RED TAPE Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/148
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

ID: E000295

Follow the money

The bill

RED TAPE Act

S. 148, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.

The sponsor

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$383,500 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 859-862 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.

November 18, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Senator Ernst and her trusty sidekick, Mr. Lankford. The RED TAPE Act, a bill so cleverly named it's almost as if they're trying to distract us from its actual purpose.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to restrict regulatory agencies from considering "non-monetized or unqualified factors" in their decision-making processes. In simpler terms, they want to ensure that only tangible, immediately quantifiable monetary benefits are taken into account when evaluating the impact of regulations. Because, you know, the value of human life, environmental sustainability, and social welfare can be easily reduced to a dollar figure.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Chapter 6 of title 5, United States Code, by adding a new section (Sec. 613) that prohibits agencies from considering non-monetized or unqualified factors in regulatory impact analyses and benefit-cost analyses. It also requires agencies to publish summaries and texts of these analyses, along with their methodologies and decision-making processes. Oh, and let's not forget the pièce de résistance: a judicial review process that allows parties affected by regulations to challenge them in court if they suspect non-monetized factors were considered.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: regulatory agencies, industries, corporations, and special interest groups. But don't worry, the bill's sponsors are looking out for the little guy – as long as that little guy is a shareholder or a CEO.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a dream come true for corporate lobbyists and a nightmare for anyone who cares about public health, safety, and environmental protection. By restricting regulatory agencies' ability to consider non-monetized factors, the RED TAPE Act effectively ties their hands behind their backs. It's like asking a doctor to diagnose a patient without considering symptoms that can't be measured in dollars and cents.

In reality, this bill is not about reducing red tape or promoting transparency; it's about giving corporations more power to influence regulatory decisions and further enrich themselves at the expense of the public good. The sponsors of this bill are either willfully ignorant or deliberately deceitful – take your pick.

As I always say, "Everyone lies." In this case, the lie is that this bill is designed to promote efficiency and accountability in regulatory decision-making. Don't be fooled; it's just another example of legislative malpractice, where politicians prioritize corporate interests over the well-being of their constituents.

Related Topics

Water & Air Quality RegulationsFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$383,500
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$375,800

No PAC contributions found

1
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
2 transactions
$6,700
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
ABEL, ANDREA MS.
1 transaction
$50,000
2
MCINERNEY, THOMAS E. MR.
1 transaction
$50,000
3
NICOLLS, BOB MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
4
GRAY, C. BOYDEN
1 transaction
$25,000
5
CATSIMATIDIS, JOHN A. MR.
1 transaction
$25,000
6
KOTICK, ROBERT MR.
1 transaction
$16,600
7
VINCZE, CHRISTOPHER
1 transaction
$15,800
8
FRANCE, BRIAN Z. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
9
BAKER, BERNARD J. MR. III
1 transaction
$15,000
10
HEGYI, ALBERT P. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
11
DAVISON, JAMES E. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
12
BROIN, JEFF MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
13
SHERRILL, STEPHEN C. MR.
1 transaction
$15,000
14
GLEESON, JOHN W. MR.
1 transaction
$12,500
15
RAY-GLEESON, KAREN S. MRS.
1 transaction
$12,500
16
POPOLO, JOE
1 transaction
$11,800
17
PFAUTCH, ROY MR.
1 transaction
$11,600
18
GOLDMAN, MARC STANLEY
1 transaction
$10,000
19
SCHLOEMER, JAMES H. MR.
1 transaction
$10,000
20
SABIN, ANDREW MR.
1 transaction
$10,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Lankford, James [R-OK]

