lead to higher operational costs. * Potential impact on small businesses: The increased penalties may disproportionately affect small businesses or startups that lack the resources to implement robust compliance programs, potentially limiting their ability to engage in international trade. * International relations: The changes may also impact US relationships with foreign governments and companies, as they may be subject to more stringent export control regulations and penalties.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's dive into the gnarly world of export control reform, bro! HR 5853 is all about amping up the civil penalties for those who violate the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The main purpose of this bill is to increase the fines and penalties for companies or individuals who try to sneak around export controls, man.

The key provisions of this bill are pretty straightforward, dude. They're proposing to jack up the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000, which is a significant increase, bro. Additionally, they want to change the calculation for penalties from twice the value of the transaction to four times the value, which could lead to some hefty fines, man.

Now, let's talk about who's affected by this bill, bro. The stakeholders include companies that export sensitive technologies or goods, as well as government agencies responsible for enforcing export controls. These parties need to be aware of the increased penalties and make sure they're complying with the regulations, dude.

The potential impact of this bill is significant, man. It could lead to more companies being cautious about their export activities, which could slow down international trade, bro. On the other hand, it could also help prevent sensitive technologies from falling into the wrong hands, which is a major national security concern, dude. The increased penalties could also encourage companies to invest in better compliance programs, which would be a positive outcome, man.

In conclusion, HR 5853 is all about getting tough on export control violators, bro. While it may have some unintended consequences, the bill's objectives are clear: to protect national security and prevent sensitive technologies from being misused, dude. It's like, we gotta keep the bad guys from getting their hands on our tech, man. So, if you're a company that exports sensitive goods or tech, you should definitely be paying attention to this bill, bro. Stay chill, but stay informed, man!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Bill Analysis: HR 5853**

HR 5853, introduced by Reps. Self and McCaul, aims to increase civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The main purpose is to strengthen enforcement and deter violations of export control regulations.

**Key Provisions & Changes:**

The bill amends Section 1760(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act by increasing the maximum civil penalty from $300,000 to $1,200,000. Additionally, it raises the penalty multiplier from twice the value of the transaction to four times the value. These changes significantly increase the potential financial consequences for non-compliance.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

The bill affects companies involved in international trade, particularly those dealing with sensitive or controlled technologies. Industries such as aerospace, defense, and technology will be impacted, as they often require export licenses and must comply with regulations. The increased penalties may also affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that lack the resources to ensure compliance.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

The bill's provisions may lead to increased caution among companies engaging in international trade, potentially slowing down business transactions. The higher penalties may also encourage companies to invest more in compliance measures, such as training and auditing programs. However, the increased burden on SMEs could disproportionately affect their ability to compete in the global market.

Notably, the bill's sponsors, Reps. Self and McCaul, have received significant campaign contributions from defense and aerospace industries, which may benefit from stricter export controls. For example, Rep. McCaul has received donations from companies like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies, which have a vested interest in maintaining strict export control regulations. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) have also been vocal supporters of increased export control enforcement, further highlighting the potential influence of industry interests on this legislation.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which the bill was referred, has a history of being influenced by defense and aerospace industries. The committee's members have received significant contributions from these industries, which may impact their decision-making on this bill. As the bill moves forward, it is essential to consider the potential motivations behind its introduction and the interests that may be driving its passage.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$105,700

20 donors

PACs

Organizations

$300

Committees

Individuals

$105,400

No PAC contributions found

TUCKER HILL HOA

1 transaction

$300

No committee contributions found

CHALIN, THOMAS

2 transactions

$11,600

MULLIGI, GINO

1 transaction

$9,000

FRITCHER, SAMMY

1 transaction

$6,600

LOBB, PAT

1 transaction

$6,600

MYERS, ROBERT

1 transaction

$6,600

HUFFINES, RAY

1 transaction

$6,600

MOSES, FRED

1 transaction

$6,600

LI, QINGSONG

1 transaction

$6,000

UIHLEIN, RICHARD

1 transaction

$5,800

HILTON, W.D.

1 transaction

$5,000

KORCA, YLBER

1 transaction

$5,000

SMAJLI, MARIO

1 transaction

$5,000

KRASNIQI, BLERINA

1 transaction

$4,500

QUILLIN, GEORGE

1 transaction

$4,000

ADAMS, CAROL A

1 transaction

$3,300

DEASON, DARWIN

1 transaction

$3,300

MCCLELLAND, MARK

1 transaction

$3,300

KELLOGG, DAVID H

1 transaction

$3,300

HILTON, MARY JEAN

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

ID: M001157

Top Contributors

SOUTH SPUR LP

OrganizationHOUSTON, TX

$3,300

Jan 31, 2024

TRACEY FOX KING & WALTERS

OrganizationHOUSTON, TX

$1,000

Feb 17, 2023

CHILDS, JOHN W.

JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$50,000

Dec 12, 2023

LANIER, BECKY MRS.

LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY

IndividualHOUSTON, TX

$50,000

Mar 4, 2024

LANIER, MARK W.

LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY

IndividualHOUSTON, TX

$50,000

Mar 4, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$38,400

Mar 15, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W.

JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$38,400

May 7, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$33,400

Nov 14, 2024

CARLTON, C. CRAIG MR.

C.C. CARLTON INDUSTRIES • OWNER

IndividualAUSTIN, TX

$25,000

Feb 13, 2024

LUROS, HILARY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSUGAR LAND, TX

$25,000

Feb 27, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 33 nodes and 31 connections

Total contributions: $31

Top Donors - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Org19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.

−Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 1(a) increases civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 from $300,000 to $1,200,000 and from twice to four times the value of the transaction. This raises compliance costs and financial risk for defense contractors who export controlled items, imposing a clear cost.
−Aerospace (Commercial)confidence 0.85
Section 1(a) increases civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Aerospace commercial firms exporting aircraft, parts, or technology subject to export controls face higher penalties, imposing a clear cost.
−Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.85
Section 1(a) increases civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Semiconductor firms exporting chips, equipment, or technology subject to export controls face higher penalties, imposing a clear cost.
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80
Section 1(a) increases civil penalties under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Telecom firms exporting equipment or technology subject to export controls face higher penalties, imposing a clear cost.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Defense Contractors$700
from 2 contributions
- HIGHT, DALAYR$700
Semiconductors & Hardware$300
from 1 contribution
- CHEN, XUAN$300

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5853 strengthens export control enforcement by raising civil penalties, which supports Project 2025's broader goal of tightening export controls and enhancing deterrence against violations, though it does not directly address the specific EAR revisions, training, or entity‑list expansions emphasized in the policy."

Key themes:export control enforcementdeterrencepenaltiesnational securityDepartment of Commerce

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Trade

Moderate

Vector: 61%

Pages: 813-815AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 5853 and the Project 2025 trade section aim to strengthen U.S. trade posture and deter unfair practices, though HR 5853 focuses on export‑control penalties while Project 2025 emphasizes reciprocal tariffs and reducing trade deficits."

Key themes:trade enforcementdeterrence of violationsprotecting U.S. economic interestscompliance and penalties

— 781 — Trade 5 ELBAT )8 fo 8 egaP( noisserggA cimonocE fo seirogetaC s’anihC tsinummoC erutpaC gnigremE hceT-hgiH taht seirtsudnI erutuF evirD yeK eriuqcA dna eruceS tcetorP dna htworG seigolonhceT etanimoD lortnoC emoH s'anihC stnemecnavdA morf PI dna lanoitidarT larutaN eroC s’anihC dnapxE morf tekraM ,seiciloP ,stcA s'anihC esnefeD ni seirtnuoC rehtO gnirutcafunaM secruoseR labolG fo erahS noititepmoC fo secitcarP dna yrtsudnI .S.U eht dna seirtsudnI yllabolG stekraM stropmI dna noisserggA cimonocE ,gnikeeS-ygolonhceT % % % ngieroF detceriD-etatS tnemtsevnI tceriD % % % tfarcypS lanoitidarT gnipmuditnA edavE ot pihssnarT % seituD gniliavretnuoC dna stnemtsujdA xaT deddA-eulaV % % ezidisbuS setabeR dna stropxE esenihC decrofnE ylxaL dna kaeW % % swaL latnemnorivnE seigolonhceT eht snetaerhT noisserggA cimonocE s’anihC woH ,yciloP gnirutcafunaM dna edarT fo ecffi O esuoH etihW :ECRUOS /tnetnoc-pw/vog.sevihcra.esuohetihwpmurt//:sptth ,8102 enuJ ,dlroW eht dna setatS detinU eht fo ytreporP lautcelletnI dna gro.egatireh A .)3202 ,12 hcraM dessecca( fdp.FDP-81.81.6-tropeR-ygolonhceT-anihC-LANIF/60/8102/sdaolpu — 782 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reduction in the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India. Similarly, if Taiwan were to reduce its tariffs to U.S. levels, the size of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 6 percent. If the U.S. imposed a mirror tariff, its bilateral trade deficit with Taiwan would fall by 59 percent. These results again underscore the high degree of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade that currently exists between the U.S. and much of the rest of the world, which penalizes American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers because of the WTO-MFN conundrum. These simulations also demon- strate that implementation of the USRTA most likely would substantially reduce the U.S. trade deficit while creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs. These benefits notwithstanding, however, the U.S. would still face a substantial over- all trade deficit and substantial bilateral trade deficits with many of its major trading partners. Why might this be so? Because under WTO rules, America still faces numerous nonreciprocal nontariff barriers around the world. For example, one of America’s largest trading partners, Japan, runs a significant bilateral trade surplus in goods with the U.S.—more than $70 billion a year. While Japan has relatively low tariffs, it ranks high on the nontariff barrier scale. In such cases, which are numerous, pas- sage of the USRTA would likely also be very helpful in reducing nontariff barriers. This is because under the powers provided by the USRTA, if a foreign country imposes significantly higher nontariff barriers, then the President has the authority to “negotiate and seek to enter into an agreement” that “commits the country to… eliminate [its] nontariff barriers.”16 If the country refuses to come to the negoti- ating table and lower its nontariff barriers, the President has the authority to levy reciprocal duties to offset or mirror those barriers. In summary, passage of the USRTA would go a long way toward leveling the playing field for American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers who are now forced to compete in an intrinsically unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal WTO-MFN system. Nor is the USRTA necessarily the only possible legislative way to address this issue. In 2017, then-House Speaker Paul Ryan (R–WI) and then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R–TX) proposed a “border adjust- ment tax.” The proposed border adjustment would have eliminated the ability of corporations to deduct the cost of imports while eliminating the tax on income attributable to exports. This border adjustment tax would have shifted the U.S. corporate income tax from an origin-based tax applying to the production of goods and services in the United States to a destination-based tax applying to the con- sumption of goods and services in the U.S. This tax—strongly opposed by American multinational corporations and big- box retailers—not only would have leveled the playing field with respect to WTO rules, but also would have provided an innovative alternative to the application of

