The bill
SHADOW Act
HR. 7632, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
ID: S001224
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7632, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 155-157 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 46 - 0.
March 25, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SHADOW Act (because, of course, it needs a catchy acronym) claims to address the "persistent and growing threat" of hybrid warfare activities against US interests. How quaint. Its primary objective is to create a new bureaucratic position, the Coordinator for Hybrid Warfare Accountability, because what every government needs is more administrative bloat.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to:
1. Assess and engage diplomatically with foreign governments to counter hybrid warfare activities (read: more pointless meetings and empty rhetoric). 2. Designate a Coordinator to oversee interagency efforts on hybrid warfare (because one person can surely fix this complex problem). 3. Submit reports on Chinese entities supporting Russia's defense industrial base, recommending sanctions or other measures (a classic example of "do something" legislation).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. The Department of State, which will have to deal with the new Coordinator and associated bureaucratic red tape. 2. NATO allies, who will be subjected to more US lectures on cooperation and information sharing. 3. Chinese entities, which might face sanctions or other measures (but let's be real, they'll just find ways to circumvent them). 4. The American people, who will foot the bill for this legislative posturing.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of "security theater," designed to create the illusion of action while accomplishing little. Its potential impact is negligible, but it may:
1. Create a new layer of bureaucratic inefficiency. 2. Provide a temporary distraction from more pressing issues (like the fact that US foreign policy is still driven by special interests and campaign donations). 3. Further strain relations with China and Russia, because what's a little more diplomatic tension among "friends"? 4. Waste taxpayer money on reports, meetings, and other bureaucratic busywork.
In conclusion, the SHADOW Act is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect: it looks like something is being done, but in reality, it's just a shallow attempt to appease the masses while perpetuating the status quo. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold. Next patient, please!
Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000375
Top Contributors
10
ID: S000344
Top Contributors
10
ID: B001307
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 52 nodes and 36 connections (31 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $151,700
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 2 harmed.
Section 4 requires a report identifying Chinese entities materially supporting Russia's defense industrial base and recommending sanctions, export controls, or other measures. This could lead to sanctions on Chinese defense suppliers, potentially benefiting U.S. defense contractors by reducing foreign competition or creating opportunities for alternative suppliers.
Section 2(3) encourages information sharing with NATO allies on hybrid warfare activities, including Chinese and Russian cyber campaigns. Section 3(b)(1) includes assessing and disseminating information on hybrid warfare activities for diplomatic engagement and interagency strategy. Section 3(d)(1) requires reports on key assessments and findings on hybrid warfare activities. These provisions likely increase demand for cybersecurity threat intelligence, attribution, and defensive services, benef
Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and telecommunications. This implies potential regulatory scrutiny or requirements for telecommunications companies to enhance security against hybrid threats, which could impose compliance costs.
Section 3(b)(4) includes supporting resilience and de-risking efforts with allies and partners in sectors vulnerable to foreign coercion, including critical infrastructure and energy. This suggests potential regulatory focus on energy infrastructure security, possibly leading to new requirements or costs for energy infrastructure firms.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments. — 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
Board of Veterans Appeals Annual Report Transparency Act of 2025
119/hr/6698
To amend title 38, United States Code, to establish the Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs in the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes.
119/hr/7950
To amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to increase the civil penalties that may be imposed under such Act.
119/hr/5853