ID: L000575

Top Contributors

22

1
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION
OrganizationOKMULGEE, OK
$1,000
Oct 29, 2024
2
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
OrganizationRICHMOND, VA
$1,000
Aug 4, 2023
3
SAMPLES, RYAN
SAMPLES GROUP • MANAGEMENT
IndividualOKLAHOMA CITY, OK
$6,600
Aug 30, 2023
4
KAY, ALISON
KIDS CAPITAL • HEDGE FUND MANAGER
IndividualBEVERLY HILLS, CA
$6,600
Jun 20, 2023
5
KANADY, CHRISTIAN
ECHO INVESTMENT CAPITAL, LLC • CEO
IndividualNICHOLS HILLS, OK
$6,600
Jun 10, 2024
6
MANDELBLATT, DANIELLE
RETIRED
IndividualASPEN, CO
$6,600
Jul 31, 2024
7
MANDELBLATT, ERIC
SOROBAN CAPITAL PARTNERS LP • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualASPEN, CO
$6,600
Jul 31, 2024
8
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024
9
ROWAN, MARC J.
APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT • CEO
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024
10
ARMSTRONG, SINCLAIR WALKER JR.
ARMSTRONG BANK • CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
IndividualVIAN, OK
$6,600
Aug 30, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 42 nodes and 39 connections

Total contributions: $39

Top Donors - Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 6 helped.

  • +Oil & Gasconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(2) adds a provision to prohibit the use of non-monetized or unqualified factors for regulatory analyses, which could lead to reduced regulatory burdens on the oil and gas industry, as seen in Sec. 613(a) 'Agency Prohibition'

  • +Coal Miningconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(2) adds a provision to prohibit the use of non-monetized or unqualified factors for regulatory analyses, which could lead to reduced regulatory burdens on the coal mining industry, as seen in Sec. 613(a) 'Agency Prohibition'

  • +Electric Utilitiesconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(2) adds a provision to prohibit the use of non-monetized or unqualified factors for regulatory analyses, which could lead to reduced regulatory burdens on the electric utilities industry, as seen in Sec. 613(a) 'Agency Prohibition'

  • Section 3(a)(2) adds a provision to prohibit the use of non-monetized or unqualified factors for regulatory analyses, which could lead to reduced regulatory burdens on the energy infrastructure industry, as seen in Sec. 613(a) 'Agency Prohibition'

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.60

    Section 3(d) requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to issue revised guidance to agencies, which could lead to more predictable regulatory environments for commercial banks, as seen in the discussion of regulatory impact analyses

  • Section 3(d) requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to issue revised guidance to agencies, which could lead to more predictable regulatory environments for private equity and hedge funds, as seen in the discussion of regulatory impact analyses

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 6 contributions
    • ROWAN, MARC J. MR.$9,900
    • FRIEDMAN, SCOTT$2,500
    • ALHADI, AYAD$2,000
    • KIRBY, ANDREW$1,000
    • NOVA, RIA$500
  • from 22 contributions
    • ROHRBAUGH, TROY$3,300
    • DIMON, JAMIE$3,300
    • LOPATA, BENJAMIN$2,000
    • BEER, ALLISON$1,000
    • MESACK, MICHELLE$500
  • from 6 contributions
    • JOHNSON, ERNESTO$194
    • MITCHELL, STEPHEN$130

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Very Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 859-862AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The RED TAPE Act’s prohibition on agencies considering non‑monetized or unquantified factors directly implements Project 2025’s goal of limiting regulatory agencies to quantifiable economic impacts and opposing considerations such as climate, diversity, or ESG that are viewed as impediments to capital formation."

Key themes:regulatory impact analysismonetized benefits onlyopposition to non‑economic factors (ESG/climate)transparency in agency analysisreducing regulatory burden

— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The RED TAPE Act’s focus on requiring monetized cost‑benefit analysis, limiting agency consideration of non‑quantified factors, and increasing OMB oversight aligns closely with Project 2025’s goal of streamlining financial regulatory agencies, reducing unnecessary burdens, and promoting transparent, quantifiable decision‑making."

Key themes:regulatory impact analysiscost‑benefit analysisOMB guidancetransparencyreducing regulatory burden

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The RED TAPE Act’s focus on prohibiting non‑monetized factors in regulatory analyses, mandating transparency, and increasing accountability aligns closely with Project 2025’s goal of reining in financial regulatory agencies through stricter cost‑benefit scrutiny and oversight."

Key themes:regulatory transparencycost-benefit analysislimiting non-monetized factorsagency accountabilityfinancial regulatory reform

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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