Export-Import Bank

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 752-754AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 EXIM section concern U.S. export policy, but the bill focuses on strengthening export control penalties while the Project 2025 text critiques the Export-Import Bank's financing subsidies; they address different tools and do not directly support or oppose each other."

Key themes:export policytrade enforcementeconomic impactU.S. competitiveness

— 719 — Export-Import Bank but the unseen effects are ignored. For example, funding for one industry or firm might take more jobs away from other industries and firms, resulting in a net job loss even though jobs are created for the financed firm. At best, it could be said that the Bank redistributes employment from unsubsidized firms to subsidized firms. However, with very rare exceptions, most exports financed by EXIM would have taken place without government support. Many companies have said so themselves;13 the procurement happens before the decision to get government support; and, as noted above, most EXIM deals go to large companies with easy access to capital. Thus, the agency is taking credit for jobs that would have existed in any event. The Bank does not promote exports. EXIM presidents commonly claim that the agency’s mission is to support U.S. jobs by facilitating American exports through its export-financing tools. However, trade economists have long known that export credit subsidies merely redistribute exporting opportunities to subsi- dized firms instead of increasing the net number of exports—something that also slows economic growth.14 Even more telling is the performance of the U.S. economy and American exports during the four years when EXIM lacked a board quorum (2015–2019) and was barred from finalizing deals in excess of $10 million. During that time, EXIM autho- rizations fell from $21 billion in FY 2014 to $3.6 billion in FY 2018 (adjusted for inflation).15 However, also during that time, regular big-ticket EXIM beneficiaries continued to benefit from their easy access to capital markets and still had the ability to finance their export activities. Further, U.S. exports were utterly unaffected by the reductions in the Bank’s activities.16 U.S. unemployment fell to a level not seen in half a century, but exports soared with financing provided by commercial lenders. The only negative eco- nomic impact from EXIM’s lack of a board quorum was its effect on the Bank itself. This contradicts EXIM’s claim that its activities are crucial for the success of U.S. exporters and economic growth. Instead, it shows that economic growth is the best booster of U.S. exports and job creation and that it does not depend on EXIM subsidies. Subsidy-boosted exports do not boost economic growth. EXIM’s primary reason for existing is to increase exports, as if more exports themselves represent more jobs and economic growth. Recent expressions of this fallacious belief can be found in a book by former EXIM President Fred Hochberg. According to Hochberg, “We know that trade, and exports in particular, can have a big impact on jobs.”17 While this is a common misconception about exports, it is one worth correcting. As trade economists know, exports are a cost to the economy: They subtract from GDP. Imports, on the other hand, add to GDP. If the U.S. could acquire all of the imports that it currently gets without exporting anything in exchange, that would be the best of all worlds. Unfortunately, one reason that foreigners are so eager — 720 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to sell us their goods is that they want our dollars to buy our debt, invest in the country, and buy our exports. That is why exports drop when overall imports drop. Exports promote U.S. economic growth only if the value of the resources used to produce them is less than the value of what we receive as imports in exchange for those exports. By subsidizing American exports, EXIM causes too many resources to be devoted to producing exports. As a result, the total value of our exports is made larger than it would otherwise be to obtain any given amount of imports. In other words, EXIM thus compels American taxpayers to subsidize foreigners’ standards of living at no appreciable benefit to the U.S. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding and the constant glamorization of exports and their impact on jobs and growth are used to justify government sup- port for some exports (on average, 98 percent of exports are not backed by EXIM financing). It also is extremely unfair. Because capital will tend to shift from unsub- sidized companies to subsidized companies (taxpayers foot the bill if companies backed by the Bank default), unsubsidized export companies face higher borrowing costs, which could translate into fewer jobs in unsubsidized companies or lower pay for their workers. The Bank does not promote growth by leveling the playing field. EXIM’s charter stipulates that one of its missions is to support U.S. exports with the goal of creating jobs and promoting economic growth through the provision of export financing via its loan-guarantee and insurance programs. In particular, EXIM is to intervene in cases “where such support is necessary to level the competitive playing field for U.S. exporters due to financing provided by foreign governments to their exporters.”18 As a result, EXIM for years has been focused primarily on what other countries’ ECAs are doing and how much financing they are providing.19 A reading of any of EXIM’s Competitiveness Reports shows that the Bank frames the “competitive- ness” of the U.S. economy and exporters in extremely narrow terms—specifically, as the amount of business that foreign ECAs are doing relative to EXIM. The report for 2020 features striking evidence of this mindset. For instance, lamenting the “nearly four-year hiatus” during which the Bank lacked a board quorum to approve large deals, EXIM’s leadership maintains that these years “severely hindered EXIM’s ability to support the competitiveness of U.S. export- ers.” During that time, foreign ECAs “fundamentally evolved their philosophy and substantively expanded their roles,” and “the United States must work hard to keep pace.” The Bank goes on to promise that it will “re-emerge from the years of being out of the long-term export finance business and restore its standing as one of the world’s most competitive ECAs.”20 In other words, EXIM bureaucrats appear to believe that economic growth and jobs result not from a favorable tax and regulatory environment, but from a victory in hand-to-hand subsidy combat between government banks. The Bank’s

