FAIR Credit Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/9639
Last Updated: July 22, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12]

ID: T000481

Follow the money

The bill

FAIR Credit Act

HR. 9639, 119th Congress — read as touching For-Profit Education & Student Loans.

The sponsor

Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$100,800 raised

28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 872-874 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4694-4695)

July 20, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 9639 – FAIR Credit Act: A Prescription for a Systemically Diseased Credit Reporting Industry**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The FAIR Credit Act masquerades as a benevolent intervention to “restore” credit for victims of predation, but let’s be clear: it’s an admission that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) has been comatose for decades, kept alive only by the life support of industry lobbying and consumer despair. Its stated goals—shortening negative reporting timelines, banning medical debt from credit reports, expediting removal of paid debts, and fortifying identity theft protections—are less about compassion and more about triaging a system so broken it actively harms the people it claims to serve. The real objective? Force credit bureaus to finally do the bare minimum they’ve been legally obligated to do since 1970: report accurately and fairly. Spoiler: they haven’t.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** This bill doesn’t tweak the FCRA—it puts it in intensive care. Key changes include: - **Section 103**: Flat-out bans medical debt from appearing on consumer reports. No more punishing people for getting sick in a country that treats healthcare like a luxury cruise with mandatory tipping. - **Sections 101–102**: Shortens the reporting period for most adverse information (from 7 years to, presumably, less) and mandates *immediate* removal of paid or settled debts—because apparently, proving you paid your bill shouldn’t require a notarized affidavit and a sacrifice to the credit gods. - **Sections 104–106**: Creates special credit restoration pathways for victims of predatory lending, education fraud, and economic abuse (e.g., coercive control in domestic violence situations). Finally, recognition that your credit score shouldn’t be a permanent scar from someone else’s crime. - **Title II**: Expands fraud alert protocols, mandates free credit monitoring for vulnerable consumers, strengthens security freezes, and requires bureaus to actually *share* fraud data with victims—novel concept, I know. - **Section 303**: Voids contracts deemed “not in the public interest,” a direct swipe at predatory arbitration clauses and pay-to-play credit repair schemes.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Consumers**: The supposed beneficiaries—especially low-income individuals, victims of fraud, medical debt holders, and survivors of abuse—stand to gain meaningful relief. If the bureaus comply, that is. - **Credit Reporting Agencies (Equifax, Experian, TransUnion)**: The primary targets. These entities, which have treated accuracy as optional and consumer harm as a externality, will now face enforceable duties to clean up their act—or face penalties. Expect lawsuits, lobbying blitzkriegs, and sudden “technical difficulties” in implementation. - **Lenders & Creditors**: May lose a convenient proxy for risk (i.e., punishing the poor for being poor), but gain a more accurate—if less exploitative—view of creditworthiness. Some will whine; the smart ones will adapt. - **State Attorneys General & CFPB**: Gain new enforcement tools. Finally, something to use besides strongly worded letters.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** If enacted and enforced, this bill could reduce credit-based discrimination, lower barriers to housing and employment for marginalized groups, and force the credit industry to stop profiting from consumer vulnerability. But let’s not get utopian. The bureaus have spent years gaming the system—this is less a cure and more a restraining order. Implementation will be delayed, loopholes exploited, and the CFPB likely neutered by the next administration. In short: it’s a well-intentioned bandage on a gangrenous limb. Helpful? Possibly. Transformative? Only if we stop pretending the credit bureaus are anything but for-profit surveillance firms with a public relations problem.

**Diagnosis**: Legislative placebo with occasional active ingredients. Prognosis: guarded, contingent on enforcement—and the absence of regulatory capture.

Related Topics

Healthcare & Insurance ReformGovernment Operations & AccountabilityCriminal Justice & Law Enforcement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$100,800
26 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$9,500
Committees
$0
Individuals
$91,300

No PAC contributions found

1
ANH MANAGEMENT LLC
1 transaction
$2,500
2
FALAH VENTURES LLC
1 transaction
$2,000
3
LAW OFFICE OF AFFAR BAKSH LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
4
A. ARMUSANDNEEBOM CONSULTING LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
5
NADIM ISLAM EMERGENCY SERVICES, PLLC
1 transaction
$1,000
6
KHALAF LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
7
MEHRIZI PROPERTIES LLC
1 transaction
$500
8
MR AND MOSTAK LLC
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
MAHMOUD, ANNA F.
1 transaction
$13,200
2
HAMARSHI, MAJDI
2 transactions
$11,600
3
BARAKAT, AMANI
2 transactions
$10,000
4
MALAS, MOHANNAD
1 transaction
$9,300
5
ALAUSU, SAYF
1 transaction
$4,300
6
BEARAT, LINA
1 transaction
$3,300
7
DUDUM, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
8
MUGHNI, ANJUM
1 transaction
$3,300
9
MCFADDEN, JIM
1 transaction
$3,300
10
BASHA, AHMAD
1 transaction
$3,300
11
RAHMAN, ZIAUR
1 transaction
$3,300
12
SARAFA, RANDALL
1 transaction
$3,300
13
NASR, KRISTINA
1 transaction
$3,300
14
KANDIL, MARIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
15
ALSAWAH, SAMIR
1 transaction
$3,300
16
KHALDI, AHMAD
1 transaction
$3,300
17
DUDUM, RON
1 transaction
$3,300
18
ATTIA, MAGED
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large]

