The bill
End the Fed’s Big Bank Bailout Act
S. 2113, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
ID: P000603
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2113, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "24" section, p. 767-769 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hearings held.
December 10, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant piece of legislative theater, courtesy of Senator Paul and his merry band of populist poseurs. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's title, "End the Fed's Big Bank Bailout Act," is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. In reality, it's a half-hearted attempt to address the issue of banks earning interest on their reserve balances at the Federal Reserve. But don't worry, folks, this isn't about actually ending bailouts or promoting meaningful reform; it's just a shallow PR stunt designed to appease the senator's libertarian base.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill proposes to amend Section 19(b) of the Federal Reserve Act by prohibiting earnings on balances maintained at a Federal Reserve bank by depository institutions. Wow, what a bold move! Except, of course, this change would have negligible impact on the overall banking system and wouldn't even begin to address the root causes of bailouts.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved here: big banks, community banks, and the Federal Reserve itself. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the ones who actually benefit from this bill: Senator Paul's campaign donors, including the libertarian PACs and special interest groups that have been bankrolling his crusade against the Fed.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "treat the symptom, ignore the disease." By focusing on a minor aspect of banking regulation, Senator Paul and his co-sponsors are distracting from more pressing issues, like the systemic risks posed by too-big-to-fail banks or the revolving door between Wall Street and Washington. Meanwhile, the real beneficiaries – the big banks and their lobbyists – will continue to reap the rewards of their cozy relationships with lawmakers.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Potemkin Village Syndrome" – all show, no substance. The patient's symptoms of populist outrage are directly related to their $200K infection from libertarian PACs and special interest groups. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong regimen of campaign finance reform and actual policy changes that address the root causes of bailouts.
In short, this bill is a joke – a transparent attempt to score cheap political points while ignoring the real problems plaguing our financial system. But hey, at least it's good for a laugh... or a cry, depending on your perspective.
Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S000033
Top Contributors
20
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 46 nodes and 47 connections
Total contributions: $47
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2 amends the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit earnings on balances maintained at a Federal Reserve bank by or on behalf of a depository institution, directly affecting commercial banks' interest income on reserves.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's prohibition on the Federal Reserve paying interest on depository institution reserves directly implements the Project 2025 policy objective to 'stop paying interest on excess reserves,' aiming to end the perceived subsidy to banks and encourage lending."
— 734 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to influence monetary policy.12 Since then, these assets have exploded, and the Federal Reserve now owns nearly $9 trillion of mainly federal debt ($5.5 trillion)13 and mortgage-backed securities ($2.6 trillion).14 There is currently no government oversight of the types of assets that the Federal Reserve purchases. These purchases have two main effects: They encourage federal deficits and support politically favored markets, which include housing and even corporate debt. Over half of COVID-era deficits were monetized in this way by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasuries, and housing costs were driven to historic highs by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage securities. Together, this policy subsidizes government debt, starving business borrowing, while rewarding those who buy homes and certain corporations at the expense of the wider public. Federal Reserve balance sheet purchases should be limited by Congress, and the Federal Reserve’s existing balance sheet should be wound down as quickly as is prudent to levels similar to what existed historically before the 2008 global financial crisis.15 l Limit future balance sheet expansions to U.S. Treasuries. The Federal Reserve should be prohibited from picking winners and losers among asset classes. Above all, this means limiting Federal Reserve interventions in the mortgage-backed securities market. It also means eliminating Fed interventions in corporate and municipal debt markets. Restricting the Fed’s open market operations to Treasuries has strong economic support. The goal of monetary policy is to provide markets with needed liquidity without inducing resource misallocations caused by interfering with relative prices, including rates of return to securities. However, Fed intervention in longer-term government debt, mortgage- backed securities, and corporate and municipal debt can distort the pricing process. This more closely resembles credit allocation than liquidity provision. The Fed’s mortgage-related activities are a paradigmatic case of what monetary policy should not do. Consider the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. Between February 2020 and August 2022, home prices increased 42 percent.16 Residential property prices in the United States adjusted for inflation are now 5.8 percent above the prior all-time record levels of 2006.17 The home-price-to-median-income ratio is now 7.68, far — 735 — Federal Reserve above the prior record high of 7.0 set in 2005.18 The mortgage-payment-to- income ratio hit 43.3 percent in August 2022—breaking the highs of the prior housing bubble in 2008.19 Mortgage payment on a median-priced home (with a 20 percent down payment) jumped to $2,408 in the autumn of 2022 vs. $1,404 just one year earlier as home prices continued to rise even as mortgage rates more than doubled. Renters have not been spared: Median apartment rental costs have jumped more than 24 percent since the start of 2021.20 Numerous cities experienced rent increases well in excess of 30 percent. A primary driver of higher costs during the past three years has been the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Since