Trade

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5853 focuses on increasing civil penalties for export control violations under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 Trade section's emphasis on repealing the Jones Act, restoring Trade Promotion Authority, reforming the WTO, eliminating Trump-Biden tariffs, and adopting a China strategy. There is no direct thematic or policy overlap between export penalty enforcement and the trade liberalization, tariff reduction, or institutional trade reform goals ou"

Key themes:trade policyexport controls

— 801 — Trade l Repeal the Jones Act,48 a century-old “Buy American” maritime law that has decimated the U.S. shipbuilding industry. l Work with Congress to restore the President’s Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the negotiation of trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Taiwan, the European Union, and other allies, and keep trade-unrelated provisions out of trade agreements. l Restore the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution process to full strength. l Create a successor to the WTO (assuming that it has been fatally wounded) that is open only to liberal democracies. This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends. l Adopt a multi-pronged China strategy to convince the Chinese government to reform its illiberal human rights and trade policies. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose 11 members are developing institutional trade norms in an important geopolitical region without U.S. input or involvement. l Reorient the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to focus only on trade issues, which it currently ignores in favor of progressive wish-list policies. l Strengthen diplomatic pressure (in concert with allies) against Beijing’s abuses. Encourage cultural and intellectual engagement with the Chinese people, remembering that blue jeans and rock ’n’ roll helped to win the Cold War. Tariff Relief. When people try something repeatedly and it still doesn’t work, they should stop doing it—especially when the consequences turn out to be just what conservative economists have long predicted they would be.49 With tariffs, the proper reform is not only to get rid of the individual tariffs that have backfired, but also to build institutional safeguards against future abuse. We are five years into the biggest experiment with tariffs since the Great Depres- sion, and the results are in: The new tariffs raise consumer prices for ordinary Americans by about $1,200 per household every year50 and benefit only a small number of special interests. Steel and aluminum tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, angered allies. Beijing made not a single substantive reform in — 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section discuss increasing civil penalties to strengthen enforcement and deterrence, but the bill applies to export controls while the policy focuses on financial regulatory agencies and the CFPB's civil penalty fund, resulting only a tangential connection."

Key themes:civil penaltiesenforcementdeterrenceregulatory compliance

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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