Secure Space Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
ID: F000463
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
April 13, 2026
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
📍 Current Status
Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt denizens of Congress. The Secure Space Act of 2025, a bill so breathtakingly stupid, it's a wonder the sponsors didn't trip over their own feet on the way to the podium.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The ostensible purpose of this farce is to "secure" the US satellite industry by prohibiting the FCC from granting licenses or market access to entities that produce or provide certain communications equipment or services. Because, you know, national security and all that jazz. In reality, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to protect the interests of domestic telecom companies and their lobbyists.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 by adding a new section (SEC. 10) that prohibits the FCC from granting licenses or market access to entities that produce or provide covered communications equipment or services, or their affiliates. It also defines terms like "affiliate," "blanket-licensed earth station," and "gateway station" – because who doesn't love a good game of bureaucratic jargon? The changes are designed to limit competition and create a cozy little monopoly for favored companies.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: telecom companies, satellite operators, and their respective lobbyists. Oh, and let's not forget the poor, benighted voters who will be told this bill is "good for national security" and "protects American jobs." Meanwhile, the real beneficiaries will be the corporations that get to reap the rewards of reduced competition and increased profits.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the hallmarks of a classic case of regulatory capture. By limiting competition and creating barriers to entry, it will stifle innovation, drive up costs, and ultimately harm consumers. But hey, who needs competition or innovation when you can have a nice, plump monopoly? The potential impact is a further entrenchment of the telecom oligopoly, with all the attendant consequences for prices, service quality, and technological progress.
In conclusion, the Secure Space Act of 2025 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a bill that serves no purpose other than to line the pockets of special interests and perpetuate the myth that Congress is actually doing something useful. Bravo, lawmakers! You've managed to create a bill that's both pointless and pernicious. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do – like watching paint dry or waiting for the inevitable collapse of this farcical system.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Luján, Ben Ray [D-NM]
ID: L000570
Top Contributors
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No contribution data available
Donor Network - Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 27 connections
Total contributions: $144,300
Top Donors - Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
- −Telecommunications confidence 0.90
Section 2(b) prohibits FCC from granting licenses or market access for satellite systems or earth station authorizations if held/controlled by entities producing covered communications equipment or services or their affiliates, directly restricting telecom companies' ability to operate satellite-based services.
- −Big Tech Platforms confidence 0.80
Same provision affects large tech platforms (e.g., Amazon's Project Kuiper, SpaceX's Starlink) that produce or provide satellite communications equipment/services, blocking their market access if deemed affiliates of covered equipment producers.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]) received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HARMS
- Telecommunications$30,900from 10contributions
- ERGEN, CHARLES$16,500
- ERGEN, CANTEY$9,900
- BREAUX, JEFF$1,000
- LANGNER, COLLEEN$1,000
- DONILAN, BROOKE$1,000
- Big Tech Platforms$10,382from 6contributions
- WALKER, KENT$6,600
- KAPLAN, JOEL$2,082
- ROSSI, NICHOLAS$1,700
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The Secure Space Act of 2025 aligns with Project 2025's objective to advance America's space leadership by enhancing national security in the satellite communications sector, and its focus on regulatory actions by the FCC also resonates with the policy's emphasis on holding government accountable and eliminating outdated regulations. The bill's provisions on expediting reviews and approvals for satellite systems indirectly support the goal of promoting space technology advancements."
— 855 — Federal Communications Commission so a new Administration should redouble efforts to require timely reviews and final actions by agencies with jurisdiction over federal lands, including the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. l Advance America’s space leadership. One of the most significant technological developments of the past few years has been the emergence of a new generation of low-earth orbit satellites like StarLink and Kuiper. This technology can beam a reliable, high-speed Internet signal to nearly any part of the globe at a fraction of the cost of other technologies. This has the potential to significantly accelerate efforts to end the digital divide and disrupt the federal regulatory and subsidy regime that applies to communications networks. The FCC should expedite its work to support this new technology by acting more quickly in its review and approval of applications to launch new satellites. Otherwise, the U.S. risks ceding space leadership to entities based in countries with more friendly regulatory environments. Holding Government Accountable. Federal technology and telecommunica- tions programs have been plagued by a troubling lack of accountability and good governance. They would benefit from stronger oversight and a fresh look at elim- inating outdated regulations that are doing more harm than good. l End wasteful broadband spending policies. Many of the broadband spending policies being pursued by the current Administration are poised to waste taxpayer money while leaving rural communities and unconnected Americans behind. At the same time, the dramatic recent increases in funding through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act mean that the federal government has more than enough resources to meet its broadband connectivity goals. Congress should therefore hold the agencies accountable so that taxpayer money is used effectively to promote broadband connectivity across the nation. To that end, the next Administration should instruct the various departments and agencies that are administering broadband infrastructure funds to direct those resources to communities without adequate Internet infrastructure instead of to places that already enjoy broadband connectivity. Take, for example, the final rules that the Treasury Department adopted in 2022 that govern the expenditure of $350 billion in ARPA funds. Rather than directing those dollars to the rural and other communities that have no Internet infrastructure, the current
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The Secure Space Act of 2025 aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective to advance America's space leadership by enhancing national security and regulating satellite communications, which is a key aspect of promoting broadband connectivity and ending the digital divide. The bill's focus on securing US satellite systems and preventing unauthorized access supports the broader goal of ensuring reliable and secure communication networks."