ID: N000147

Top Contributors

20

1
DONOHOE, BERT
THE DONOHOE COMPANIES INC. • EVP, REAL ESTATE
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$3,300
May 2, 2024
2
OTONI, RAFAELA
HILTON CORPORATION • PRESIDENT & CEO
IndividualMC LEAN, VA
$3,300
May 3, 2024
3
REID, JACK
RAM CUSTOM SERVICES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCHESAPEAKE BEACH, MD
$3,300
May 6, 2024
4
LEWIS, JACQUELINE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Jul 10, 2023
5
LEWIS, JACQUELINE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Jul 10, 2023
6
BARRY, DAVID E. JR
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualBEALLSVILLE, MD
$2,500
May 12, 2024
7
POLASKI, MICHAEL
THE DONOHOE COMPANIES INC. • EXECUTIVE
IndividualBROADLANDS, VA
$2,500
May 13, 2024
8
GRUNLEY, KENNETH
GRUNLEY CONSTRUCTION • CEO
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$2,500
Jun 23, 2023
9
BRUCH, CHRIS
THE DONOHOE COMPANIES INC. • CEO
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$2,300
Apr 30, 2024
10
EARNEST, JAMES M.
SELF-EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$2,300
May 10, 2024

Rep. Stansbury, Melanie A. [D-NM-1]

ID: S001218

Top Contributors

70

1
PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS
OrganizationTACOMA, WA
$3,700
Jun 10, 2024
2
PUEBLO OF ISLETA
OrganizationISLETA, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
3
PUEBLO OF SANDIA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
4
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Dec 6, 2023
5
PUEBLO OF SANTA ANA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023
6
PUEBLO OF SANDIA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
7
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE
OrganizationTUCSON, AZ
$3,300
Dec 30, 2023
8
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023
9
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023
10
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRANTON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Mar 25, 2024

Rep. Carson, André [D-IN-7]

ID: C001072

Top Contributors

22

1
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 22, 2023
2
INDIANA IMPORT LLC
OrganizationFISHERS, IN
$1,000
Nov 11, 2023
3
MNAYMEH, HALA
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCORAL GABLES, FL
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
4
DE LA CRUZ, FABIO
WESTON PROPERTY MANAGEMENT • PARTNER
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
5
KHAN, AZHER M
CALDERON TEXTILES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Dec 8, 2023
6
HOGAN, ALAN P.
THE HOGAN GROUP, INC. • CONSULTANT
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Feb 22, 2023
7
JOHNSON, LACY M.
ICE MILLER • ATTORNEY
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Mar 16, 2023
8
STACK, ANN M.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Feb 22, 2023
9
ABDALLA, MIKE A.
MAGNA PROPERTIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Mar 11, 2024
10
MAMOUN, IHSAN
SDI RADIOLOGY • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEFFNER, FL
$3,300
Jan 23, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 38 nodes and 53 connections

Total contributions: $53

Top Donors - Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

8 Orgs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 5 harmed.

  • Section 105 provides credit relief for education loan borrowers who were defrauded or misled by proprietary education institutions or career education programs, directly impacting for-profit education institutions.

  • −Health Insuranceconfidence 0.80

    Section 103 prohibits the appearance of medical debt on consumer reports, which could reduce the number of individuals with poor credit scores due to medical debt, potentially decreasing the number of high-risk policyholders for health insurance companies.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.70

    Section 104 provides credit restoration for victims of predatory mortgage lending, which could impact commercial banks involved in mortgage lending.

  • Section 104 provides credit restoration for victims of predatory mortgage lending, which could impact private equity firms involved in mortgage lending.

  • Section 103 prohibits the appearance of medical debt on consumer reports, which could impact insurance companies that use credit scores to determine policy premiums.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Tlaib, Rashida [D-MI-12])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 26 contributions
    • AREKAT, NAJLA$1,500
    • ALBIBI, OSAMA$752
    • KHAN, MUSTAFA$500
    • ALI, SHADAB$500
    • MOTAN, ABDULLAH$300
  • from 36 contributions
    • OVERLUND, TIMOTHY$1,150
    • MOORE, MATTHEW$500
    • RAHMAN, MIZANUR$500
    • MAHMOOD, UMAIMA$350
    • FLORES, CARLOS$243
  • from 3 contributions
    • JOUZY, WALEED$1,250
  • from 4 contributions
    • REGO, JORDANA$265
    • MALIK, NADIA$250
    • MASON, JAMES$50

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The FAIR Credit Act strengthens consumer protections and expands the CFPB's role in enforcing fair credit reporting, which directly contradicts Project 2025's goal of abolishing the CFPB and limiting its authority. While both address financial regulation, their objectives are fundamentally opposed."

Key themes:financial regulationconsumer protectioncredit reporting

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The FAIR Credit Act focuses on consumer credit reporting reforms, identity theft protections, and medical debt removal, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses CFPB funding limits, civil penalty funds, and structural oversight—showing only tangential alignment through shared concern for CFPB accountability but divergent policy priorities."

Key themes:Consumer Financial Protection Bureaufinancial regulationconsumer protection

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 64%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The FAIR Credit Act focuses on consumer protection in credit reporting, while Project 2025's Financial Regulatory Agencies section emphasizes reforming or limiting the CFPB and other financial regulators, with no discussion of credit reporting accuracy or consumer redress. There is minimal thematic overlap beyond general financial regulation."

Key themes:Consumer Financial Protection Bureaufinancial regulationconsumer protection

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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