The bill
Protecting Consumers from Deceptive AI Act
HR. 8893, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
ID: F000477
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8893, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 720-722 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 35 - 0.
June 24, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 8893: Protecting Consumers from Deceptive AI Act** *Or: How to Pretend You’re Solving a Problem While Actually Just Making More Meetings*
Ah, another noble effort to “protect consumers” from the terrifying menace of… AI-generated cat videos and slightly-too-perfect LinkedIn posts. HR 8893 doesn’t ban deepfakes, doesn’t penalize liars, doesn’t even *define* “deceptive AI” with any precision. No, it does something far more American: it creates **task forces**. Because when in doubt, form a committee. Preferably one with 15 subcategories of stakeholders, all of whom hate each other and none of whom will agree on anything before the heat death of the universe.
**New Regulations?** Technically, none. The bill doesn’t impose rules—it mandates that NIST form **task forces** to *study* the possibility of someday maybe creating voluntary guidelines for watermarking, metadata, and fingerprinting AI-generated audio, video, and text. Think of it as a federal arts and crafts project for technologists, funded by your tax dollars and guided by the collective wisdom of privacy advocates, AI developers, and labor unions—groups whose idea of compromise is a passive-aggressive email chain.
**Affected Industries?** Everyone who touches digital content: social media platforms (Meta, TikTok, YouTube), AI developers (OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI), browser makers (Google, Apple, Mozilla), OS vendors, news orgs, stock photo sites, and any company dumb enough to use AI-generated interns. In short: Silicon Valley, Hollywood, and your cousin’s Etsy shop selling “AI-enhanced” tarot readings.
**Compliance Requirements?** None—yet. The task forces have **90 days to form**, **270 days to report internally**, and **one year to report to Congress** (with annual follow-ups for five years). So we’re looking at a minimum of **18 months** before anyone even *suggests* a standard—and another decade before it’s adopted, ignored, or circumvented by a teenager in Belarus using Photoshop and spite.
**Enforcement?** Laughable. There are **zero penalties**, **zero mandates**, and **zero enforcement mechanisms**. The bill relies entirely on the hope that if you ask nicely and form enough subcommittees, corporations will voluntarily watermark their AI slop out of the goodness of their hearts. Spoiler: they won’t. They’ll wait for the standard to be weak, loophole-ridden, and unenforceable—then comply just enough to slap a “Proudly AI-Assisted!” badge on their product while continuing to flood the zone with undetectable garbage.
**Economic Impact?** Minimal direct cost—just the expense of paying NIST to herd cats into task forces. But the *opportunity cost* is massive: another year of delay while real harm (fraud, disinformation, non-consensual porn, market manipulation) metastasizes. Meanwhile, the tech industry gets to pretend it’s “self-regulating” while actually doing nothing—except lobbying to ensure any eventual standard is toothless.
**Real Diagnosis?** This isn’t consumer protection. It’s **regulatory theater**—a placebo bill designed to make Congress look busy while avoiding the hard work of actual accountability. The sponsors get to wave a “Protecting Consumers!” banner at re-election time. The tech lobby gets to delay meaningful rules. And the public? We get another PowerPoint deck on watermarking standards while our democracy drowns in AI-generated sewage.
In short: HR 8893 is less a law, more a **symptom**—of a legislature that confuses activity with achievement, and prefers the illusion of control to the mess of real solutions. Prescription: Stop forming task forces. Start enforcing consequences. Or at least admit you’re just here for the photo op.
Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001219
Top Contributors
23
ID: B001292
Top Contributors
24
ID: F000466
Top Contributors
22
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 36 nodes and 39 connections
Total contributions: $39
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 5 helped.
Section 2(a)(1) establishes task forces to support the development of technical standards and guidelines for identifying content created by generative artificial intelligence, which could benefit the AI and cloud infrastructure industry by promoting standards and guidelines for AI-generated content.
Section 2(a)(1)(B) mentions online application and content providers, which includes big tech platforms, and task forces will support the development of technical standards and guidelines to assist these providers in identifying and labeling AI-generated content.
Section 2(a)(1)(A) mentions digital fingerprinting and watermarking, which are techniques used in cybersecurity, and task forces will support the development of technical standards and guidelines for these techniques.
Section 2(a)(3)(D) and (E) mention social networking service providers, online instant messaging service providers, and online search engine service providers, which are part of the telecommunications industry, and task forces will include representatives from these industries.
