The bill
D.C. Taxing Authority Review Act
HR. 9720, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Rep. Comer, James [R-KY-1]
ID: C001108
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9720, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Housing and Urban Development" section, p. 545-547 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 23 - 18.
July 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9720: D.C. Taxing Authority Review Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 9720 is to increase congressional oversight over the District of Columbia’s tax and fee policies by requiring explicit congressional approval for any D.C. law that amends Title 47 of the D.C. Code (taxation and revenue) or imposes/increases any tax or fee. Ostensibly framed as a measure to ensure “fiscal responsibility” and prevent “taxation without representation” (ironically, given D.C.’s lack of voting representation in Congress), the real objective is clear: to neuter D.C.’s limited home rule authority and allow Congress—particularly its more fiscally conservative, D.C.-skeptical members—to veto local tax initiatives they dislike, regardless of local democratic process. It’s a power grab disguised as oversight, targeting a city that pays federal taxes but has no vote in the body that would now control its purse strings.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to add a new procedural hurdle: any D.C. act affecting taxation (Title 47) or imposing/increasing fees must now be approved by a joint resolution of Congress within a 60-day review period, or it does not take effect. Currently, most D.C. laws take effect automatically unless Congress passes a resolution of disapproval. This bill flips the script for tax-related measures, requiring affirmative approval. It also limits debate on such resolutions to one hour (equally split), curtailing meaningful discussion and ensuring rapid, partisan votes. A conforming amendment ensures the new rule isn’t overlooked in existing exemptions. The changes apply only to acts transmitted after enactment, avoiding retroactive chaos—but making clear this is about future control.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **D.C. Government**: Loses autonomy over its own tax and fee policy, subjecting local fiscal decisions to congressional whims. - **D.C. Residents**: Face potential taxation without meaningful local representation, as their elected officials’ tax decisions can be overruled by legislators they didn’t elect. - **Congress (especially House Oversight & Rules Committees)**: Gains expanded veto power over D.C. finances, a power they’ve long lusted after. - **Lobbyists & Special Interests**: Gain a new, more accessible chokepoint—targeting a few dozen congressional votes is easier than influencing a whole local council and mayor. - **Federal Taxpayers**: Indirectly affected, as D.C.’s ability to fund services via local taxes could be hampered, potentially increasing reliance on federal aid.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill would significantly undermine D.C.’s home rule, turning its tax policy into a partisan football in Congress. Expect gridlock, delays, and the killing of popular local measures (e.g., soda taxes, fees on luxury goods, or congestion pricing) not because they’re bad policy, but because they offend ideological sensibilities of lawmakers from Wyoming or Alabama. It incentivizes D.C. to avoid bold local revenue solutions, potentially worsening service gaps or increasing dependence on federal bailouts. Legally, it raises serious questions about the erosion of delegated authority and the constitutionality of taxation without effective representation—though, given Congress’s plenary power over D.C. under the Constitution, it’s likely to survive judicial scrutiny. Ultimately, it’s less about fiscal oversight and more about asserting dominance: a reminder that, in the eyes of many in Congress, D.C. residents are still second-class citizens whose self-governance exists only at the sufferance of those who refuse them a vote. A legislative leech, masquerading as a watchdog.
Rep. Comer, James [R-KY-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 54 nodes and 53 connections
Total contributions: $53
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(a) may also impact big tech platforms operating in the District of Columbia, as changes to title 47 could affect their business operations, although the connection is less direct than for telecommunications.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill concerns congressional oversight of D.C. tax and fee policies, while the Project 2025 excerpt focuses on HUD administrative reforms, program efficiency, and leadership appointments. There is no substantive thematic or policy overlap between the two."
— 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from — 514 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise their homes, businesses, or farms as a direct result of acquisition, rehabilitation, or demolition for a Federally- funded program or project.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD Exchange, “49 CFR Part 24–URA Regulations,” published February 2005, https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/804/ura-and- real-property-acquisition-policies-act-49-cfr-part-24/ (accessed March 4, 2023). HUD is one of the 18 federal departments and agencies that “are subject to the Uniform Act.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs,” Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 243 (December 18, 2019), pp. 69466–69521, esp. p. 69484, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-12-18/pdf/2019-25558.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 14. H.R. 3219, Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-330, 104th Congress, October 26, 1996, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ330/PLAW-104publ330.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 6-1. The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner–Steagall Act) established the origins of locally chartered housing agencies that administer federal funding for various rental assistance programs—a quintessentially progressive New Deal–era policy that expanded the administrative state’s powers to the housing market—with the primary legislative intent of eradicating slum housing in urban areas, boosting jobs, and providing housing for the working poor. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). A decade later, the Housing Act of 1949 codified federal standards for housing livability—a rationale that HUD and federal legislators have continued to use to justify federal intervention in housing—establishing as a national policy objective the provision of a minimum standard of housing quality for all Americans. This legislation also statutorily established many of the rural housing programs that are administered at USDA and expanded programs facilitating the removal of slum housing in urban areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, pp. 1-2 and 2-2. 17. The National Housing Act of 1934 established the FHA and the statutory authority for the secondary market. The main stated premise was to stimulate jobs and facilitate the housing and construction sector during the Great Depression. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12 (accessed March 4, 2023). 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29 (accessed March 4, 2023). 20. HUD’s Departmental Enforcement Center (DEC) is led by a Director. It was established in 1998 as part of a broader effort to streamline and consolidate functions at HUD and was later merged with the Office of General Counsel. The DEC “is comprised of the Office of the Director, the Compliance Division, the Operations Division and five Satellite Offices” and describes its mission as “assuring the highest standards of ethics, management and accountability in the resolution of HUD's troubled properties.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Departmental Enforcement Center, “Program Offices: Departmental Enforcement Center,” https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/enforcement (accessed March 4, 2023). 21. H.R. 5334, Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-1017, 102nd Congress, October 28, 1992, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/102/statute/STATUTE-106/STATUTE-106-Pg3672.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 22. H.R. 8588, Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-452, 95th Congress, October 12, 1978, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1101.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 23. Guiding questions: What immediate administrative reforms of HUD and its programs can be made with high probability of success? What short-term legislative reforms can be proposed that, in tandem with administrative reforms, would achieve the HUD vision/mission objective? What HUD offices should be eliminated and/or realigned to reduce any redundancy that may persist in programmatic functions? 24. Wholly aside from reforms that would require legislation, the next Administration must ensure that key political appointees are able to acquit themselves as change agents to execute administrative reforms. Otherwise, whether because of a sheer lack of skill and expertise or simply a lack of will and philosophical alignment with reforms, staff may frustrate the efforts of committed political appointee staff and leadership to execute substantive administrative reforms. To achieve the policy and regulatory reforms outlined in this chapter, political appointees must be carefully placed in positions that reflect not only technical, market/ industry, and operational expertise, but also a shared will and commitment.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on congressional oversight of D.C. tax and fee policies, while the Project 2025 excerpt pertains to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's civil penalty fund and financial regulatory agency structure. There is no thematic or policy overlap between the two."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on congressional oversight of D.C. tax authority, while the Project 2025 excerpt addresses financial regulatory agencies like the SEC, CFPB, and CFTC, with no substantive connection between D.C. Home Rule reform and federal financial regulation policy."
— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Tax Court Improvement Act
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Internal Revenue Service relating to "Interim Guidance Simplifying Application of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax to Partnerships".
Fair and Accountable IRS Reviews Act