— 855 — Federal Communications Commission so a new Administration should redouble efforts to require timely reviews and final actions by agencies with jurisdiction over federal lands, including the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. l Advance America’s space leadership. One of the most significant technological developments of the past few years has been the emergence of a new generation of low-earth orbit satellites like StarLink and Kuiper. This technology can beam a reliable, high-speed Internet signal to nearly any part of the globe at a fraction of the cost of other technologies. This has the potential to significantly accelerate efforts to end the digital divide and disrupt the federal regulatory and subsidy regime that applies to communications networks. The FCC should expedite its work to support this new technology by acting more quickly in its review and approval of applications to launch new satellites. Otherwise, the U.S. risks ceding space leadership to entities based in countries with more friendly regulatory environments. Holding Government Accountable. Federal technology and telecommunica- tions programs have been plagued by a troubling lack of accountability and good governance. They would benefit from stronger oversight and a fresh look at elim- inating outdated regulations that are doing more harm than good. l End wasteful broadband spending policies. Many of the broadband spending policies being pursued by the current Administration are poised to waste taxpayer money while leaving rural communities and unconnected Americans behind. At the same time, the dramatic recent increases in funding through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act mean that the federal government has more than enough resources to meet its broadband connectivity goals. Congress should therefore hold the agencies accountable so that taxpayer money is used effectively to promote broadband connectivity across the nation. To that end, the next Administration should instruct the various departments and agencies that are administering broadband infrastructure funds to direct those resources to communities without adequate Internet infrastructure instead of to places that already enjoy broadband connectivity. Take, for example, the final rules that the Treasury Department adopted in 2022 that govern the expenditure of $350 billion in ARPA funds. Rather than directing those dollars to the rural and other communities that have no Internet infrastructure, the current — 856 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Administration gave the green light for recipients to spend those funds to overbuild existing high-speed networks in communities that already have multiple broadband providers. A new Administration should eliminate government-funded overbuilding of existing networks. l Adopt a national coordinating strategy. Hundreds of billions of infrastructure dollars have been appropriated by Congress or budgeted by agencies over the past couple of years that can be used to end the digital divide. Yet, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by a national strategy”; instead, “[f]ederal broadband efforts are fragmented and overlapping, with more than 100 programs administered by 15 agencies,” risking overbuilding as well as wasteful duplication.26 Many of these programs remain plagued by inefficiency, further contributing to waste of limited taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the federal government is failing to put appropriate guardrails in place to govern the expenditure of billions in broadband funds. This is the regulatory equivalent of turning the spigot on full blast and then walking away from the hose. There is a worrisome lack of adequate tracking, measurement, and accountability standards governing all of this broadband spending. As a result, we are likely to see headline levels of waste, fraud, and abuse. A new Administration needs to bring fresh oversight to this spending and put a national strategy in place to ensure that the federal government adopts a coordinated approach to its various broadband initiatives. Similarly, the next Administration should ask the FCC to launch a review of its existing broadband programs, including the different components of the USF, with the goal of avoiding duplication, improving efficiency of existing programs, and saving taxpayer money. l Correct the FCC’s regulatory trajectory and encourage competition to improve connectivity. The FCC is a New Deal–era agency. Its history of regulation tends to reflect the view that the federal government should impose heavy-handed regulation rather than relying on competition and market forces to produce optimal outcomes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended that Congress create the FCC in February 1934 for the purposes of establishing “a single Government agency charged with broad authority” over the field of communications.27 Congress subsequently established the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934. Congress has passed a number of additional statutes—some broad, some
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The Secure Space Act of 2025 aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective of protecting America's national security by limiting the involvement of entities that pose a risk, such as those tied to the Chinese Communist Party, in the US telecommunications industry. The bill's provisions to prohibit licenses or market access to certain entities and the policy's goal to address national security threats posed by the CCP show significant overlap."
— 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national — 851 — Federal Communications Commission security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During that time, the FCC eliminated federal subsidies for telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE, thereby greatly reducing the chances of that equipment finding a way into our nation’s communications networks. The FCC also stood up a program to rip and replace insecure network gear to ensure that it did not remain a threat lurking inside our systems. The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. There are, however, additional strong actions that the FCC can and should take to address the CCP’s malign campaign. Specifically: l Address TikTok’s threat to U.S. national security. As law enforcement officials have made clear, TikTok poses a serious and unacceptable risk to America’s national security.22 It also provides Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans. As of this writing, the Biden Administration’s Treasury Department has not announced a final decision concerning its long-pending review of TikTok. If that inaction persists, or if the Administration allows TikTok to continue to operate in the U.S., a new Administration should ban the application on national security grounds. l Expand the FCC’s Covered List. The FCC maintains a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. It is known as the Covered List.23 Huawei is one of the companies on the Covered List, and its inclusion means that the FCC will no longer review or approve new applications from Huawei. Without FCC approval, new Huawei gear cannot be lawfully sold or used in the U.S. However, the FCC must do a better job of ensuring that its Covered List stays up to date and accounts for changes in corporate names and forms. Therefore, a new Administration should create a more regular and timely process for reviewing entities with ties to the CCP’s surveillance state. l End the unregulated end run. As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. in a manner that would require an FCC license or authorization because of the national security risks that those entities pose. However, many of these same entities are still operating in the U.S. and offering services very similar to the ones that they are prohibited from providing. China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or “unregulated” basis. A new Administration should work with the FCC to close this loophole. One way to do so would be for the FCC to prohibit any regulated carrier from interconnecting with an insecure provider.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.