Section 2(a)(1)(B) mentions online platforms, which includes entertainment streaming services, and task forces will support the development of technical standards and guidelines to assist these platforms in identifying and labeling AI-generated content.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on NIST's role in technical standards and government-led coordination, particularly through task forces involving private expertise. However, it focuses on AI transparency and consumer protection rather than the specific NTIS/NTIA reforms or market access priorities outlined in the Project 2025 text."
— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on combating deceptive AI and enhancing transparency aligns with Project 2025's concern about online platforms' negative utility and threats to democratic institutions, though the bill emphasizes technical standards while Project 2025 calls for FTC sophistication in measuring consumer surplus and behavioral harms."
— 879 — Federal Trade Commission As Judge Frank Easterbrook famously suggested, regulators should look at the cost of error in their judgments. This argument has usually been used to buttress a tentative and hands off approach to antitrust because judicial error in antitrust will persist (Type II error) and continue to damage markets, while failure to take antitrust action (Type I error) will correct itself in the long run as competitors challenge monopolies.28 However, failing to take antitrust enforcement action (Type I error) includes the possibility of real injury to the structure of important American institutions such as democratic accountability and free speech. If so, a more proactive approach may be warranted. Certain online services, such as social media, have an unquestionable negative utility, particularly on young people, as set forth above. The more “efficient” pro- vision of such services may create more unhappiness. More broadly, the utility benefits of many online platforms and services are obscure and may be significantly overstated, as the most recent evidence suggests.29 The FTC must become more sophisticated in measuring consumer surplus. In addition, the FTC should be open to behavioral explanations, such as habit and small hedonic differences, as keys to how platforms create and keep market power.30 CONCLUSION Conservative approaches to antitrust and consumer protection continue to trust markets, not government, to give people what they want and provide the prosperity and material resources Americans need for flourishing, productive, and meaningful lives. At the same time, conservatives cannot be blind to certain developments in the American economy that appear to make government–private sector collusion more likely, threaten vital democratic institutions, such as free speech, and threaten the happiness and mental well-being of many Americans, particularly children. Many, but not all, conservatives believe that these develop- ments may warrant the FTC’s making a careful recalibration of certain aspects of antitrust and consumer protection law and enforcement. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Rachel Bovard, John Ehrett, Christopher Iacovella, Jessica Melugin, and Jon Schweppe deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 880 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38. 2. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 3. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. 4. The Robinson–Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13b, and 21a. 5. Ernest Gellhorn, “An Introduction to Antitrust Economics,” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1975, https:// scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol24/iss1/1 (accessed March 22, 2023). 6. Charles A. Boston, “The Spirit Behind the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 5, 1912, pp. 341–371. See especially p. 348. 7. Wiliam Howard Taft, The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1914), p. 4. 8. Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War With Itself, (Bork Publishing: 1978, 2021), p. 109. 9. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as Fundamental Causes of Long-Run Growth,” Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, No. 385-472 2005, Chapter 6, pp. 386–419. 10. Milton Friedman references his own words in his essay “A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits,” The New York Times, September 13, 1970, https://www.nytimes. com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html%20 Capitalism%20and%20Freedom (accessed March 9, 2023). 11. Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Rescinds 2015 Policy that Limited Its Enforcement Ability Under the FTC Act,” July 1, 2021, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/07/ftc-rescinds-2015-policy-limited- its-enforcement-ability-under-ftc-act (accessed March 9, 2023). 12. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 13. While not directly relevant to the constitutionality of the FTC, the Court’s grant of certiorari in Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., Ltd. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 51 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. granted sub nom. CFPB v. Com. Fin. Servs. Assn., No. 22-448, 2023 WL 2227658 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2023), could signal a major retreat from Humphrey’s Executor. 14. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight of Federal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, September 20, 2022, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-of-federal-enforcement-of- the-antitrust-laws (accessed March 9, 2023). 15. Milton Friedman, “A Friedman Doctrine.” 