Federal Program Integrity and Fraud Prevention Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6916
Last Updated: August 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

ID: S001224

Follow the money

The bill

Federal Program Integrity and Fraud Prevention Act of 2026

HR. 6916, 119th Congress — read as touching Construction & Engineering.

The sponsor

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$105,700 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 786-788 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

June 8, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The "Federal Program Integrity and Fraud Prevention Act of 2026" - because, you know, the previous 47 laws with similar titles didn't quite do the trick. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to prohibit federal funds from being provided to individuals convicted of certain federal felonies. Wow, what a revolutionary concept! It's not like this is just a rehashing of existing laws with a fresh coat of paint. The real purpose, of course, is to create the illusion of action against corruption and fraud, while actually doing little to address the root causes.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends title 31 of the United States Code by adding a new section that prohibits federal contracts, grants, or financial assistance to individuals convicted of covered felonies. It also establishes a waiver process for agencies to bypass this prohibition on a case-by-case basis - because, you know, flexibility is key when it comes to corruption. The bill also requires notification and updates to the System for Award Management Exclusions list. Yay, more bureaucracy!

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include individuals convicted of federal felonies (oh no, their feelings might get hurt!), agencies responsible for implementing this law (more paperwork, yay!), and contractors or grant recipients who might be impacted by these changes (just another hurdle to navigate in the already Byzantine world of federal contracting). And, of course, the usual suspects: lobbyists, special interest groups, and politicians looking to score points with their constituents.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact is negligible, as this law will likely have little effect on actual corruption or fraud. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound - a symbolic gesture designed to placate the masses while allowing business as usual to continue behind the scenes. The real implications are that it will create more red tape, increase administrative burdens, and provide a false sense of security for voters who think their elected officials are actually doing something about corruption.

In conclusion, this bill is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect - a meaningless gesture designed to make politicians look good without actually addressing the underlying issues. It's a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic inability of our political system to effectively address corruption and fraud. But hey, at least it sounds good on paper, right? Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$105,700
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$105,400

No PAC contributions found

1
TUCKER HILL HOA
1 transaction
$300

No committee contributions found

1
CHALIN, THOMAS
2 transactions
$11,600
2
MULLIGI, GINO
1 transaction
$9,000
3
FRITCHER, SAMMY
1 transaction
$6,600
4
LOBB, PAT
1 transaction
$6,600
5
MYERS, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HUFFINES, RAY
1 transaction
$6,600
7
MOSES, FRED
1 transaction
$6,600
8
LI, QINGSONG
1 transaction
$6,000
9
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$5,800
10
HILTON, W.D.
1 transaction
$5,000
11
KORCA, YLBER
1 transaction
$5,000
12
SMAJLI, MARIO
1 transaction
$5,000
13
KRASNIQI, BLERINA
1 transaction
$4,500
14
QUILLIN, GEORGE
1 transaction
$4,000
15
ADAMS, CAROL A
1 transaction
$3,300
16
DEASON, DARWIN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
MCCLELLAND, MARK
1 transaction
$3,300
18
KELLOGG, DAVID H
1 transaction
$3,300
19
HILTON, MARY JEAN
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Randall, Emily [D-WA-6]

ID: R000621

Top Contributors

28

1
JAMESTOWN S'KLALLAM TRIBE
OrganizationSEQUIM, WA
$3,300
Dec 31, 2023
2
JAMESTOWN S'KLALLAM TRIBE
OrganizationSEQUIM, WA
$3,300
Oct 16, 2024
3
MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE
OrganizationAUBURN, WA
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
4
SNOQUALMIE TRIBE
OrganizationSNOQUALMIE, WA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
5
THE TULALIP TRIBES OF WASHINGTON
OrganizationTULALIP, WA
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
6
QUINAULT INDIAN NATION
OrganizationTAHOLAH, WA
$1,500
Jul 30, 2024
7
SQUAXIN ISLAND TRIBE
OrganizationSHELTON, WA
$1,000
Apr 26, 2024
8
SAMISH TYEE
OrganizationANACORTES, WA
$1,000
Oct 30, 2024
9
JACOBS, IRWIN
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualLA JOLLA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2024
10
ANAND, SHELLY
SUR LEGAL COLLABORATIVE INC • ATTORNEY
IndividualDECATUR, GA
$3,300
Nov 21, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 33 nodes and 31 connections

Total contributions: $31

Top Donors - Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Org19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • As Federal contractors, construction and engineering firms may be subject to the prohibition in Section 2(a)(1) if they have individuals with certain felony convictions, potentially affecting their business.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Small Business Administration

Moderate
Vector: 67%
Pages: 786-788AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on preventing individuals convicted of federal felonies from receiving federal funds, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of addressing fraud in SBA lending programs, particularly COVID-19-related loans. However, the bill is broad and not specific to SBA or disaster lending, resulting in moderate rather than strong alignment."

Key themes:fraud preventionloan accountabilityfederal fund integritySBA oversighteligibility enforcement

— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55

Small Business Administration

Moderate
Vector: 65%
Pages: 786-788AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on preventing individuals convicted of federal felonies from receiving federal funds, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of addressing fraud in COVID-19 lending programs by holding ineligible recipients accountable. Both emphasize accountability and integrity in federal fund distribution, though the bill is broader in scope and not specific to PPP loans or the SBA."

Key themes:fraud preventionaccountabilityfederal fund integrityloan eligibilityoversight

— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on prohibiting federal funds for individuals convicted of certain federal felonies to enhance program integrity, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt discusses the CFPB's civil penalty fund, its structure, legal challenges, and proposed reforms to financial regulatory agencies. There is no direct thematic overlap between the bill's fraud prevention mechanism and the policy's focus on CFPB funding limits, governance, or enforcement activities."

Key themes:federal accountabilityfinancial oversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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