The bill
DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act
HR. 881, 119th Congress — read as touching For-Profit Education & Student Loans.
Sponsored by
Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
ID: P000048
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 881, 119th Congress — read as touching For-Profit Education & Student Loans.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
May 7, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
HR 881, the "DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act," is a bill that claims to address national security concerns related to China's influence on American institutions of higher education. But don't be fooled – this is just a thinly veiled attempt to grandstand on China-bashing while lining the pockets of favored special interests.
The total funding amount for this bill? A whopping $0. Yes, you read that right. This bill doesn't actually allocate any funds; it's all about restrictions and waivers. But don't worry, I'm sure the politicians will find ways to "accidentally" funnel money to their cronies through other means.
Key programs and agencies receiving funds? Ha! There aren't any. This bill is all about posturing and pretending to care about national security while actually doing nothing concrete.
Notable increases or decreases from previous years? Well, since this bill doesn't allocate any funds, it's hard to say. But I'm sure the politicians will find ways to spin this as a "tough on China" move, even though it's just empty rhetoric.
Riders and policy provisions attached to funding? Oh boy, there are plenty. The most notable one is the waiver provision in Section 2(c), which allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to exempt institutions from these restrictions if they meet certain conditions. Guess who gets to decide what those conditions are? That's right – the same politicians who wrote this bill.
Fiscal impact and deficit implications? Since this bill doesn't allocate any funds, it won't have a direct fiscal impact. But let's be real, folks – this is just a drop in the ocean of wasteful government spending. The real cost will come from the bureaucratic overhead and administrative burdens imposed on institutions of higher education.
In conclusion, HR 881 is a classic case of legislative malpractice. It's a bill that pretends to address a pressing national security concern while actually doing nothing but providing cover for politicians to grandstand and line their pockets. The real disease here is not China's influence on American academia, but the corruption, cowardice, and stupidity that pervades our political system.
Diagnosis: Terminal case of legislative theater-itis, with symptoms including empty rhetoric, bureaucratic waste, and a complete disregard for fiscal responsibility. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the absurdity of it all.
Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000597
Top Contributors
10
ID: E000300
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001220
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000603
Top Contributors
10
ID: J000302
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 56 nodes and 38 connections (54 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $156,335
Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(b) restricts institutions of higher education with relationships to Confucius Institutes or Chinese entities of concern from receiving Department of Homeland Security funds, which could impact for-profit education institutions.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on restricting DHS funding to universities with ties to Chinese entities like Confucius Institutes, which aligns with Project 2025's broader concern about Chinese influence and national security threats, though it does not directly address CFIUS reform, greenfield investments, or Treasury-led financial warfare initiatives outlined in the policy."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy aim to counter China-related national security threats by imposing oversight and restrictions on foreign ties, but the bill targets DHS funding to universities while the policy focuses on CFIUS reform and Treasury oversight of foreign investment."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's concern about foreign influence in U.S. higher education, particularly regarding Confucius Institutes and Chinese entities, reflecting shared goals of safeguarding academic integrity and national security. However, the bill focuses on DHS funding restrictions rather than Department of Education-specific reforms like HEA amendments or Title VI funding changes outlined in the policy."
— 356 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Investigate postsecondary institutions that fail to honor their Section 117 obligations and make appropriate referrals to DOJ. l Work with Congress to amend the HEA to tie the HEA’s foreign source reporting requirements to an institution's ability to receive federal financial assistance, particularly participation in programs funded under Titles IV and VI of the HEA. Allowing Competency-Based Education to Flourish Competency-based education is a promising approach that could provide a high-quality and affordable education to many students. Since the credit hour, which measures the time in the classroom, is inappropriate for such programs, the direct assessment method was introduced to allow competen- cy-based programs to participate in the federal financial aid programs. However, overregulation has hampered the usage of direct assessment, with the lead- ing competency-based university choosing to instead convert their courses into credit hours for compliance purposes. One of the leading obstacles is the requirement that courses include “regular and substantive” interaction between faculty and students. l New regulations should clarify the definition and requirements of regular and substantive interaction for competency-based education, as well as for online programs. Reforming “Area Studies” Funding l Congress should wind down so-called “area studies” programs at universities (Title VI of the HEA), which, although intended to serve American interests, sometimes fund programs that run counter to those interests. l In the meantime, the next Administration should promulgate a new regulation to require the Secretary of Education to allocate at least 40 percent of funding to international business programs that teach about free markets and economics and require institutions, faculty, and fellowship recipients to certify that they intend to further the stated statutory goals of serving American interests. — 357 — Department of Education NEW EXECUTIVE ORDERS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE Guidance Documents l The President should immediately reinstate and reissue Executive Order 13891: Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019), and Executive Order 13892: Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication (Oct. 15, 2019). These executive orders required all federal agencies to treat guidance documents as non-binding in law and practice and also forbade federal agencies from imposing new standards of conduct on persons outside the executive branch through guid- ance documents. They required all federal agencies to apply regulations and statutes instead of guidance documents in any enforcement action. President Biden revoked these executive orders on January 20, 2021, demonstrating that these executive orders effectively restrained the abuses of an expansive administrative state. l Require APA notice and comment. The President should issue an executive order requiring the Office for Civil Rights’ Case Processing Manual to go through APA (Administrative Procedures Act) notice and comment. l Protect the First Amendment. The President should issue an executive order requiring grant applications (SF-424 series) to contain assurances that the applicant will uphold the First Amendment in funded programs and work. l Minimize bachelor’s degree requirements. The President should issue an executive order stating that a college degree shall not be required for any federal job unless the requirements of the job specifically demand it. l Eliminate the “list of shame.” Educational institutions can claim a religious exemption with the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education from the strictures of Title IX. In 2016, the Obama Administration published on the Department of Education’s website a list of colleges that had applied for the exemption. This “list of shame” of faith-based colleges, as it came to be known, has since been archived on ED’s website, still publicly available. The President should issue an executive order removing the archived list and preventing such a list from being published in the future.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.