16. Joan Luby and Sarah Kurtz, “Increasing Suicide Rates in Early Adolescent Girls in the United States and the Equalization of Sex Disparity in Suicide: The Need to Investigate the Role of Social Media,” JAMA Network Open, Vol. 2, No. 5 (2019) https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/article-abstract/2733419 (last visited March 21, 2023); Brett Burstein, “Suicidal Attempts and Ideation Among Children and Adolescents in US Emergency Departments, 2007–2015.” JAMA Pediatrics, Vol. 173, No. 6 (2019), pp. 598–600, https://jamanetwork. com/journals/jamapediatrics/articlepdf/2730063/jamapediatrics_burstein_2019_ld_190006.pdf (last visited March 21, 2023); Katherine M. Keyes, Dahsan Gary, et al., “Recent Increases in Depressive Symptoms Among U.S. Adolescents: Trends from 1991 to 2018,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, Vol. 54, No. 8 (2019), pp. 987–99, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00127-019-01697-8 (last visited March 21, 2023); Ramin Mojtabai, Mark Olfson, and Beth Han, “National Trends in the Prevalence and Treatment of Depression in Adolescents and Young Adults,” Pediatrics, Vol. 138, No. 6 (2014), https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-abstract/138/6/ e20161878/52639/National-Trends-in-the-Prevalence-and-Treatment-of (last visited March 21, 2023); Gregory Plemmons, Matthew Hall, et. al., Hospitalization for Suicide Ideation or Attempt: 2008–2015,” Pediatrics, Vol. 141, No. 6 (2018), https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article/141/6/e20172426/37690/Hospitalization-for-Suicide- Ideation-or-Attempt (last visited March 21, 2023); Henry A. Spiller, John P. Ackerman, et al., “Sex- and Age-Specific Increases in Suicide Attempts by Self-poisoning in the United States Among Youth and Young Adults from 2000 to 2018,” Journal of Pediatrics, Vol. 210, (2019), pp. 201–208, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ pii/S002234761930277X?casa_token=jms1NxTEV10AAAAA:Ouz_vL9ElIZ58p21w_5SuwOs0OJTNJZtCakf5O3I_ NJCcXWoBm0zDvDTvm-YB0Ma5pZhiKXN (last visited March 21, 2023); Jean M. Twenge, A. Bell Cooper, Thomas E. Joiner, et al., “Age, Period, and Cohort Trends in Mood Disorder Indicators and Suicide-related Outcomes in a Nationally Representative Dataset, 2005–2017,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 128 (2019), pp. 185–199, https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fabn0000410 (last visited March 21, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on consumer protection from deceptive AI through voluntary standards for content provenance and labeling, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes declassification modernization, Big Data tools, AI/ML for classification consistency, and countering adversarial technology use—showing only tangential overlap in AI application without shared objectives."
— 224 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Enhanced metrics for accuracy of classification. l A general simplification of the overall system for the benefit of users. On the back end, an ODNI-run declassification process that is faster, nimbler, default-to-automated, and larger-scale should be a priority. Additionally, investments in IT are required to deal with the growing volumes of CNSI collected and produced in the digital age, along with many years’ worth of existing analog and digital holdings that could provide valuable historical insights. An incoming Administration needs to explore options to prioritize funding for innovation in declassification management: for example, by establishing a budget line item specifically for the modernization of declassification or designating fund- ing for program classification management as a special-interest item. The Administration will also need to transition to using technology, including tools and services for managing Big Data (which provide a robust electronic record repository, making information within and across agencies easier to organize and locate and facilitating more rapid review and release capabilities for records of emerging interest); artificial intelligence/machine learning (which, when incor- porated into existing business practices, enables machine interpretation of unstructured text and data, applies decision support technology to enable more consistent classification decisions, and expedites reviews between agencies); and expansion of Commercial Cloud services (which facilitate the rapid testing and deployment of new tools and technologies). However, technology is not a panacea; human expertise in information holdings and routine validation of the technology will always be necessary. With or with- out machine assistance, agencies will require more people and more varied skill sets to improve their ability to meet the electronic records era’s classification and declassification demands and serve an incoming Administration’s goals. Broader U.S. Government and IC Intelligence Needs. Increasingly, con- flicts among U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are conducted in the realms of technology and finance.40 This challenge requires new tools, authorities, and technological expertise across the U.S. government, par- ticularly at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is housed at the Treasury Department. An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and SCIF capacity, and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of multifaceted adversaries such as China. This would include additional work with private-sector expertise, granting clearances to niche sector experts and United States citizen commercial and financial partners as needed. — 225 — Intelligence Community Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy regulations. In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.