March 2020, the Federal Reserve has driven down mortgage interest rates and fueled a rise in housing costs by purchasing $1.3 trillion of MBSs from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The $2.7 trillion now owned by the Federal Reserve is nearly double the levels of March 2020. The flood of capital from the Federal Reserve into MBSs increased the amount of capital available for real estate purchases while lower interest rates on mortgage borrowing—driven down in part by the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases— induced and enabled borrowers to take on even larger loans.21 The Federal Reserve should be precluded from any future purchases of MBSs and should wind down its holdings either by selling off the assets or by allowing them to mature without replacement. l Stop paying interest on excess reserves. Under this policy, also started during the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve effectively prints money and then “borrows” it back from banks rather than those banks’ lending money to the public. This amounts to a transfer to Wall Street at the expense of the American public and has driven such excess reserves to $3.1 trillion, up seventyfold since 2007.22 The Federal Reserve should immediately end this practice and either sell off its balance sheet or simply stop paying interest so that banks instead lend the money. Congress should bring back the pre-2008 system, founded on open-market operations. This minimizes the Fed’s power to engage in preferential credit allocation. MONETARY RULE REFORM OPTIONS While the above recommendations would reduce Federal Reserve manipulation and subsidies, none would limit the inflationary and recessionary cycles caused by the Federal Reserve. For that, major reform of the Federal Reserve’s core activity of manipulating interest rates and money would be needed. A core problem with government control of monetary policy is its exposure to two unavoidable political pressures: pressure to print money to subsidize
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly prohibits the Fed from paying interest on depository institutions' reserve balances, which matches the Project 2025 objective to stop paying interest on excess reserves and end the alleged bailout to banks."
— 735 — Federal Reserve above the prior record high of 7.0 set in 2005.18 The mortgage-payment-to- income ratio hit 43.3 percent in August 2022—breaking the highs of the prior housing bubble in 2008.19 Mortgage payment on a median-priced home (with a 20 percent down payment) jumped to $2,408 in the autumn of 2022 vs. $1,404 just one year earlier as home prices continued to rise even as mortgage rates more than doubled. Renters have not been spared: Median apartment rental costs have jumped more than 24 percent since the start of 2021.20 Numerous cities experienced rent increases well in excess of 30 percent. A primary driver of higher costs during the past three years has been the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Since March 2020, the Federal Reserve has driven down mortgage interest rates and fueled a rise in housing costs by purchasing $1.3 trillion of MBSs from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The $2.7 trillion now owned by the Federal Reserve is nearly double the levels of March 2020. The flood of capital from the Federal Reserve into MBSs increased the amount of capital available for real estate purchases while lower interest rates on mortgage borrowing—driven down in part by the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases— induced and enabled borrowers to take on even larger loans.21 The Federal Reserve should be precluded from any future purchases of MBSs and should wind down its holdings either by selling off the assets or by allowing them to mature without replacement. l Stop paying interest on excess reserves. Under this policy, also started during the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve effectively prints money and then “borrows” it back from banks rather than those banks’ lending money to the public. This amounts to a transfer to Wall Street at the expense of the American public and has driven such excess reserves to $3.1 trillion, up seventyfold since 2007.22 The Federal Reserve should immediately end this practice and either sell off its balance sheet or simply stop paying interest so that banks instead lend the money. Congress should bring back the pre-2008 system, founded on open-market operations. This minimizes the Fed’s power to engage in preferential credit allocation. MONETARY RULE REFORM OPTIONS While the above recommendations would reduce Federal Reserve manipulation and subsidies, none would limit the inflationary and recessionary cycles caused by the Federal Reserve. For that, major reform of the Federal Reserve’s core activity of manipulating interest rates and money would be needed. A core problem with government control of monetary policy is its exposure to two unavoidable political pressures: pressure to print money to subsidize — 736 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise government deficits and pressure to print money to boost the economy artificially until the next election. Because both will always exist with self-interested politi- cians, the only permanent remedy is to take the monetary steering wheel out of the Federal Reserve’s hands and return it to the people. This could be done by abolishing the federal role in money altogether, allowing the use of commodity money, or embracing a strict monetary-policy rule to ward off political meddling. Of course, neither free banking nor a allowing commodi- ty-backed money is currently being discussed, so we have formulated a menu of reforms. Each option involves trade-offs between how effectively it restrains the Federal Reserve and how difficult each policy would be to implement, both polit- ically for Congress and economically in terms of disruption to existing financial institutions. We present these options in decreasing order of effectiveness against inflation and boom-and-bust recessionary cycles. Free Banking. In free banking, neither interest rates nor the supply of money is controlled by the government. The Federal Reserve is effectively abolished, and the Department of the Treasury largely limits itself to handling the government’s money. Regions of the U.S. actually had a similar system, known as the “Suffolk System,” from 1824 until the 1850s, and it minimized both inflation and economic disruption while allowing lending to flourish.23 Under free banking, banks typically issue liabilities (for example, checking accounts) denominated in dollars and backed by a valuable commodity. In the 19th century, this backing was commonly gold coins: Each dollar, for example, was defined as about 1/20 of an ounce of gold, redeemable on demand at the issuing bank. Today, we might expect most banks to back with gold, although some might prefer to back their notes with another currency or even by equities or other assets such as real estate. Competition would determine the right mix of assets in banks’ portfolios as backing for their liabilities. As in the Suffolk System, competition keeps banks from overprinting or lending irresponsibly. This is because any bank that issues more paper than it has assets available would be subject to competitor banks’ presenting its notes for redemp- tion. In the extreme, an overissuing bank could be liable to a bank run. Reckless banks’ competitors have good incentives to police risk closely lest their own hold- ings of competitor dollars become worthless.24 In this way, free banking leads to stable and sound currencies and strong finan- cial systems because customers will avoid the riskier issuers, driving them out of the market. As a result of this stability and lack of inflation inherent in fully backed currencies, free banking could dramatically strengthen and increase both the dominant role of America’s financial industry and the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of choice.25 In fact, under free banking, the norm is for the dollar’s purchasing power to rise gently over time, reflecting gains in economic productivity. This “supply-side deflation” does not cause economic busts. In fact,
AI Analysis:
"The bill targets a specific Federal Reserve practice—paying interest on reserves—that Project 2025 identifies as part of the Fed's expanded discretionary powers and bailout‑like subsidies to big banks. Both seek to curb the Fed's ability to provide financial advantages to private institutions and to promote a more limited, stable‑money focused central bank."
— 731 — 24 FEDERAL RESERVE Paul Winfree Money is the essential unit of measure for the voluntary exchanges that constitute the market economy. Stable money allows people to work freely, helps businesses grow, facilitates investment, supports saving for retirement, and ultimately provides for economic growth. The federal govern- ment has long made policy regarding the nation’s money on behalf of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.1 Over time, however, Congress has delegated that responsibility first to the Department of the Treasury and now to the quasi-public Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve was created by Congress in 1913 when most Americans lived in rural areas and the largest industry was agriculture. The impetus was a series of financial crises caused both by irresponsible banks and other financial institutions that overextended credit and by poor regulations. The architects of the Federal Reserve believed that a quasi-public clearinghouse acting as lender of last resort would reduce financial instability and end severe recessions. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s was needlessly prolonged in part because of the Federal Reserve’s inept manage- ment of the money supply. More recessions followed in the post–World War II years. In the decades since the Federal Reserve was created, there has been a down- turn roughly every five years. This monetary dysfunction is related in part to the impossibility of fine-tuning the money supply in real time, as well as to the moral hazard inherent in a political system that has demonstrated a history of bailing out private firms when they engage in excess speculation. Public control of money creation through the Federal Reserve System has another major problem: Government can abuse this authority for its own advantage — 732 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise by printing money to finance its operations. This necessitated the original Federal Reserve’s decentralization and political independence. Not long after the central bank’s creation, however, monetary decision-making power was transferred away from regional member banks and consolidated in the Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve’s independence is presumably supported by its mandate to maintain stable prices. Yet central bank independence is challenged in two addi- tional ways. First, like any other public institution, the Federal Reserve responds to the potential for political oversight when faced with challenges.2 Consequently, its independence in conducting monetary policy is more assured when the economy is experiencing sustained growth and when there is low unemployment and price stabil- ity—but less so in a crisis.3 Additionally, political pressure has led the Federal Reserve to use its power to regulate banks as a way to promote politically favorable initiatives including those aligned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives.4 Even formal grants of power by Congress have not markedly improved Federal Reserve actions. Congress gave the Federal Reserve greater regulatory authority over banks after the stock market crash of 1929. During the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was given the power to set reserve requirements on banks and to regulate loans for the purchase of securities. During the stagflation of the 1970s, Congress expanded the Federal Reserve’s mandate to include “maximum employ- ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”5 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s banking and financial regulatory authorities were broadened even further. The Great Recession also led to innova- tions by the central bank such as additional large-scale asset purchases. Together, these expansions have created significant risks associated with “too big to fail” financial institutions and have facilitated government debt creation.6 Collec- tively, such developments have eroded the Federal Reserve’s economic neutrality. In essence, because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers with respect to monetary and regulatory policy, the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence. To protect the Federal Reserve’s independence and to improve monetary policy outcomes, Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money. This chapter provides a number of options aimed at achieving these goals along with the costs and benefits of each policy recommendation. These recommended reforms are divided into two parts: broad institutional changes and changes involv- ing the Federal Reserve’s management of the money supply. BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS l Eliminate the “dual mandate.” The Federal Reserve was originally created to “furnish an elastic currency” and rediscount commercial paper so that the supply of credit could increase along with the demand for money
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.